Understanding Pakistan Project

Athar Osama July 23rd, 2007

 By: Athar Osama

The Reluctant General or the “President-in-Waiting”?

It is often claimed that Pakistan Army was an unwilling recipient of political power at the time when Ayub Khan took over the reigns of the country that it only stepped in when all political options had failed miserably and Pakistan was on a brink of becoming an irrelevant state. While there is some truth to the contention that myopic Pakistani politicians of the 1950s had failed miserably in achieving consensus on only a handful of important, albeit contentious, constitutional issues such as the relationship between Pakistani provinces, between provinces and the center, and the role of religion in the Pakistani state, and in doing so had lost the initiative completely, it would also be a incorrect to put the entire blame of this on the politicians alone.

Ever since its independence in 1947, with the minor exception of the first four years under Jinnah and Liaquat, Pakistan had been ruled by bureaucrats and bureaucrats-turned-politicians under the guise of a democratic dispensation. These bureaucrats were openly contemptuous of the politicians and did not let any opportunity go by to either make them appear incompetent or remove them from power, if necessary. The story of the second part of the first decade of governance in Pakistan (1952-58) can hardly be termed as democracy in the same way as it is often conceived in the western world or even practiced at that very time in neighboring India.

While the Army was a silent spectator in this game of one-upmanship between the politicians and the bureaucrats for much of this time—during majority of which the bureaucrats ruled from behind the scenes—it was by no means a disinterested in spectator. The story of Pakistan Army’s involvement in the country’s politics—behind the scenes at first, much more flagrant later on—is the essentially the story of one man’s military professionalism and political aspirations.

General Mohammad Ayub Khan became the first Pakistani to have become the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army in 1951 (Wikipedia, 2007). Born in 1907 in NWFP as a son to a risaldar-major in the British Indian Army, Ayub Khan went to the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in 1926 and fought in Burma during the second world-war. At the time of the Partition, Ayub was a Brigadier in the Boundary Force established to quell violence in Punjab—and while the venture failed miserably, the experience would have a profound impact on his outlook in life and towards India. In these early days, as General Officer Commanding (GOC) of East Pakistan in 1948, Ayub also showed considerable political acumen and the ability to make compromises where necessary (Cloughley, 1999, p. 24).  

This was a time when the Pakistan Army, like every other in the country, was a struggling institution. There was little or no discipline, training, or esprit de corps in the military. Ayub Khan, after becoming the Commander-in-Chief set about transforming the military. Almost immediately after Ayub Khan took over the reigns, he was faced with the Rawalpindi Conspiracy affair in which Major-General Akbar Khan and his colleagues attempted a coup against Liaquat Ali Khan government. Ayub was brutal in his handling of the affair. He also dramatically increased the field exercises of the Army knowing fully well that not only would they benefit the professional training of the rank and file but also that a “barrack-bound” army is recipe for mischief (Cloughley, 1999, p. 27).

Back at the GHQ in Rawalpindi, he also invested heavily in improving the living conditions and benefits of the soldiery and in re-writing the training doctrines of the army. In 1953, Ayub visited the United States with the then Prime Minister and Pakistan signed SEATO and CENTO in 1954 and 1955 respectively. In the 1954, as well, the United States and Pakistan signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement that provided Pakistan with access to modern equipment—not available from Britain at that time—and training support urgently needed to modernize the Army. Ayub wanted to create an efficient Army—one that was modernized in every way—and his early efforts at paid handsome dividends in that respect. In a matter of years, Ayub was able to make a dramatic difference on the standard of the Army and in doing so had not only won the loyalty of his troops but also had become somewhat of a national figure.  (Figure: General Ayub Khan meeting a group of ex-Servicemen. He invested heavily in the welfare of his permanent “constituency”)

As the Army grew to be confident and proficient, its Commander-in-Chief also became more confident of his own position and began looking at other elements of the national equation. One early incident highlights Army’ growing clout on the national scene as well as the political aspirations of its leaders. One was the Anti-Ahmediyya riots of 1953 when Army was reluctantly called in by Khawaja Nazimuddin to quell the violence and stabilize Lahore.  Major General Mohammad Azam Khan—later a Minister in Ayub Khan’s martial law cabinet—was the GOC of Lahore at that time and he left no stone unturned to demonstrate Army’s superiority over the fighting politicians and Mullahs. General K. M. Arif—The Vice Chief of Army Staff during Zia’s days, in his Khaki Shadows: Pakistan (1947-97), writes:

“The Army brass was elated at succeeding in a task in which the civil administration had failed. The military action—firm and fair—was hailed by the public. This public response might have given ideas to the top military leaders that a repetition of the martial law in the future would not provoke a negative reaction from the masses…[Major General Azam Khan] cleverly launched a media campaign to publicize the jawans and to the display his own authority. The military tasted the heady effects of publicity when its performance in civil affairs was reported widely in the print media in superlative adjectives. The Lahore martial law enhanced the image of the military and inflated the ego of its top brass…The slogans of Pakistan Army Zindabad in the streets of Lahore, and pro-Army publicity in state controlled and state-influenced media was a high potency tonic to the Army. To project the Army as the (only) savior of the country was a dangerous and short-sighted scheme. But those who mattered were most interested in quick and tactical gains.”  (Arif, 2001, p.11)

While General Arif is correct in the dangerous precedent this single incident—and many others after that—had set for the country and for the spoiling of Army’s professional and impartial role as the defenders of the country’s frontiers, he is probably half-true in claiming that these were mere tactical maneuvers by some generals. Gradually, Army had become interested in the country’s politics and the notion that “if Punjab could be sorted out in a few days—why not the whole country, if that were to be required?” (Cloughley, 1999, p. 38) was becoming quite common within the Army’s top brass and soldiery alike. In 1953/54 for instance, Ayub Khan wrote a paper titled “A short appreciation of present and future problems of Pakistan”—a lengthy and comprehensive analysis totally political in content that demonstrates, in the words of General K. M. Arif, “that the scheme had long been in the mind of its author” (Arif, 2001, p. 25).

Ayub had become a Commander-in-Chief at an early age of forty-one. Having served his regular tenure as C-in-C for four years, Ayub got two extensions, one in 1955 and then another in 1958. Despite spending eight years at the helm of the Army, however, he was just too young to have faded away. While he had advised his Army to stay away from politics, this was not an advice that he took for himself. In 1954, after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly by Ghulam Mohammad, Ayub was offered a position in the Federal Cabinet as the Defense Minister—one that he readily accepted. In his own book, he justifies this acceptance by stating that “The one consideration that made accept this offer was that I wanted to act as a buffer between the politicians and the armed forces”. However, contends Brian Coughley (1999), in his The History of Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections, that:

“…there was more to it than that. Ayub despised most politicians for their lack of dedication to Pakistan and for their seeking of power for its own sake….Ayub wanted to provide national direction as well as lead the Army. It is open question, however, if he should have remained Commander-in-Chief in addition to being a member of the cabinet as defense minister”. (Cloughley, 1999, p. 35)

The journey from here to Ayub’s Martial Law is traced in an earlier episode of this write-up, however, it is worth noting here that Ayub Khan was not as disinterested an observer as he may have been liked to be projected. That he was deeply distressed by the country’s circumstances and the political games that went on for the first few years of the nation’s independence is understandable but in thinking that the army’s involvement in the country’s politics would straighten things out was naïve, at best. Having imposed martial law on the country in 1958, not only did Ayub Khan realize the indispensability of political institutions but also ultimately learnt-the hard way—the futility of trying to sweep Pakistan’s many complex and real constitutional and political problems under the rug. While the military rule did provide temporary relief to the country, it also created or festered many more problems—problems that ultimately led to the break-up of Pakistan and the disgrace of Pakistan Army. We will visit these in due course of time, but first Pakistan under Ayub Khan’s martial law.

Initial developments and Successes of Ayub’s Martial Law Regime

On 7th October 1958 at 10:30 pm, Major-General Iskander Mirza—the first President of Pakistan—issued a proclamation declaring martial law within the country. The 1400 word proclamation dismissed central and provincial governments, dissolved central and provincial assemblies, abolished political parties, and appointed General Ayub Khan as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Pakistan and the Chief Martial Law Administrator. The proclamation, notes Herbert Feldman, in the Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of Martial Law Administration, concluded:

“For all these reasons, and to avert a bloody revolution which [those same] politicians had threatened, the country must first be taken to sanity by peaceful revolution and then a constitution that would be devised more suited to the genius of the Muslim people”. (Feldman, 1967, p.2)

In his own broadcast to the nation on 8th October 1958, General Ayub Khan, for the first time publicly, lamented the politicians of the country as he warned:

“A word for the disruptionists, political opportunists, smugglers, black marketeers, and other such social vermin, sharks, and leeches. The soldiers and the people are sick of the sight of you. So, it will be good for yourself to turn a new leaf and begin to behave, otherwise retribution will be swift and sure” (quoted in Cloughley, 1999, p. 42)

These words certainly do not appear to come from one on whom responsibility had been thrust over night. The October coup certainly appeared to be a pre-mediated affair. There was also an unequivocal promise of the return to democracy “but of a type that people can understand and work with” (Feldman, 1967, p.4). It was also noted that maximum possible attempt will be made to use the civilian institutions within the country, but martial law regulations will be introduced to tighten the law on malingering and inefficiency among officials, bribery, corruption, hoarding, smuggling, and other types of anti-social activity (ibid). On Oct 9th, 1958, first batch of Martial Law Regulations – 29 in number – were published that dealt with establishment of Martial Law Zones, Summary Military Courts (and the scales and types of punishment to be awarded by these courts) and imposition of military pre-censorship on matters touching the martial law.

Two specific offences (MLR 6 & 7) for which the delinquent was to suffer death and no less punishment were for those assisting the “recalcitrants” or joining them (MLR 3 defined “recalcitrant” as any external enemy of Pakistan, mutineers, rebels or rioters etc.). There was clearly an implication here—unfortunate, though—that anybody opposing the martial law regime was, by implication, an enemy of Pakistan and could be punished under this article. Feldman (1967, p.5) notes, though, that:

“It is now a matter of history that no specific accusation of any person, to this effect, was ever made and no one was ever charged with being such. No trial, conviction, or punishment under MLR 6 & 7 ever took place and there can be no doubt that these two Regulations were minatory in purpose and completely successful. The fact is that after Martial Law was promulgated not a single voice, defending lost liberty, was heard. No one raised a hand; not a barricade was mounted. No one lost his life; not a single drop of blood was shed; and the constitution quietly expired, quite possibly unlamented, but certainly without a published word of obsequy from even its most devoted admirers.”   

Indeed, the common man had already begun to see relief. Within ninety six hours of these changes, the prices of consumer goods had fallen by 25% of goods such as textiles, medicines, watches, cooking spices, ghee, and eggs (Feldman, 1967, p. 5) and trade unions all across the country had started coming with revised price lists. This started a buying spree among the people and arrangements had to be made to discourage people from over-buying. Military and police parties also began raiding—with much success—businessmen and go-downs suspected of hoarding food and other items.

Martial Law Regulations were also issued with an objective of inducing and teaching civic values and responsibility, for example, cleanliness, hygiene, and civic well-being. In Karachi, for instance, urinating on streets was made punishable by one year in jail; molesting women by five years; begging by six months and whipping; and throwing litter on streets was also made punishable.

The government also began a movement to arrest corrupt and anti-federation politicians. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan in NWFP, G. M. Syed in Sindh, and Maulana Bhashani in East Pakistan were arrested under Security of Pakistan Act. Several East Pakistani politicians and senior civil servants were also arrested under East Pakistan Anti-Corruption Act of 1957. The Martial Law government established information centers throughout the country that could receive public information about undesirable and anti-social activities through phone, personal visit, or in writing and act upon it.

With the tremendous speed and efficiency with which the army had provided relief to the common people, it won kudos from the general population. Ayub Khan insisted that the Martial Law Regime was a benign one and “only intended to help the civil power to clear up the existing mess” (Feldman, 1967, p. 10). Indeed, as quickly as the military’s presence became visible on the streets on Oct 8th, it began to recede as well. On October 25th, President Iskander Mirza constituted a new cabinet to replace an advisory council set up in the interim. This included, among others, Ayub Khan (as Prime Minister), Lt. Gen Azam Khan (Rehabilitation), Lt. Gen Burki (Health and Social Welfare), Lt. Gen. Sheikh (Interior), and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Commerce).  (Figure: The Talent Cabinet of Ayub Khan)

These were sworn in on Oct. 27th, 1958. On the same night, three Generals went to President Iskander Mirza and informed him, on behalf of the new Prime Minister, that he “had been too much associated with politicians responsible for bringing about the state of affairs in the country” and was therefore asked to resign. The office of the Prime Minister was abolished and the General Ayub Khan became the President of Pakistan. What transpired within the 12 hours between the swearing in of the Prime Minister who was willing to serve under Iskander Mirza and the time when the latter was disposed off remains a mystery. Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan were no strangers to each other. They both knew each others objectives and aspirations and it is clear that they were taking calculated risks in pursuit of their own interests. While Iskander Mirza was dependent upon Ayub Khan for the imposition of Martial Law to get rid of the politicians, he was also aware of the latter’s interest in political power. Ayub Khan, on the other hand, would have clearly clinched power sooner or later had Iskander Mirza not provided him with an opportunity to do so in the October coup. He only remained loyal to his benefactor until he found an opportunity to firmly put himself in control (i.e. the leader of a Supreme Court-validated coup and the Prime Minister and heir apparent of a weak and outgoing President) and dumped him at the first possible instance that he could. Iskander Mirza had clearly over-played his cards and lost in his game of political power.

On October 27, 1958, General Mohammad Ayub Khan’s tenure as the second President of Pakistan—the name “Islamic Republic of Pakistan” had been dropped as per a Presidential Order—began. On Wednesday (July 25, 2007), we will look at the accomplishments and disappointments of the first three years of Ayub Khan’s Martial Law “Revolution”.

• Iskander Mirza , Ayub Khan , Military , 1958-1962