After Lal Masjid, A Battle for Pakistan’s Soul
Understanding Pakistan Project Team August 29th, 2007
Guest Column* By: Ibn-e-Khuldun
In this piece, witten in the immediate aftermath of the Lal Masjid Episode but being published for the first time, Khuldun talks about the challenges posed by the dual extremism of Taliban-style theocrats and the promoters of Enlightened Moderation who are tearing the Pakistani society apart….
The Lal Masjid episode that had–quite predictably–eaten up the media bandwidth for several months ended in a somewhat predicted–although still very deplorable–blood bath–on last Tuesday. The high drama that came to its (anti-) climax that day has left more questions unanswered than answers it may have provided. Whether or not this was really, as alleged by the Opposition and many in the media, a diversionary tactic on the part of the Musharraf Government to sideline the epic constitutional battle being faught just across the road on the Constitution Avenue, one can only speculate.
It did, however, once again put Musharraf and his brand of “saviors” firmly in charge of the “savage” millions in Pakistan and has established, in the eyes of the West and its media, the often-repeated (by his government) “indispensibility” of his dictatorial rule in Pakistan. Add on top of that the fact that there are serious allegations that the two brothers in Lal Masjid had been in the pay of the agencies, and that it is next to impossible for anybody–no matter how slick or smart he was–to operate with such imputiny in the heavily “watched and monitored” city of Islamabad for years, and the conincidences just get too many for most of us to digest.
Regardless, however, of whether the Lal Masjid espisode was a bold and audacious attempt on the part of a bunch of Mullahs and their naive followers to enforce their brand of Shariah on a country of 150 million or a creation of Masharraf and his agencies themselves, what is amply clear is that it represents a society on a collision course with itself.
I am not complaining that establishing the writ of law within the country–something that the Lal Masjid Mullahs and their followers had repeatedly flouted over the last few months by taking the law in their own hands or by attempting to establish a parallel judicial system–is not an important objective. I think it is absolutely important to do so and nobody must be allowed to flout our laws. What I am complaining, however, is the more-than-just-suspicious and brutal manner in which Operation Silence was carried out and, more importantly, how and why did we let the things reach this far in the first place?
If there is an address, an exact location for the rift tearing Pakistan apart, and possibly the world, it is a spot 17 miles (28 kilometers) west of Islamabad called the Margalla Pass. Here, at a limestone cliff in the middle of Pakistan, the mountainous west meets the Indus River Valley, and two ancient, and very different, civilizations collide. To the southeast, unfurled to the horizon, lie the fertile lowlands of the Indian subcontinent, realm of peasant farmers on steamy plots of land, bright with colors and the splash of serendipitous gods. To the west and north stretch the harsh, windswept mountains of Central Asia, land of herders and raiders on horseback, where man fears one God and takes no prisoners.
Many well-known Pakistani political commentators seem bent upon trivializing Lal Masjid. Although its bloody siege now enters into its fifth day, for them the comic sight of the bearded Maulana Abdul Aziz fleeing in a burqa is proof that this episode was mere puppet theatre. They say it was enacted byhidden hands within the government, expressly created to distract attention away from General Musharraf’s mounting problems, as well as to prove to his supporters in the West that he remains the last bulwark against Islamic extremism. The writers conclude that this is a contrived problem, not a real one. They are dead wrong. Lal Masjid underscores the danger of runaway religious radicalism in Pakistan. It calls for urgent and wide-ranging action.
That the crisis could have been averted is beyond doubt. The Lal Masjid militants were given a free hand by the government to kidnap and intimidate. For months, under the nose of Pakistan’s super-vigilant intelligence agencies, large quantities of arms and fuel were smuggled inside to create a fearsome fortress in the heart of Pakistan’s capital. Even after Jamia Hafsa students went on their violent rampages in February 2007, no attempt was made to cut off the electricity, gas, phone, or website – or even to shut down their illegal FM radio station. Operating as a parallel government, the mullah duo, Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi and Maulana Abdul Aziz, ran their own Islamic court. They received the Saudi Arabian ambassador on the mosque premises, and negotiated with the Chinese ambassador for the release of his country’s kidnapped nationals. But for the outrage expressed by China, Pakistan’s all-weather ally, the status quo would have continued.
Concerns over Islamic extremism, extensive in the West even before this month’s terrorist attacks in London, are shared to a considerable degree by the publics in several predominantly Muslim nations surveyed. Nearly three-quarters of Moroccans and roughly half of those in Pakistan, Turkey and Indonesia see Islamic extremism as a threat to their countries. At the same time, most Muslim publics are expressing less support for terrorism than in the past. Confidence in Osama bin Laden has declined markedly in some countries and fewer believe suicide bombings that target civilians are justified in the defense of Islam.
In non-Muslim countries, fears of Islamic extremism are closely associated with worries about Muslim minorities. Western publics believe that Muslims in their countries want to remain distinct from society, rather than adopt their nation’s customs and way of life. Moreover, there is a widespread perception in countries with significant Muslim minorities, including the U.S., that resident Muslims have a strong and growing sense of Islamic identity. For the most part, this development is viewed negatively, particularly in Western Europe. In France, Germany and the Netherlands, those who see a growing sense of Islamic identity among resident Muslims overwhelmingly say this is a bad thing.
While we should all be thankful to Allah Almighty for giving us this piece of land, that we can call our home, and its people, our people, we should also not leave any stone unturned to make this piece of land the envy of the world. We are far from that aspiration and there is a long way to go. In fact, some of us may argue that we aren’t even moving in the right direction. Ironically, Pakistan is a country that has not yet come to terms with some of the most important questions that must define a country’s march into the future:
to create in 1947? Surely I cannot say anything new on this venerable and much-discussed historical subject; the experts know much more. But, as we approach Pakistan’s sixtieth anniversary, the matter of Jinnah and the Islamic State is still a hot one. It is confounded both by the wishful thinking of my well-meaning liberal friends, as well as conveniences invented at different times by Pakistan’s military, political, and religious establishments. Therefore, it seems to me that objectivity, honesty, and clarity are still desperately needed if we are to clean out old cobwebs and chart a new course for the future of our country.
Today being the 60th anniversary of Pakistan’s independence is an opportunate moment to look at Quaid-e-Azam’s vision of Pakistan delivered 60 years ago, by Mr. Jinnah, Pakistan’s undisputed Leader, Governor General and elected President of the Constituent Assembly elaborated his vision for the future of Pakistan.
According Allama G. A. Pervez Allama Iqbal was the real intellectual force behind the notion of an Islamic state and Jinnah was merely an agent to implement Iqbal’s idea. In the above-cited piece, this how he explains: 
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