Archive for the 'History in a Nutshell' Category

The Thinkable Has Happened!

Understanding Pakistan Project Team November 5th, 2007

Reporting from the site of London Protest.

This 2:53 pm UK Time. I am sitting right now in front of the Pakistani Embassy in where the protest is going on. There are about 200+ people here. A while back a gentleman was singing a very beautiful “nazm”"Aisay dustoor ko mein nahin ma’anta” and the rest of the crowd was chanting with him. Local leaders are addressing the gathering. There is great sense of excitement. However, I am also thinking that somehow this is inadequate. We need to do more. When we talk about the people of Pakistan and on behalf of people of Pakistan, I keep on thinking as to where those people are? The majority of 160 million or so Pakistanis are still silent, as always.

No matter what we do here, and what we say, Pakistan will not get democracy unles Pakistanis–a vast majority of us–demand democracy. Where are the people???

As the imformation blockade continues in Pakistan, thoughts are racing through my mind at the speed of light. I will try to pen more of my thoughts on this blog in the coming days. Ahmad Faraz has written the following about my country…

Meri bustee say paray bhi meray dushmun hongay    (There might be my enemies away from my land…)

Per yahan kub koi aghyaar ka lushkar utra                   (But when did a foreign army invade here….)

A’ashna haath hi aksur meri janab lupkay                       (It always familiar hands that attacked me…)

Meray seenay mein humaisha mera khunjar utra…        (It was always my own knife that tore through my chest…)

I leave you with Faiz’s famous poem “Hum Daikhain Gay” and its video depiction adopted from Adil Najam’s All Things Pakistan that comes to mind as a very apt representation of the present circumstances…

WPvideo 1.10

Signing off Now.

Athar Osama

P.S. I have a confession to make to UPP audience. I’ve been kept away from UPP for the last month or so because of some domestic issues. I intend to return to our Story of Pakistan as soon as I can–hopefully within a week or so. The battle for constitutional rights of Pakistanis must go on and is never ending. Our country needs us today more than ever before.

Pakistan - India War of 1965: The Ground War - 2/3 (1965)

Athar Osama September 15th, 2007

By: Athar Osama 

In the first of this three part episode, we looked at the War in Kashmir that began as a precursor to the broader conflict between India and Pakistan. Hostilities began on August 5th and 6th 1965 when Pakistan army regulars infiltrated the Cease Fire Line (CFL) in Kashmir. On August 7th 1965, Pakistani forces carried out a raid in the Kargil area to cut off the road links between Srinagar and Ladakh. Between August 12th and 16th, Pakistan continued its attack on an Indian Army post in Kargil accompanied by shelling in the Chhamb sector. Increasingly, both countries were employing their regular forces in these operations and a low-intensity localized war was already underway.

(Figure: A Map of Pakistan-India War of 1965: The Ground Battles created by the author is on the next page. Please click below.)

 Brian Cloughley, in his “A History of Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections”, notes:

“There were statements in the respective parliaments, letters to the UN, and briefings of international media, but there was sense of buying time. On the Pakistan sided, it was still hoped that the actions of the Mujahids would persuade the population of the valley to rise up, whereafter the Pakistani regular troops could be deployed with a semblance of legality. The Indians were not averse to escalation of the conflict as it would, in their view, provide an opportunity to make up for the humiliation in the Runn of Kutch and settle things once and for all with their recalcitrant neighnour. They wanted to “get at and smash the Pakistani war machine’” (Cloughley, 1999, p. 63)

Here are a few videos of the 1965 War. The first of these is a typical motivational video (with a Pakistani-bent) that puts together a collage of pictures from the war itself. The second video (next page) is an Indian video of similar nature. The difference between how same events are potrayed by the popular press and public in the two countries couldn’t have been more stark. The third video (next page) is a brief actual clip of the War, perhaps taken from a Pakistani news report. (Courtesy: YouTube.com)

WPvideo 1.10
1965 War, Pakistan Vs india
03:40

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Pakistan - India War of 1965: The War in Kashmir – 1/3 (1965)

Athar Osama September 6th, 2007

By: Athar Osama

pk-220px-Time_ayub_shastri.jpgThe origins of the 1965 War between Pakistan and India, its conduct over the course of several weeks, and its consequences are quite complex for one to be able to do justice with it. Add on top of that the fact that countries engage in one-upmanship to try to make exaggerated accusations of who started the war and claims of victory after it ends, primarily in order to manage “public opinion” at home, and it really gets very difficult and tricky. One additional unfortunate factor in lack of quality reporting on the 1965 War was the attempt by Pakistani leadership—both military and civilian—to attempt to destroy the evidence of the circumstances that actually led to this war. General K. M. Arif, in his biography “Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-97” for instance writes that in the immediate aftermath of the 1965 War:

“Pakistan suffered a loss of a different kind…Soon after the War the GHQ ordered all the formations and units of the Pakistan Army to destroy their respective war diaries and submit completed reports to this effect by a given date. This was done…Their [the war diaries’] destruction, a self-inflicted injury and an irreparable national loss, was intellectual suicide.”

                                    — General Khalid Mehmood Arif, Vice Chief of Army Staff, Pakistan Army

While unofficial accounts of the 1965 War by several Pakistani figures that participated in that war, including Ayub’s biographer Altaf Gauhar, Major General Shaukat Riza, Lt. General Gul Hassan, and General Mohammad Musa have since come to the fore, the “official” version of Pakistan’s military plans and objectives from that and how the performance of our commanders and troops differed from these have not surfaced.

Additionally, no effort has been made to systematically evaluate Pakistan’s strategic and operational plans and attempt to learn some lessons from the preparation and conduct of the war. Much of this remains an official secret protected by the Official Secrets Act that does not allow anyone to compromise such information due to a perceived “national interest”. Even General K. M. Arif’s book, for instance, carries only a copy of a map depicting an Indian military plan but none from Pakistan which could have been easily accessible to a person of his stature and position.  This then sets the backdrop of this analysis of the preparation and conduct of the 1965 War between India and Pakistan.

Rationale and Preparation for the War

Several events such as the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the frustrations over lack of progress in the Kashmir dispute, and Pakistan’s own victory in the limited Runn of Kutch Affair, contributed to the events that led towards the 1965 War between India and Pakistan.

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Ayub’s Era II: National Security and Foreign Policy Challenges - 3/3 (1962-65)

Understanding Pakistan Project Team September 6th, 2007

pk5-514659187_d2b88fe2dc.jpgBy: Athar Osama

Ever since its creation, Pakistan’s national security challenges, primarily a threat from India, had occupied the minds of its defense and foreign policy planners. Just months after the country’s creation, a war broke out with India over the disputed territory of Kashmir. A day after its founder—Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah—passed away, India invaded the independent state of Hyderabad and annexed it with brutal force. Nothing it seemed was safe from Indian designs and the Indian leaders had made it amply clear that they would like the renegade Pakistan to return back to Mother India. (Figure: President Ayub Khan with Mrs. Kennedy during their visit to Pakistan. Foreign Minister Bhutto is seen in the background).

Pakistan’s Search for Security through Western Alliances

In this age of extreme paranoia—based on a fear that was justifiable or not—Pakistan’s leaders began looking for defense alliances, primarily with Western countries, to seek some level of comfort and security for its defense needs. The military had always been a pro-Western factor in Pakistan’s politics. The forces have been heavily dependent on foreign military trade and aid for their hardware and training needs respectively. In the initial years of the country’s independence, Britain provided some additional military hardware to stuff Pakistan’s virtually empty military arsenals. Britain, however, was not willing to meet all the defense procurement needs of the new country for it was also on friendly terms with India as well. During the late 1950s, therefore, there was a sharp switch towards a pro-America stance in Pakistan’s foreign in national security policy. Pakistan Army’s defense needs led this movement while the Airforce and Navy largely remained dependent on Britain and France for their weaponry.

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Ayub Era-II: Fact and Fiction Of Ayub’s “Economic Miracle” - 2/3 (1962-65)

Athar Osama August 20th, 2007

By: Athar Osama*

pk5-728377246_b376bed9b6.jpgIn the last episode of this series, we looked at Pakistan under Ayub Khan’s “Presidential” Democracy during the second part (1962-65) of his three-part 11-year tenure at the helm of the affairs. Prior to that, we had also looked the early-years of the Martial Law regime that, owing to the intensity of its policy activism, saw some dramatic changes in a whole array of policy domains. In this episode we dig deeper into two key areas policy change in Ayub Era, namely, economic and foreign policy.

(Figure -Right: Ayub Khan’s “Talent Cabinet” which was responsible for much of the regime’s policies during the 1960s. Notice: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto–who was a portege of Ayub Khan–and is known to have called the latter “daddy” on occasions.)

During the early-to-mid 1960s, Pakistan saw what appeared to be dramatic advancements in its economic affairs. In the 1960s, Pakistan’s economic progress is known to have been an envy of a number of Asian countries. It was also during this era that Pakistan’s economic planning processes, institutions, and documents—particularly the Second Five-Year Plan—are known to have been adopted by countries like South Korea who themselves where trying to chart a development trajectory for themselves. This recognition aside, Ayub’s economic policies are perhaps one of the most misunderstood aspects of this 11-year rule. While there is little disagreement on the growth rates that Pakistan experienced in GDP, industry, and agriculture during Ayub Khan’s era, what experts tend to disagree upon is how that growth occurred and what were its implications on Pakistan’s economy and society (Zaidi, 1999, p. 97). We look at Ayub’s industrial and agricultural policies, in particular, to see how they fared and why.

On the foreign policy front too, Ayub Government found itself in the midst of some truly significant changes and events and the actions it took—or failed to take—had serious repercussions for Pakistan. In fact many have argued that the 1965 War between India and Pakistan which, in many ways, Ayub and his advisors—Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, being the main protagonist—brought upon themselves marked the beginning of the end of Ayub’s Era. Before we look into that next week, we will examine how we got there. But first, a closer look at Ayub’s economic “miracle”…

Trade and Industrial Policy and Development in the Sixties

Pakistan had inherited an industrial base that was at a very nascent stage of its development. In its statement of industrial policy in 1948, the Government of Pakistan stated that:

“The most striking feature of Pakistan’s present economy is the marked contrast between its vast natural resources and its extreme industrial backwardness. A country producing nearly 75% of the world’s production of jute does not possess even a single jute mill…” (quoted in Zaidi, 1999, p. 91)

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Ayub Khan Era II: Pakistan Under Presidential “Democracy” - 1/3 (1962-65)

Athar Osama August 6th, 2007

pk5-440829976_cb73da43e0.jpgIn the last episode, we looked at the first four years of Ayub Khan Martial Law in Pakistan. This period, as the write up indicated, was marked with tremendous amount of progress, policy activism, and legislation on a number of different fronts. Philip E. Jones, in his doctoral dissertation titled “Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power”, notes that Ayub’s martial law regime evolved its policies around three main objectives:

  • The first objective of the martial law regime was the expansion and rationalization of national authority whereby an attempt was made to “replace the negativism of self, group, and provincial interest with a positive programme of national development” (p. 27). Ayub and his fellow generals and technocrats believed that “prolonged effectiveness was sufficient to bring legitimacy to the institutions and the programs that he sponsored” (ibid).
  • The second objective of the martial law regime focused on rapid economic development. This was achieved through expansion in state’s economic planning capacity and creation of institutions for central planning, policy innovation, and implementation. Ayub relied on experts and specialists—as against the generalist bureaucrats, as has been the case in the past decade—that formed the core of his policy-making apparatus. A number of new state organs were developed, e.g. Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) and Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) to facilitate in this activity.
  • The third and final objective of the martial law regime was the stabilization of the political process by “depoliticizing it through institutional innovation”. This was primarily achieved through the creation and implementation of his Basic Democracies Scheme to create a loyal cadre of people willing and able to indirectly participate in the political process and the usage of EBDO regulations to clean the political field of rival politicians. (Jones, 2003, p. 26-8)

General Mohammad Ayub Khan—by now a Self-Appointed Field Marshall—seemed a different kind of Chief Martial Law Administrator than the ones Pakistan has seen since, namely, Generals Yahya, Zia , and Musharraf.

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Ayub Khan Era-I: The Martial Law “Revolution” - 2/2 (1958-62)

Athar Osama July 23rd, 2007

By: Athar Osama

Socio-Economic and Political Reforms of Ayub’s Era-I (1958-62)

pk-p0806030301.jpgWith the power firmly in the hands of the Chief Martial Law Administrator, he set upon the task of creating country of his vision. Feldman (1967, p. 44) describes the state of the President’s mind in the following words:

“He knew that he was expected to collaborate unstintingly with a government confessedly authoritarian, claiming to derive its sanction from the necessities of a desperate situation and promising, unequivocally, to justify itself by a resolute purification of public life, by a program of indispensable reforms, and by adoption of a fresh constitution which would adequately and appropriately satisfy the citizen’s right to speak and participate in his country’s affairs”

Ayub Khan adopted an essentially technocratic mode of government depending upon a number of committees and commissions to help in policy formulation. In all, the Martial Law Administration, during its entire tenure, set up as many as 25 different commissions to deliberate on policy matters within a wide variety of domains. These included:

- Company Law Commission                            - Constitution Commission                   - Credit Inquiry Commission
- Education Reform Commission                      - Federal Capital Commission              - Finance Commission
- Food & Agriculture Commission                    - Franchise Commission                        - Jute Inquiry Commission
- Land Reforms Commission                            - Land Revenue Commission               - Manpower Commission
- Law Reform Commission                               - Maritime Commission                        - Medical Reforms Commission
- Pay & Services Commission                           - Police Commission                              - Press Commission
- Price Commission                                            - Scientific Commission                         - Social Evils Commission
- Sport, Culture, Art, & Literature Com.         – Sugar Commission                             - Taxation Inquiry Commission
- Textile Inquiry Commission

The sheer scope of the subjects that these commissions dealt with makes one wonder about the volume of policy work carried out in the early years of Ayub Khan’s era. It also makes one think as to how, without carrying out these necessary reforms in a whole variety of different areas, the country was being run in the preceding nine years of its existence. Clearly, not every one of the commissions formed during Ayub Khan’s regime undertook work of equal importance, nor did they achieve similar results, but the fact that the government was able to devote its attention to all these areas cannot escape one’s attention. 

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The Coup, The Constitution, and the Bureaucratic Musical Chairs - 1/3 (1955-58)

Athar Osama July 9th, 2007

By: Athar Osama

The Coup…

The removal of the Constituent Assembly put Pakistan into yet another constitutional crisis. This was an entity entrusted, under the terms of the Independence of India Act of 1947, by the King of England to form the constitution of the Pakistani pk3-kai.jpgdominion. With the constituent assembly now gone, the question arose as to who was to carry forward the task of constitution-making in Pakistan? Could a new constituent assembly be legitimately elected to replace the older one? What would be the “ground-rules” for electing such an assembly? Who would set those rules and whether they would be acceptable to all parties?

In the case of the old Constituent Assembly—imperfect as it was—the ground rules were set by the authority of the King of England and were deemed to be equally biased towards all parties. With the two largest provinces already at loggerheads with each other and the smaller provinces complaining about the domination of the larger ones, it would have been difficult to agree upon the ground rules of electing a new constituent assembly in a manner that would not be perceived as biased at its very onset. Even if such an assembly were to get elected and accepted by all parties, where would it start its work? How much of the work of the older Constituent Assembly could it draw upon?

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