1962-1965 | Understanding Pakistan Project

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Ayub’s Era II: National Security and Foreign Policy Challenges - 3/3 (1962-65)

Understanding Pakistan Project Team September 6th, 2007

By: Athar Osama

Ever since its creation, Pakistan’s national security challenges, primarily a threat from India, had occupied the minds of its defense and foreign policy planners. Just months after the country’s creation, a war broke out with India over the disputed territory of Kashmir. A day after its founder—Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah—passed away, India invaded the independent state of Hyderabad and annexed it with brutal force. Nothing it seemed was safe from Indian designs and the Indian leaders had made it amply clear that they would like the renegade Pakistan to return back to Mother India. (Figure: President Ayub Khan with Mrs. Kennedy during their visit to Pakistan. Foreign Minister Bhutto is seen in the background).

Pakistan’s Search for Security through Western Alliances

In this age of extreme paranoia—based on a fear that was justifiable or not—Pakistan’s leaders began looking for defense alliances, primarily with Western countries, to seek some level of comfort and security for its defense needs. The military had always been a pro-Western factor in Pakistan’s politics. The forces have been heavily dependent on foreign military trade and aid for their hardware and training needs respectively. In the initial years of the country’s independence, Britain provided some additional military hardware to stuff Pakistan’s virtually empty military arsenals. Britain, however, was not willing to meet all the defense procurement needs of the new country for it was also on friendly terms with India as well. During the late 1950s, therefore, there was a sharp switch towards a pro-America stance in Pakistan’s foreign in national security policy. Pakistan Army’s defense needs led this movement while the Airforce and Navy largely remained dependent on Britain and France for their weaponry.

Kashmir , Relations with India , Relations with US , United Nations , Foreign Policy , Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto , 1962-1965 , Military , Ayub Khan , History in a Nutshell
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Ayub Era-II: Fact and Fiction Of Ayub’s “Economic Miracle” - 2/3 (1962-65)

Athar Osama August 20th, 2007

By: Athar Osama*

In the last episode of this series, we looked at Pakistan under Ayub Khan’s “Presidential” Democracy during the second part (1962-65) of his three-part 11-year tenure at the helm of the affairs. Prior to that, we had also looked the early-years of the Martial Law regime that, owing to the intensity of its policy activism, saw some dramatic changes in a whole array of policy domains. In this episode we dig deeper into two key areas policy change in Ayub Era, namely, economic and foreign policy.

(Figure -Right: Ayub Khan’s “Talent Cabinet” which was responsible for much of the regime’s policies during the 1960s. Notice: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto–who was a portege of Ayub Khan–and is known to have called the latter “daddy” on occasions.)

During the early-to-mid 1960s, Pakistan saw what appeared to be dramatic advancements in its economic affairs. In the 1960s, Pakistan’s economic progress is known to have been an envy of a number of Asian countries. It was also during this era that Pakistan’s economic planning processes, institutions, and documents—particularly the Second Five-Year Plan—are known to have been adopted by countries like South Korea who themselves where trying to chart a development trajectory for themselves. This recognition aside, Ayub’s economic policies are perhaps one of the most misunderstood aspects of this 11-year rule. While there is little disagreement on the growth rates that Pakistan experienced in GDP, industry, and agriculture during Ayub Khan’s era, what experts tend to disagree upon is how that growth occurred and what were its implications on Pakistan’s economy and society (Zaidi, 1999, p. 97). We look at Ayub’s industrial and agricultural policies, in particular, to see how they fared and why.

On the foreign policy front too, Ayub Government found itself in the midst of some truly significant changes and events and the actions it took—or failed to take—had serious repercussions for Pakistan. In fact many have argued that the 1965 War between India and Pakistan which, in many ways, Ayub and his advisors—Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, being the main protagonist—brought upon themselves marked the beginning of the end of Ayub’s Era. Before we look into that next week, we will examine how we got there. But first, a closer look at Ayub’s economic “miracle”…

Trade and Industrial Policy and Development in the Sixties

Pakistan had inherited an industrial base that was at a very nascent stage of its development. In its statement of industrial policy in 1948, the Government of Pakistan stated that:

“The most striking feature of Pakistan’s present economy is the marked contrast between its vast natural resources and its extreme industrial backwardness. A country producing nearly 75% of the world’s production of jute does not possess even a single jute mill…” (quoted in Zaidi, 1999, p. 91)

Ayub Khan , Industry , Agriculture , Economics , Inter-Provincial Relations , 1962-1965 , East Pakistan , History in a Nutshell
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Ayub Khan Era II: Pakistan Under Presidential “Democracy” - 1/3 (1962-65)

Athar Osama August 6th, 2007

In the last episode, we looked at the first four years of Ayub Khan Martial Law in Pakistan. This period, as the write up indicated, was marked with tremendous amount of progress, policy activism, and legislation on a number of different fronts. Philip E. Jones, in his doctoral dissertation titled “Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power”, notes that Ayub’s martial law regime evolved its policies around three main objectives:

The first objective of the martial law regime was the expansion and rationalization of national authority whereby an attempt was made to “replace the negativism of self, group, and provincial interest with a positive programme of national development” (p. 27). Ayub and his fellow generals and technocrats believed that “prolonged effectiveness was sufficient to bring legitimacy to the institutions and the programs that he sponsored” (ibid).
The second objective of the martial law regime focused on rapid economic development. This was achieved through expansion in state’s economic planning capacity and creation of institutions for central planning, policy innovation, and implementation. Ayub relied on experts and specialists—as against the generalist bureaucrats, as has been the case in the past decade—that formed the core of his policy-making apparatus. A number of new state organs were developed, e.g. Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) and Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) to facilitate in this activity.
The third and final objective of the martial law regime was the stabilization of the political process by “depoliticizing it through institutional innovation”. This was primarily achieved through the creation and implementation of his Basic Democracies Scheme to create a loyal cadre of people willing and able to indirectly participate in the political process and the usage of EBDO regulations to clean the political field of rival politicians. (Jones, 2003, p. 26-8)

General Mohammad Ayub Khan—by now a Self-Appointed Field Marshall—seemed a different kind of Chief Martial Law Administrator than the ones Pakistan has seen since, namely, Generals Yahya, Zia , and Musharraf.