Wardi Special: A History of Failure - The Rise and Fall of the Military “Experiment” in Pakistan
Athar Osama September 23rd, 2007
By: Athar Osama
In October 1999, when General Musharraf came to power in a coup and declared himself the Chief Executive of the country, he was met by a silent nod of approval by his 150 million compatriots. He charted a six point agenda that included broad-based accountability of those who had plundered the country’s wealth and political reforms that would rid the country of the shackles of “professional” politicians–which many of us, ordinary citizens, thought was a euphemism for a mix of political and land-reforms aimed at weakening, if not eliminating, the hold of feudal and family dynasties from the country.
I, for one, like many of my compatriots was willing to give the General a chance. The resolve that Musharraf showed upfront won him kudos and inspired a hope–a very naive hope, though–that when the General finishes his Supreme Court mandated 3-year tenure, Pakistan would be in a much better position to develop true sustainable democracy than before.
Then something predictable–something that I had not foreseen then–happened. Musharraf regime took a course that is far too similar to the 2 or 3 (depending upon how you see it) military regimes in the past. It is important to look at and understand this general pattern because I think it makes a very important point that many of us, Pakistanis, have not fully understood and assimilated.
Today, as Musharraf seeks to have himself elected for a second term, it is useful to ask a question: Is military rule the solution to Pakistan’s problems? Is Musharraf any different than his predecessor generals? Answering these questions is critical to charting a new course of democracy in Pakistan for it will address and counter the argument at the very center of the ongoing political saga and the impending presidential elections in Pakistan.
In this article, I would demonstrate, I hope, that military dictatorship in Pakistan’s context has repeatedly proved itself to be incapable of either providing sustainable and stable governance or for solving the country’s long-term problems.
Therefore, when military generals force the civilian rulers out on the pretext that the latter have played havoc with the governance in the country and that they, and only they, can set things right, that makes a seriously questionable claim given the experience of 33-year military rule in Pakistan.
I will argue that there is a clear “pattern of failure” associated with a military regime that can be divided into three phases.
In the first phase, the regime comes to power and seeks legitimacy for it by making promises of cleaning up the mess and announcing a reform agenda. By the time the second phase begins, the regime is losing steam, legitimacy has remained elusive, and demands for return to civil rule are beginning to appear. This leads to creating a civilian face for the regime. The third phase really sees the crumbling of the artificial civilian order and last-ditch attempts by the regime to hang onto power. Continue Reading »
In this piece, witten in the immediate aftermath of the Lal Masjid Episode but being published for the first time, Khuldun talks about the challenges posed by the dual extremism of Taliban-style theocrats and the promoters of Enlightened Moderation who are tearing the Pakistani society apart…. 
It did, however, once again put Musharraf and his brand of “saviors” firmly in charge of the “savage” millions in Pakistan and has established, in the eyes of the West and its media, the often-repeated (by his government) “indispensibility” of his dictatorial rule in Pakistan. Add on top of that the fact that there are serious allegations that the two brothers in Lal Masjid had been in the pay of the agencies, and that it is next to impossible for anybody–no matter how slick or smart he was–to operate with such imputiny in the heavily “watched and monitored” city of Islamabad for years, and the conincidences just get too many for most of us to digest. 
When I was writing this post this morning, the Supreme Court of Pakistan had not decided this case in the favor of Nawaz Sharif and his family’s “inalienable and unqualified” right to return to Pakistan. Then Understanding Pakistan’s long-planned switchover from its servers to the new (much faster one!) ran into some glitches and the site remained inaccessible for several hours. I wanted to comment upon and archive the original copy of Nawaz-Government deal. Now, with the decision already made much of the post has been made redundant but I will do so anyway to if only to archive this agreement on Understanding Pakistan. So, here is my post, as it stood in the morning (I shall return to it later to update it with new developments)
Like many others, I too, was willing to give them a third chance, if only because there was no other alternative. However, deep down in my heart, I was very skeptical of how comprehensive and thorough their “education” in democratic values has been. True, adversity is a great teacher but our politicians have repeatedly shown a tendency not to learn from their own mistakes and Nawaz and Benazir were probably no exceptions. I was concerned that this alliance between these leaders was only temporary in the sense that once either of them came to power, he or she will forget all the lofty democratic values expressed in this Charter. Transplanting meaningful and stable democracy in Pakistan requires not only that our learders learn how to handle the “power” of the government (”absolute power corrupts absolutely!”) but also that they learn how to sit on the opposition benches and engage constructively, critically, and meaningfully with the government. Above all, it requires a certain temperament that will only come when our leaders will truly understand what democracy really is–as a system–and develop the right democratic values to sustain and nourish it.
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