Archive for the 'History in a Nutshell' Category

The Coup, The Constitution, and the Bureaucratic Musical Chairs - 2/3 (1955-58)

Athar Osama July 9th, 2007

The Constitution 

Having looked at the “Constitutional Coup” of 1954 and its repurcussions in the form of Justice Munir’s historic judgment, we now turn towards the Pakistan’s renewed quest for a Constitution.

An Era of Legal Challenges

With Justice Munir’s verdict in the Tamizuddin Khan case, not only did the Constituent Assembly stood dissolved but also sevepk-p0715010101.jpgn long years of important legislation was eliminated by a stroke of a pen. Forty-six Acts on the statute books became invalid thus putting the country in a legal vacuum making it almost impossible to govern. Days after the judgment, the Governor-General promulgated Emergency Powers Ordinance IX of 1955 that give him the power to:

  • Make provision for framing the Constitution of Pakistan
  • Make provision to constitute the province of West Pakistan
  • Validate laws which have been passed by the Constituent Assembly but had not received assent of the Governor-General
  • Authenticate the Central Budget
  • Name East Bengal as East Pakistan      (Khan, 2001, p. 89)

Governor-General’s Emergency Powers Ordinance was immediately challenged in the court. In Usif Patel vs. The Crown, Chief Justice Munir sided with the petitioner and declared the Emergency Powers Ordinance IX of 1955 as ultra vires (without legal authority). In a major flip-flop of his earlier decision, Justice Munir’s judgment recognized the continuing authority of the Constituent Assembly, and nobody else, to make any provisions to the country’s Constitution. Ironically, this was the same Constituent Assembly that had stood dissolved through his decision in the Tamizuddin Khan case.

Continue Reading »

The Coup, the Constitution, and the Bureaucratic Musical Chairs - 3/3 (1955-58)

Athar Osama July 9th, 2007

…The Bureaucratic Musical Chairs

With the Constitution now in effect, there was logically an expectation that it would lead to an end to the constant reshuffling of governments and political leaders over the last few years and bring political stability to Pakistan. Before going into whether or not that ultimately happened, lets look briefly look at some aspects of the constitution that are worth emphasizing here. 

The Constitution of 1956

pk-163px-Iskander_mirza.jpgThe Constitution of 1956 was a lengthy document—containing over 234 Articles in 13 parts and 6 schedules. By contrast, the American Constitution has a 3-line preamble, 7 articles, and 27 amendments over the last 200 years of existence. The Indian Constitution, on the other hand, has 395 articles and 12 schedules (Wikipedia, 2007). Clearly, in Pakistani Constitution of 1956, but also later ones, the framers adopted an approach, somewhat analogous to India’s, that explicitly stated many of the things that are generally left to convention in most well-developed constitutions of the world. Hamid Khan identifies several reasons for the length of the constitution including, but not limited to, complicated relationship between the federation and the provinces, special provisions for tribal areas and the Islamic character of the Constitution, emergency provisions, bill of rights, issues of state languages, election commission, and directive principles of state policy etc. (Khan, 2001, p. 102).

There is nothing inherently right or right, perhaps, about explicitly stating in quite a lot of minutiae the various structures that comprise the state and their inter-relationships with each other provided there is consistency between them and that the Constitution is then properly and fully implemented. Pakistan’s First Constitution and the later experienced presented serious problems in both these counts.

The first set of problems arose in the distribution of power between the President and the Prime Minister. The 1956 Constitution was developed and delivered during the Governor-Generalship of Iskander Mirza and the Prime Ministership of Chaudhri Mohammad Ali. While the latter was an able person—and perhaps a man of good integrity (more on this later)—the former’s strong control over power and desire to maintain that was no match to the latter’s independence and/or desire to create a well-designed (from a structural standpoint) Constitution.

Continue Reading »

Pakistan’s Constitutional Deadlock and Breakthrough - 1/2 (1951-54)

Athar Osama July 2nd, 2007

By: Athar Osama 

We left the story of Pakistan last week at a critical juncture in its history. The new country is in its fifth year since independence. It has lost two of its most capable leaders—first, Quaid-e-Azam (the greatest leader) who passed away merely a year after independence and, second, Quaid-e-Millat (the leader of the nation) who was assassinated just four years into the journey.

The country has already seen an unsuccessful military coup (the Rawalpindi Conspiracy) and while it has survived the mammoth effects of the partition, stability and prosperity is still a long way ahead. During the short few years, a number of challenges have rocked the country, thus further adding to this instability. The dispute over water of the rivers, boundaries in Kashmir, allegations of corruption in allocation of evacuee property, and a fast deteriorating drought that began as early as the last quarter of 1947 in the eastern wing are a few of these.

First Signs of Trouble in East Pakistan

In fact, in some parts of the country—especially the province of East Bengal—the Muslim population which was under the illusion—perhaps naively so—of having achieved a mythical Islamic state where welfare of the poor and social justice would reign supreme, is already getting a bit restless due to the perceived gap between that lofty ideal and the reality on the ground. Badruddin Umar, in The Emergence of Bangladesh: Class Struggles in East Pakistan (1947-58), writes:

“[After the partition] the whole political perspective was [thus] transformed, and the communal contradiction which caused the partition of the country was replaced by contradictions between the two regions and the ethnically and linguistically different people who belonged to the Muslim community…The Muslim peasants, workers and middle class people were taught to visualize Pakistan as a dreamland, where milk and honey would flow, everyone would get education and suitable job, healthcare would be a routine matter, and there would a flowering of the culture espoused during the Pakistan movement. What really happened was that the Muslims of East Bengal, who constituted the vast majority of population, were quite confused and bewildered at the barrenness of the dreamland called Pakistan, where they had to go hungry and die of famine, where no surplus land was distributed among the poor peasants and sharecroppers, where very little new opportunities were opened up for the working masses and the educated sections of the people and life in all aspects remained as torturous as before. ”  (Umar, 2004, p.15-16)

In East Bengal, which was the most politically literate and aware province of Pakistan—perhaps entire British India—and was also the birth place of All India Muslim League itself, this anti-exploitation sentiment now turned into an anti-Muslim League and soon anti-Pakistan sentiment.

Continue Reading »

Pakistan’s Constitutional Deadlock and Breakthrough - 2/2 (1951-54)

Athar Osama July 2nd, 2007

By: Athar Osama 

In the first of the two pieces on Pakistan’s Constitutional Deadlock in early-1950s, on July 2nd,  2007, we looked at the emerging debate and unrest in the provice of East Pakistan. We examined the pendulum of constitutional progress swing all the way towards a pro-Punjab and anit-Bengal position in the interim report of the Basic Principles Committee and then all the way to a pro-Bengal and anti-Punjab position in the final report of the Basic Principles Committee. Unfortunately, Khwaja Nazimuddin became the first victim of this constitutional deadlock that existed between the two largest provinces of the country. In this artcle, we will examine the progress made under the new Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali Bogra–another Bengali–who almost provided Pakistan with its first Constitution.

Constitutional Progress through the “Mohammad Ali Formula”

pk2-dawn18april1953.jpg

With Khawaja Nazimuddin out of the picture, Mohammad Ali Bogra was installed as the new Prime Minister. Mohammad Ali Bogra was a statesman of Bengali descent who came from the family of Nawabs of Bengal (Wikipedia, 2007). At the time of his appointment as Prime Minister, he was serving as the country’s ambassador to the United States and was hurriedly called back to take over the Ministry.

Mohammad Ali Bogra had a tight rope to walk as he balanced the Punjabi interests—to whom he owed his appointment—and the Bengali resentment towards perceived domination by Punjabi politicians—most notably the Governor General himself (Sayeed, 1960, p. 418). In the Cabinet as well, Bogra had little support of his own as he tried to act as a go between the two powerful interest groups. Undaunted by this, however, Bogra took on the challenge for finding a compromise solution to the country’s constitutional impasse.

Continue Reading »

Constitutional & Political Challenges During Liaquat’s Premiership - 1/2 (1949-51)

Athar Osama June 25th, 2007

By: Athar Osama 

“In all [the] matters the Qauid-e-Azam, with failing health and fits of impatience over details, had to rely more and more upon the Prime Minister, whose statesmanship grew with increasing responsibilities. Hence the death of the Great Leader, less than thirteen months after the creation of Pakistan, was not so shattering a blow as had been feared. There was a Joshua to Succeed the Mosses”.  (The Times of London, Oct. 17, 1951, quoted in Sayeed, 1960)

Up until the death of the Quaid, the real power resided within the office of the Governor General and, with his towering and awe-inspiring personality, the Prime Minister, while being the constitutional head of government, deferred to him. With the death of the Quaid, however, the balance of power shifted to where the constitution suggested that it should i.e. in the Office of the Prime Minister.pk-150px-Liaquat_Ali_Khan.jpg

With this great power also came great responsibility. While Quaid’s one year in office as the Governor General was a time of merely keeping up with the tumultous events that had overtaken Pakistan during that first year of its existence, Liaquat found himself having to define the government of Pakistan and take policy initiatives. While Liaquat may not have been able to resolve many of Pakistan’s early problems, he was definitely able to show independence of mind and policy in his three or more years in office. Several questions have emerged about Liaquat’s premiership:

  • What was the role of Liaquat Ali Khan in the Kashmir saga, especially given that Liaquat accepted the initial ceasefire with India? Did Liaquat adopt the right course on India or did he sold out the Kashmir cause, as has been alleged by his critics? Was Liaquat a dove, a realist, or a foreign policy hawk?
  • What was Liaquat’s vision about constitutional progress in Pakistan? Did Liaquat have a real plan for delivering first constitution of Pakistan–albeit at a much relaxed timescale–or did, like many other politicians of his time, preferred to avoid opening the can of worms that Constitution had become?
  • What was Liaquat’s position on several of the questions that were central to constitiutional development, namely, the role of religion in Pakistan, the inter-provincial relations, and center-provice relations etc.?
  • Did Liaquat make the right choice by adopting a pro-western policy for Pakistan (and in the process snubbing the Soviet Union)? Did he act independently in doing so or was he pressured into doing so by powerful elements within the state?

We will make an attempt to address some of these questions this week. Due to the tremendous scale of challenges faced during Liaquat’s premiership in political, constitutional, and foreign policy realms, we have divided this article into two pieces. We will discuss Liaquat’s immediate challenges (Kashmir etc.) and political problems in this piece and follow up with constitutional issues (especially, Objectives Resolution) and other foreign policy initiatives (especially, Liaquat-Nehru Pact) on Thursday (June 28, 2007).

Continue Reading »

Constitutional & Political Challenges During Liaquat’s Premiership - 2/2 (1949-51)

Athar Osama June 25th, 2007

By: Athar Osama

On Monday (June 25th, 2007), we began our investigtion of Liaquat Ali Khan tenure as the first Prime Minister of Pakistan. We looked Liaquat’s credentials for the responsibility that was put on his shoulders, the early difficulties he faced in bringing the nation together and healing its wounds in the immediate aftermath of Jinnah’s death, and his attempts to find a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir crisis. We also looked at the immediate political challenges faced by Liaquat’s Ministry.

pk-Liaqat_death.jpgIn this piece, we look at two other important aspects of Liaquat’s Premiership, namely, progress in constitution-making (most specifically the objectives resolution) and his foreign policy posture (i.e. Pakistan’s pro-Western foreign policy stance). Both these issues have defined Pakistan’s history over several decades that followed and remain, to this day, unresolved. Yet, it was during Liaquat’s momentous premiership that Pakistan first attempted to address these… 

Pakistan’s Constitutional Problems

While the Center-Province relations in this early phase of Pakistan’s history were far from ideal, the inter-provincial relations also presented a sorry picture. Until Quaid-e-Azam’s death in fall of 1948, the Constituent Assembly whose primary purpose was to create the first constitution for Pakistan had made little progress in actually doing so. Much of its legislative energy had thus far been spent in emergency legislation that was necessary in day-to-day operation of the country. Two issues represent the significant challenges it faced in making worthwhile progress on the constitutional question.

The negotiation on center-province (i.e. relative distribution of power between federal and provincial governments) inter-provincial relations (i.e. the make up of the legislative organs in the new constitution) was in a state of a deadlock with East Pakistani Province of East Bengal that commanded a sizeable majority in the Constituent Assembly seeking representation based on population while Punjab (and, to a lesser extent, the other provinces of West Pakistan) seeking to deny the same. 

The second issue that presented a major hurdle in Constituent Assembly’s progress toward the constitutional question was a lack of census on the Islamic character of Pakistan. This was especially a precarious issue because of the need to preserve the rights and liberties of a significant minority of Hindus that had remained in Pakistan since Independence. Hindus made up not so insignificant populations in all West Pakistani provinces—most notably Sindh—and a fairly significant one in East Pakistan from where they also held several seats in the Constituent Assembly.

Continue Reading »

Early Challenges Under Jinnah (1947-48)

Athar Osama June 18th, 2007

By: Athar Osama 

The rushed and haphazard manner in which the plans for the division of British India were devised and executed left so much to be desired, caused immeasurable suffering to the people on both sides of the border, left a crushing social and economic burden on the two countries—more so on Pakistan than on India, though—and a legacy of mutual rivalry and armed conflict that they continue to struggle with even to this day.

For the citizens of the nascent state, however, there were important and pressing matters to attend to. Pakistan had arrived and, with it brought a “promised homeland” for at least a major section of the Muslims of India. It also came with great opportunities and tremendous challenges.  

Yet, with their Quaid-e-Azam at the healm, Pakistanis believed that they could beat all odds and, having secured the country, wouldpk3-image001.jpg now secure their future as well. Unfortunately, that feeling did not last for too long. M. A. Jinnah–the frail leader almost on his deathbed–presided over a tumultous year for the country and, while being a source of great strength for his followers, he left a legacy as the first Governor General that could be described as mixed or “incomplete”, at best. Several questions may be raised of this first year of the country’s existence:

  • What were the factors in Jinnah’s mind that led him to adamantly deny Mountbatten’s desire to become the first Governor General of Pakistan (jointly with India)? What kind of cost-benefit analysis was made for taking that decision?
  • Did Jinnah’s insistence on becoming the first Governor General of Pakistan against Mountbatten’s desire cost Pakistan to the point of becoming crippled? Would Pakistan have fared better–in terms of share in assets, Kashmir etc.–had Mountbatten been allowed to become the Governor General instead?
  • Did Jinnah’s assumption of the office of the Governor General as well as President of Constituent Assembly and the President of Muslim League leave a tradition of personalization of power that afflicts Pakistan to this day?
  • What was the precise role of second-tier politicians in the post-independence Pakistan? What did Jinnah think of them and how did he (or did he?) groom them to becomes future leaders of Pakistan?
  •  What were Jinnah’s views about democracy in Pakistan? And how did he view events such as dissolution of assemblies in Sindh and NWFP, and imposition of direct rule in Baluchistan in the light of that?
  • Being the ”constitutionalist par excellence” that he was, what was Jinnah’s role toward the formation of the first Constitution of the country?

It is hard to look at Jinnah’s first and last year in office as anything other than the struggles of a dying man clinging on to life because he thinks, and rightly so, that the nation needs him most, only to lose this battle between life and death–that he has fought so hard for so many years– within a matter of months. These and many other questions highlight the critical issues confronting the country at that time. They may have also left deep legacies that continue to affect the nation today.

Continue Reading »

Pakistan Becomes a Reality (1947)

Athar Osama June 11th, 2007

By: Athar Osama 

The partition of the sub-continent at the eve of the British departure from India is such a colossal event in the history of the peoples of the region that it is difficult to adequately describe even a single element of it in the space allocated to this article. Indeed, British Historian Nicholas Mansergh has filled ten volumes of the “The Transfer of Power” containing documents and narratives describing the circumstances leading up to and of this momentous event.

It is also an event that unfolded over such a wide geographical swath of land and in such diverse circumstances of its protagonists—the British, the Hindus, the Muslims, the Sikhs—that generalizing these experiences into one will be a gross injustice to the event itself.

Despite all this, the partition of the subcontinent remains the single most important event in the history of the region that not only changed—sometimes altogether—the lives of hundreds of millions of people but also continues to define their outlook and destinies to this day.

The very act of the partition of India provides an opportunity to ask several questions:

  • What were the ideas and opinions from all sides–British, Hindu, Muslims, Sikhs, but especially the British–that shaped the 3rd June Plan for Division of India?
  • Why was the plan of partition rushed through the British parliament and thrust down the throats of the Indian (Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh) leadership?
  • What was the role of Lord Mountbatten–the last Viceroy of India–in the entire scheme of things? Did he act as an impartial or a partial actor in the unfolding drama?
  • Could the calamity that was unleashed at the partition have been avoided, had certain measures been adopted prior to the partition?
  • Was the Pakistani demand an act of “political suicide”? Was the resulting Pakistan really “designed to fail” or could it it have been created differently to make it a more viable state?

This piece covers events of 1947–starting from the June 3rd Plan up until August 15th, 1947 and beyond–as it looks at partition from multiple perspectives. 

Continue Reading »

« Prev - Next »