Archive for the 'Foreign Policy' Category

Pakistan - India War of 1965: The Ground War - 2/3 (1965)

Athar Osama September 15th, 2007

By: Athar Osama 

In the first of this three part episode, we looked at the War in Kashmir that began as a precursor to the broader conflict between India and Pakistan. Hostilities began on August 5th and 6th 1965 when Pakistan army regulars infiltrated the Cease Fire Line (CFL) in Kashmir. On August 7th 1965, Pakistani forces carried out a raid in the Kargil area to cut off the road links between Srinagar and Ladakh. Between August 12th and 16th, Pakistan continued its attack on an Indian Army post in Kargil accompanied by shelling in the Chhamb sector. Increasingly, both countries were employing their regular forces in these operations and a low-intensity localized war was already underway.

(Figure: A Map of Pakistan-India War of 1965: The Ground Battles created by the author is on the next page. Please click below.)

 Brian Cloughley, in his “A History of Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections”, notes:

“There were statements in the respective parliaments, letters to the UN, and briefings of international media, but there was sense of buying time. On the Pakistan sided, it was still hoped that the actions of the Mujahids would persuade the population of the valley to rise up, whereafter the Pakistani regular troops could be deployed with a semblance of legality. The Indians were not averse to escalation of the conflict as it would, in their view, provide an opportunity to make up for the humiliation in the Runn of Kutch and settle things once and for all with their recalcitrant neighnour. They wanted to “get at and smash the Pakistani war machine’” (Cloughley, 1999, p. 63)

Here are a few videos of the 1965 War. The first of these is a typical motivational video (with a Pakistani-bent) that puts together a collage of pictures from the war itself. The second video (next page) is an Indian video of similar nature. The difference between how same events are potrayed by the popular press and public in the two countries couldn’t have been more stark. The third video (next page) is a brief actual clip of the War, perhaps taken from a Pakistani news report. (Courtesy: YouTube.com)

1965 War, Pakistan Vs india
03:40

Continue Reading »

Pakistan - India War of 1965: The War in Kashmir – 1/3 (1965)

Athar Osama September 6th, 2007

By: Athar Osama

pk-220px-Time_ayub_shastri.jpgThe origins of the 1965 War between Pakistan and India, its conduct over the course of several weeks, and its consequences are quite complex for one to be able to do justice with it. Add on top of that the fact that countries engage in one-upmanship to try to make exaggerated accusations of who started the war and claims of victory after it ends, primarily in order to manage “public opinion” at home, and it really gets very difficult and tricky. One additional unfortunate factor in lack of quality reporting on the 1965 War was the attempt by Pakistani leadership—both military and civilian—to attempt to destroy the evidence of the circumstances that actually led to this war. General K. M. Arif, in his biography “Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-97” for instance writes that in the immediate aftermath of the 1965 War:

“Pakistan suffered a loss of a different kind…Soon after the War the GHQ ordered all the formations and units of the Pakistan Army to destroy their respective war diaries and submit completed reports to this effect by a given date. This was done…Their [the war diaries’] destruction, a self-inflicted injury and an irreparable national loss, was intellectual suicide.”

                                    — General Khalid Mehmood Arif, Vice Chief of Army Staff, Pakistan Army

While unofficial accounts of the 1965 War by several Pakistani figures that participated in that war, including Ayub’s biographer Altaf Gauhar, Major General Shaukat Riza, Lt. General Gul Hassan, and General Mohammad Musa have since come to the fore, the “official” version of Pakistan’s military plans and objectives from that and how the performance of our commanders and troops differed from these have not surfaced.

Additionally, no effort has been made to systematically evaluate Pakistan’s strategic and operational plans and attempt to learn some lessons from the preparation and conduct of the war. Much of this remains an official secret protected by the Official Secrets Act that does not allow anyone to compromise such information due to a perceived “national interest”. Even General K. M. Arif’s book, for instance, carries only a copy of a map depicting an Indian military plan but none from Pakistan which could have been easily accessible to a person of his stature and position.  This then sets the backdrop of this analysis of the preparation and conduct of the 1965 War between India and Pakistan.

Rationale and Preparation for the War

Several events such as the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the frustrations over lack of progress in the Kashmir dispute, and Pakistan’s own victory in the limited Runn of Kutch Affair, contributed to the events that led towards the 1965 War between India and Pakistan.

Continue Reading »

Ayub’s Era II: National Security and Foreign Policy Challenges - 3/3 (1962-65)

Understanding Pakistan Project Team September 6th, 2007

pk5-514659187_d2b88fe2dc.jpgBy: Athar Osama

Ever since its creation, Pakistan’s national security challenges, primarily a threat from India, had occupied the minds of its defense and foreign policy planners. Just months after the country’s creation, a war broke out with India over the disputed territory of Kashmir. A day after its founder—Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah—passed away, India invaded the independent state of Hyderabad and annexed it with brutal force. Nothing it seemed was safe from Indian designs and the Indian leaders had made it amply clear that they would like the renegade Pakistan to return back to Mother India. (Figure: President Ayub Khan with Mrs. Kennedy during their visit to Pakistan. Foreign Minister Bhutto is seen in the background).

Pakistan’s Search for Security through Western Alliances

In this age of extreme paranoia—based on a fear that was justifiable or not—Pakistan’s leaders began looking for defense alliances, primarily with Western countries, to seek some level of comfort and security for its defense needs. The military had always been a pro-Western factor in Pakistan’s politics. The forces have been heavily dependent on foreign military trade and aid for their hardware and training needs respectively. In the initial years of the country’s independence, Britain provided some additional military hardware to stuff Pakistan’s virtually empty military arsenals. Britain, however, was not willing to meet all the defense procurement needs of the new country for it was also on friendly terms with India as well. During the late 1950s, therefore, there was a sharp switch towards a pro-America stance in Pakistan’s foreign in national security policy. Pakistan Army’s defense needs led this movement while the Airforce and Navy largely remained dependent on Britain and France for their weaponry.

Continue Reading »

Guest Post: Hard Facts about 1965 War

Understanding Pakistan Project Team September 6th, 2007

 Guest Post* by: MAK Lodhi (published in The News International, Sept 7, 2007)

pk-p0807030301.jpgThe Indian army launched a three-pronged attack across a 50-mile wide front towards Lahore at 0530 hours on September 6, 1965. The Indian XI Corps, comprising the 7th and 15th Infantry Divisions and the 4th Mountain Division mounted the attack. Within a couple of days, the Indian army launched a full-scale attack with its 1st Corps directed towards Sialkot, in between Lahore and Kashmir.

The war, fought for only seventeen days, is often drummed up as a great victory compared with the debacle of 1971 when the country split into two, more because of internal factors, which are often ignored, than external factors.

Even for the 1965 war, the blame is laid entirely on India as the aggressor and the nation is not allowed to have a realistic appraisal of the missteps and blunders that led India to attack. Nor has Pakistan’s establishment ever accepted that armed forces were totally unprepared for such an eventuality.

Was there any exigency plan ready to be implemented? Were the forces alert enough to face a counter-offensive before launching two adventures, one after the other, in the occupied Jammu and Kashmir prior to Indian invasion of Pakistan?

It is time the up-and-coming generations were apprised of true and bitter realities, of myopic vision of Pakistani leaders, of lack of planning and strategic fiascos.

From the 1965 war to Kargil in the spring of 1999, the military establishment seemed to have learned no lesson. “Pakistan’s behaviour is so unlike that of other vanquished powers that it belies Michael Howard’s dictum that ‘the vanquished are likely to learn more from their defeat than the victors from their victory”, writes Ahmad Faruqui in “Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan.”

Continue Reading »

Pew Project: Global Attitudes Toward Islamic Extremism and Terrorism

Understanding Pakistan Project Team August 29th, 2007

Guest Post* : Pew Global Attitudes Project (July 2005)

Pew Global Attitudes Project: Summary of Findings

Concerns over Islamic extremism, extensive in the West even before this month’s terrorist attacks in London, are shared to a considerable degree by the publics in several predominantly Muslim nations surveyed. Nearly three-quarters of Moroccans and roughly half of those in Pakistan, Turkey and Indonesia see Islamic extremism as a threat to their countries. At the same time, most Muslim publics are expressing less support for terrorism than in the past. Confidence in Osama bin Laden has declined markedly in some countries and fewer believe suicide bombings that target civilians are justified in the defense of Islam.

Nonetheless, the polling also finds that while Muslim and non-Muslim publics share some common concerns, they have very different attitudes regarding the impact of Islam on their countries. Muslim publics worry about Islamic extremism, but the balance of opinion in predominantly Muslim countries is that Islam is playing a greater role in politics – and most welcome that development. Turkey is a clear exception; the public there is divided about whether a greater role for Islam in the political life of that country is desirable.

In non-Muslim countries, fears of Islamic extremism are closely associated with worries about Muslim minorities. Western publics believe that Muslims in their countries want to remain distinct from society, rather than adopt their nation’s customs and way of life. Moreover, there is a widespread perception in countries with significant Muslim minorities, including the U.S., that resident Muslims have a strong and growing sense of Islamic identity. For the most part, this development is viewed negatively, particularly in Western Europe. In France, Germany and the Netherlands, those who see a growing sense of Islamic identity among resident Muslims overwhelmingly say this is a bad thing.

The latest survey by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, conducted among more than 17,000 people in 17 countries this spring, finds that while many Muslims believe that radical Islam poses a threat, there are differing opinions as to its causes. Sizable minorities in most predominantly Muslim countries point to poverty, joblessness and a lack of education, but pluralities in Jordan and Lebanon cite U.S. policies as the most important cause of Islamic extremism.

Continue Reading »

Ayub Khan Era-I: The Martial Law “Revolution” - 2/2 (1958-62)

Athar Osama July 23rd, 2007

By: Athar Osama

Socio-Economic and Political Reforms of Ayub’s Era-I (1958-62)

pk-p0806030301.jpgWith the power firmly in the hands of the Chief Martial Law Administrator, he set upon the task of creating country of his vision. Feldman (1967, p. 44) describes the state of the President’s mind in the following words:

“He knew that he was expected to collaborate unstintingly with a government confessedly authoritarian, claiming to derive its sanction from the necessities of a desperate situation and promising, unequivocally, to justify itself by a resolute purification of public life, by a program of indispensable reforms, and by adoption of a fresh constitution which would adequately and appropriately satisfy the citizen’s right to speak and participate in his country’s affairs”

Ayub Khan adopted an essentially technocratic mode of government depending upon a number of committees and commissions to help in policy formulation. In all, the Martial Law Administration, during its entire tenure, set up as many as 25 different commissions to deliberate on policy matters within a wide variety of domains. These included:

- Company Law Commission                            - Constitution Commission                   - Credit Inquiry Commission
- Education Reform Commission                      - Federal Capital Commission              - Finance Commission
- Food & Agriculture Commission                    - Franchise Commission                        - Jute Inquiry Commission
- Land Reforms Commission                            - Land Revenue Commission               - Manpower Commission
- Law Reform Commission                               - Maritime Commission                        - Medical Reforms Commission
- Pay & Services Commission                           - Police Commission                              - Press Commission
- Price Commission                                            - Scientific Commission                         - Social Evils Commission
- Sport, Culture, Art, & Literature Com.         – Sugar Commission                             - Taxation Inquiry Commission
- Textile Inquiry Commission

The sheer scope of the subjects that these commissions dealt with makes one wonder about the volume of policy work carried out in the early years of Ayub Khan’s era. It also makes one think as to how, without carrying out these necessary reforms in a whole variety of different areas, the country was being run in the preceding nine years of its existence. Clearly, not every one of the commissions formed during Ayub Khan’s regime undertook work of equal importance, nor did they achieve similar results, but the fact that the government was able to devote its attention to all these areas cannot escape one’s attention. 

Continue Reading »

The Coup, the Constitution, and the Bureaucratic Musical Chairs - 3/3 (1955-58)

Athar Osama July 9th, 2007

…The Bureaucratic Musical Chairs

With the Constitution now in effect, there was logically an expectation that it would lead to an end to the constant reshuffling of governments and political leaders over the last few years and bring political stability to Pakistan. Before going into whether or not that ultimately happened, lets look briefly look at some aspects of the constitution that are worth emphasizing here. 

The Constitution of 1956

pk-163px-Iskander_mirza.jpgThe Constitution of 1956 was a lengthy document—containing over 234 Articles in 13 parts and 6 schedules. By contrast, the American Constitution has a 3-line preamble, 7 articles, and 27 amendments over the last 200 years of existence. The Indian Constitution, on the other hand, has 395 articles and 12 schedules (Wikipedia, 2007). Clearly, in Pakistani Constitution of 1956, but also later ones, the framers adopted an approach, somewhat analogous to India’s, that explicitly stated many of the things that are generally left to convention in most well-developed constitutions of the world. Hamid Khan identifies several reasons for the length of the constitution including, but not limited to, complicated relationship between the federation and the provinces, special provisions for tribal areas and the Islamic character of the Constitution, emergency provisions, bill of rights, issues of state languages, election commission, and directive principles of state policy etc. (Khan, 2001, p. 102).

There is nothing inherently right or right, perhaps, about explicitly stating in quite a lot of minutiae the various structures that comprise the state and their inter-relationships with each other provided there is consistency between them and that the Constitution is then properly and fully implemented. Pakistan’s First Constitution and the later experienced presented serious problems in both these counts.

The first set of problems arose in the distribution of power between the President and the Prime Minister. The 1956 Constitution was developed and delivered during the Governor-Generalship of Iskander Mirza and the Prime Ministership of Chaudhri Mohammad Ali. While the latter was an able person—and perhaps a man of good integrity (more on this later)—the former’s strong control over power and desire to maintain that was no match to the latter’s independence and/or desire to create a well-designed (from a structural standpoint) Constitution.

Continue Reading »

Constitutional & Political Challenges During Liaquat’s Premiership - 2/2 (1949-51)

Athar Osama June 25th, 2007

By: Athar Osama

On Monday (June 25th, 2007), we began our investigtion of Liaquat Ali Khan tenure as the first Prime Minister of Pakistan. We looked Liaquat’s credentials for the responsibility that was put on his shoulders, the early difficulties he faced in bringing the nation together and healing its wounds in the immediate aftermath of Jinnah’s death, and his attempts to find a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir crisis. We also looked at the immediate political challenges faced by Liaquat’s Ministry.

pk-Liaqat_death.jpgIn this piece, we look at two other important aspects of Liaquat’s Premiership, namely, progress in constitution-making (most specifically the objectives resolution) and his foreign policy posture (i.e. Pakistan’s pro-Western foreign policy stance). Both these issues have defined Pakistan’s history over several decades that followed and remain, to this day, unresolved. Yet, it was during Liaquat’s momentous premiership that Pakistan first attempted to address these… 

Pakistan’s Constitutional Problems

While the Center-Province relations in this early phase of Pakistan’s history were far from ideal, the inter-provincial relations also presented a sorry picture. Until Quaid-e-Azam’s death in fall of 1948, the Constituent Assembly whose primary purpose was to create the first constitution for Pakistan had made little progress in actually doing so. Much of its legislative energy had thus far been spent in emergency legislation that was necessary in day-to-day operation of the country. Two issues represent the significant challenges it faced in making worthwhile progress on the constitutional question.

The negotiation on center-province (i.e. relative distribution of power between federal and provincial governments) inter-provincial relations (i.e. the make up of the legislative organs in the new constitution) was in a state of a deadlock with East Pakistani Province of East Bengal that commanded a sizeable majority in the Constituent Assembly seeking representation based on population while Punjab (and, to a lesser extent, the other provinces of West Pakistan) seeking to deny the same. 

The second issue that presented a major hurdle in Constituent Assembly’s progress toward the constitutional question was a lack of census on the Islamic character of Pakistan. This was especially a precarious issue because of the need to preserve the rights and liberties of a significant minority of Hindus that had remained in Pakistan since Independence. Hindus made up not so insignificant populations in all West Pakistani provinces—most notably Sindh—and a fairly significant one in East Pakistan from where they also held several seats in the Constituent Assembly.

Continue Reading »