Ayub’s Era II: National Security and Foreign Policy Challenges - 3/3 (1962-65)
Understanding Pakistan Project Team September 6th, 2007
By: Athar Osama
Ever since its creation, Pakistan’s national security challenges, primarily a threat from India, had occupied the minds of its defense and foreign policy planners. Just months after the country’s creation, a war broke out with India over the disputed territory of Kashmir. A day after its founder—Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah—passed away, India invaded the independent state of Hyderabad and annexed it with brutal force. Nothing it seemed was safe from Indian designs and the Indian leaders had made it amply clear that they would like the renegade Pakistan to return back to Mother India. (Figure: President Ayub Khan with Mrs. Kennedy during their visit to Pakistan. Foreign Minister Bhutto is seen in the background).
Pakistan’s Search for Security through Western Alliances
In this age of extreme paranoia—based on a fear that was justifiable or not—Pakistan’s leaders began looking for defense alliances, primarily with Western countries, to seek some level of comfort and security for its defense needs. The military had always been a pro-Western factor in Pakistan’s politics. The forces have been heavily dependent on foreign military trade and aid for their hardware and training needs respectively. In the initial years of the country’s independence, Britain provided some additional military hardware to stuff Pakistan’s virtually empty military arsenals. Britain, however, was not willing to meet all the defense procurement needs of the new country for it was also on friendly terms with India as well. During the late 1950s, therefore, there was a sharp switch towards a pro-America stance in Pakistan’s foreign in national security policy. Pakistan Army’s defense needs led this movement while the Airforce and Navy largely remained dependent on Britain and France for their weaponry.
It was during this decade that Pakistan signed two defense pacts with United States and its allied countries. On Sept 8, 1954, Pakistan became a member of South East Asian Treaty Organization alongside Australia, France, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, United States and United Kingdom. SEATO was designed to be a Southeast Asian version of NATO, in which the military forces of each member would be coordinated to provide for the collective security for the members. SEATO did use portions of the military forces of its members in annual joint training maneuvers (Wikipedia: SEATO, 2007).
In 1955, Pakistan also became a member of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) or the Baghdad Pact alongside Iran, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Once again, modeled after the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), CENTO committed the nations to mutual cooperation and protection, as well as non-intervention in each other’s affairs. Its goal was to contain the Soviet Union by having a line of strong states along the USSR’s southwestern frontier (Wikipedia: CENTO, 2007). Both of these entities would ultimately go down in history as useless alliances—at least from Pakistan’s perspective, but also more generally—but the fact that Pakistan was desperately trying to create some measure of security for itself in this critical early period is quite well-established.
At that time, though, Pakistan was being seen a “bulwark” and a means to secure western influence in the cold war against the Soviet Union. Military aid starting flowing, albeit in fits and starts. In 1954, the United States government offered $29.5 million in military aid (Sattar, 2007, p. 58) against which Pakistani politicians and General Ayub Khan vociferously protested. They complained to the American counterparts that by taking on the US side in the cold war Pakistan was attracting Soviet wrath and the aid it received in return wasn’t substantial enough to justify that additional risk. The Americans complied and the economic assistance to the country was increased to $106 million in 1954 and military aid to $50 million in 1955. (ibid) In addition, US also gave the commitment to equip four infantry divisions, one armoured division, and another armoured brigade, to provide modern aircrafts for six squadrons for the air force and supply twelve vessels for the navy over the coming years. (Sattar, 2007, p. 59)
In March of 1958, General Ayub Khan—the Commander-in-Chief—and Air Marshal Asghar Khan—the Chief of Air Staff—visited the United States to try to improve the working relationship between the two countries (Cloughley, 1999, p. 47). Obviously the defense angle was perhaps foremost in the minds of the members of this delegation. Ayub received a red-carpet treatment during this visit and the General developed an instant rapport with the American leaders and even with certain sections of the public. Consequently, Ayub Khan’s assumption of power in the October 1958 coup was met with a silent approval from the United States and the West. On 2nd November 1958, major multi-national CENTO maneuvers began off the coast of the Karachi in which ships from Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, the UK, and the US participated. These were broadly construed as an approval of the Ayub’s actions by these governments (Cloughley, 1999, p. 46).
In the early years of the Ayub regime, the relationship between Pakistan and the United States warmed up considerably. In 1959, for instance, a CENTO-style pact of mutual cooperation was signed between Pakistan, United States, Iran, and Turkey to allow for joint action against external threats. On March 5, 1959, Pakistan signed “The Pakistan-United States Communications Unit Agreement” establishing Badaber airfield near Peshawar as a listening post into the Soviet Union by using this airfield to fly U-2s illegally over the Soviet territory (Cloughley, 1999, p. 48).
In April 1959, Pakistan signed Pakistan-US Cooperation Agreement. In this agreement the United States went as far as declaring it “regards as vital to its own interests and international peace the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan” and that “in the case of aggression against Pakistan…the United States of America…will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon…in order to assist Pakistan at its request” (quoted in: Sattar, 2007). Amidst this flurry of activity, Pakistan had acquired some measure of western support and sympathy for its security needs, or so thought its leaders.
While the objectives of the two countries, namely, United States and Pakistan, for seeking each other’s cooperation were clearly different, there was, at least temporarily, a commonalty of interests and many, especially in Pakistan, misconstrued that as serious alignment of the two destinies. The United States was clearly seeking a country willing to become a satellite, perhaps a proxy, or even a dependable ally in its war against the Soviet Union. Pakistan, over the years, has played each of these roles with some measure of dedication and distinction. Pakistan, on the other hand, was looking towards the United States for support and military assistance in fending off a possible offensive from India. The United States was only willing to go along as long as this aligned with its own above-cited objective. The first real test of this relationship came sooner rather than later…
Sino-India War of 1962
India and China have had rather cold relations within each other all through the 1950s, based primarily, on a border dispute in India’s northern region. The cause of the war was a dispute over the sovereignty of the widely-separated Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh border regions. Aksai Chin, claimed by India to belong to Kashmir and by China to be part of Xinjiang, contains an important road link that connects the Chinese regions of Tibet and Xinjiang. China’s construction of this road was one of the triggers of the conflict (Wikipedia, 2007). Arunachal Pradesh (called South Tibet by China) is also claimed by both nations—although it is roughly the size of Austria, it is sparsely inhabited (by numerous local tribes) due to its mountainous terrain. (Figure: A Life Magazine Cover focusing on the Sino-Indian War)
While the border dispute had been present at the time of creation of both India (1947) and China (1949), none of the countries were willing to go war over them, and were willing to let the border dispute festering for a while. In fact, India was more than eager to have cordial relationships with China and was one of the first countries to recognize China in 1949. Both India and China indicated officially that they had not territorial disputes but had claimed the Aksai Chin region in their own official documents (Wikipedia, 2007). In 1959, however, the Tibet Dispute in China and India’s support for the Separatists and the Dalai Lama resulted in considerable worsening in the relationship.
Various border conflicts and “military incidents” between India and China flared up throughout the summer and fall of 1962. During the period of June-July 1962, the Indian military planners began advocating “probing actions” against the Chinese, and accordingly, moved mountain troops forward to cut off Chinese supply lines. According to Patterson, the Indian motives were threefold:
1. Test Chinese resolve and intentions regarding India.
2. Test whether India would enjoy Soviet backing in the event of a Sino-Indian war.
3. Create sympathy for India within the US, with whom relations had deteriorated after the Indian annexation of Goa.
Nehru, bolstered by an abrasive defense minister and incompetent generals had decided to call China’s bluff. But it wasn’t a bluff. It was Nehru’s generals who were bluffing (Cloughley, 1999, p. 53). In the coming weeks and months, these skirmishes only increased in frequency and intensity and on Oct 10, 1962, war broke out between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Indian Army. During over the next forty days of fighting, the Chinese Army inflicted heavy losses on the Indian military. The war ended on November 20, 1962 with China having captured both disputed territories and unilaterally declaring ceasefire once its objectives were achieved.
The Indian Army had been soundly defeated—to the point of humiliation—and from that “nothing but good could have come for Pakistan” (Cloughley, 1999, p.53). The complete victory of the People’s Liberation Army raised many eyebrows in the western capitals where the rise of “Red China” was seen as yet another front on the cold-war battle between communism and capitalism. The leaders of the so called “free world” panicked instantaneously.
The Kennedy administration was disturbed by what they considered blatant Chinese communist aggression against India. In a May 1963 National Security Council meeting, contingency planning on the part of the United States in the event of another Chinese attack on India was discussed. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor advised the president to use nuclear weapons should the Americans intervene in such a situation. Kennedy insisted that Washington defend India as it would any ally, saying, “We should defend India, and therefore we will defend India”. The Johnson Administration even considered, but then rejected the idea of giving nuclear weapons technology to the Indians. (Wikipedia, 2007)
To much annoyance and dismay of Pakistan, the western countries once deemed as friends against a possible aggression by India now lined up to arm India against another possible attack against China. Nehru asked for fighter aircraft from the US, artillery from the UK, tanks from France, and got most of what he wanted. The US compliance of these requests to arm India was widely seen as a violation of the “assurance of prior consultation” personally given by President Kennedy to Ayub Khan in the latter’s visit to the United States 1961 (Arif, 2001, p. 39; Sattar, 2007, p. 64).
Pakistan had been, perhaps the first but certainly not the last time, been ditched by its allies in the West in its own ideological war against India.
The Kashmir Issue and the Worsening in Pakistan – India Relations
The relationship between Pakistan and India had been strained almost right from the day of the partition. We have already covered the harrowing events of the partition that resulted in massacres of unimaginable cruelty. Once the dust on the partition settled, the issue of the disputed territory of Kashmir became the bone of contention between the two countries.
The diplomatic efforts on the resolution of the Kashmir dispute began in on November 16th 1947 when Liaquat Ali Khan proposed a request to the United Nations to send it representatives to stop the fighting and repression in Kashmir. On November 21st, however, Nehru, while rejecting Liaquat’s request, replied that it was not clear what the UN could do to help (Sattar, 2007, p. 25). On January 1, 1948, India itself filed a complaint in the UNSC against Pakistan asking the Council to call upon Pakistan to stop giving assistance to the invaders in Kashmir. By the time the Council began deliberations on the issue, Pakistan had also filed a counter complaint accusing India of genocide and refuting the validity of Maharaja’s accession.
On January 20th, UNSC created the UN Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to ascertain the facts and exercise mediatory influence. On April 21st 1948, Council passed a resolution “noting with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the question of accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic way of a free and impartial plebiscite…” (Sattar, 2007, p. 26). When India, in contravention of this resolution, began another spring offensive in 1948, Pakistan sent three brigades to troops to reinforce defense lines held in Azad Kashmir in May (ibid). This led to another UNSC resolution in August of 1948 providing for ceasefire, a truce agreement, and a plebiscite. Throughout 1949, the proposals made by UNCIP for reduction of forces in Kashmir were rejected by India.
On December 23, 1952, Frank P. Graham, a UN nominated representative again made recommendations to reduce forces in Kashmir. Pakistan accepted the resolution but India, once again, rejected it. Graham continued in his efforts to bring India around to demilitarization and in the process published five more reports until 1958 but with no result. In June 1953, Prime Minister Bogra held meetings with Nehru (pictured above) to try to make a bilateral breakthrough. Both leaders, once again, affirmed the right of self-determination and impartial plebiscite. However, soon after this meeting Nehru called off the entire dialogue stating that Pakistan’s contemplated military pact with America was a “qualitative change of circumstances” and “will affect the major questions…more especially, the Kashmir Issue”.
Pakistan’s ex-Foreign Secretary and Minister Abdus Sattar, in his “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Concise History”, writes that:
“Pakistan’s alliance with other countries could neither absolve India of its obligations under UN resolutions nor prejudice the recognized right of self-determination of the people of Kashmir…India’s argument that Pakistan’s defense pact with the United States represented ‘change in circumstances’ releasing India from its obligations under the UN resolutions was totally inadmissible in law and logic. Bad faith was also writ large on India’s plea that a decision by Kashmiris in favor of Pakistan would prejudice India’s secular character and political unity”
The Soviet Union, already perturbed by Pakistan’s increasing closeness with the United States now came down heavily in India’s favor with the result that every UNSC resolution on Kashmir since then has been vetoed by the Soviet Union on India’s behalf and the diplomatic track on the resolution of the Kashmir dispute has been reduced to a naught.
This frustration with India’s position on Kashmir issue and lack of progress on the diplomatic front then became the backdrop of the gradual worsening of the India Pakistan relations in the early 1960s. In early 1965, fighting took place between Pakistan and India army troops in the coastal area of Runn of Kutch between Karachi and Bombay. On April 4, 1965, an Indian patrol overcame a Pakistani garrison of fort of Kanjarkot at an outpost called Ding. Pakistanis sent in army reinforcements and after only a minor amount of fighting, the Pakistan army pushed the Indians back. It was a little campaign, won by superior tactics (Cloughley, 1999, p. 54). Ceasefire came into effect on June 30th and an international commission to adjudicate the boundary was appointed.
There are conflicting opinions on the significance of this small incident. Brian Cloughley (1999) in a supposedly “independent” assessment notes that the significance of Rann of Kutch affair “was the false sense optimism and superiority engendered within the Pakistan army concerning its ability to fight a war with India.” He acknowledges, though, that “there is little doubt that India was still spoiling for a war” but asserts that “equally there is little doubt that Pakistan tweaked India’s ultra sensitive tail just a bit too much” (Cloughley, 1999, p. 55)
General K. M. Arif, in his biography, note that “If India had planned to wash off the stigma of her 1962 defeat by achieving a military success in the Rann of Kutch, her plans misfired” (Arif, 2001, p.40). He notes that the Rann of Kutch affair created a political storm in New Delhi with Mr. U. M. Trivadi—an assembly member—asking the India Military forces to go “right up to Lahore to bring Pakistan to its senses” (p. 42) and others wanting a revenge by attacking Karachi. He notes that “the mood in Pakistan was buoyant….the military morale could not have been higher” (p. 43).
These circumstances, and the lack of progress on the Kashmir question ultimately forced Pakistani leadership, most notably, President General Ayub Khan, Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed, and some generals in the GHQ and northern command (e.g. General Akhtar Hussain Malik) to start planning a military operation to “unfreeze” the Kashmir issue and bring it to the attention of the world. This operation, code named Operation Gibraltar, was the starting point of what would ultimately become the India – Pakistan war of 1965.
We will look at the motivation and planning for Operation Gibraltar and Operation Grand Slam in the first part of the next episode (on Wednesday). We’ll then look at 1965 Ground War between India and Pakistan on the second of the three parts of the next episode (on Friday), and conclude this episode of the 1965 War by looking at the air war and the ceasefire agreement in the third part of the three-part episode (on Saturday)
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