Understanding Pakistan Project

Understanding Pakistan Project Team September 16th, 2007

Guest Post By: Brig (Retd.) Shaukat Qadir 

Part 1: Operation Gibraltar: Battle that never was

Unfortunately most of our history, particularly that relating to the conduct of military operations, remains shrouded in mystery, since none of the actual details is made public. Consequently, even those like myself who possess some knowledge of the actual events need to piece these together with educated speculations to fill in the gaps. Today, 40 years after this war, the true story remains untold.

Within the military an effort has been made to detail and analyse the actual events, but even these efforts might not be the whole truth, nor have they been made public. Therefore, those who choose to read this version with skepticism might be more sensible than those who consider this an accurate version, but I will attempt to relate the events as I am aware of them. If these read like a comedy of errors, I can only suggest that occasionally truth is indeed stranger than fiction.

Early the same year Pakistan army had successfully defended itself against the Indian attempted incursion in the Rann of Kutch, but that chapter was closed since the dispute had been referred for arbitration. Why therefore should Pakistan embark on a venture that might lead to war remains an unanswered question to date, particularly when we were aware that such a venture in which we were considered the aggressor would result in the severance of aid from the US, which ultimately happened?

It is a matter of historical record that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, then foreign minister, convinced Ayub Khan, the president, that the Indian response to our incursions in Kashmir would not be across the international boundary and would be confined to Kashmir.

He must have offered powerful diplomatic arguments as forcefully and articulately as he could, but despite that I find it difficult to comprehend how Ayub accepted such an argument which was militarily untenable and, while Ayub could be accused of many things, he was far from being militarily unwise.

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• Relations with India , Ayub Khan , Military , 1965 , Guest Post
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Athar Osama September 15th, 2007

By: Athar Osama 

In the first of this three part episode, we looked at the War in Kashmir that began as a precursor to the broader conflict between India and Pakistan. Hostilities began on August 5th and 6th 1965 when Pakistan army regulars infiltrated the Cease Fire Line (CFL) in Kashmir. On August 7th 1965, Pakistani forces carried out a raid in the Kargil area to cut off the road links between Srinagar and Ladakh. Between August 12th and 16th, Pakistan continued its attack on an Indian Army post in Kargil accompanied by shelling in the Chhamb sector. Increasingly, both countries were employing their regular forces in these operations and a low-intensity localized war was already underway.

(Figure: A Map of Pakistan-India War of 1965: The Ground Battles created by the author is on the next page. Please click below.)

 Brian Cloughley, in his “A History of Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections”, notes:

“There were statements in the respective parliaments, letters to the UN, and briefings of international media, but there was sense of buying time. On the Pakistan sided, it was still hoped that the actions of the Mujahids would persuade the population of the valley to rise up, whereafter the Pakistani regular troops could be deployed with a semblance of legality. The Indians were not averse to escalation of the conflict as it would, in their view, provide an opportunity to make up for the humiliation in the Runn of Kutch and settle things once and for all with their recalcitrant neighnour. They wanted to “get at and smash the Pakistani war machine’” (Cloughley, 1999, p. 63)

Here are a few videos of the 1965 War. The first of these is a typical motivational video (with a Pakistani-bent) that puts together a collage of pictures from the war itself. The second video (next page) is an Indian video of similar nature. The difference between how same events are potrayed by the popular press and public in the two countries couldn’t have been more stark. The third video (next page) is a brief actual clip of the War, perhaps taken from a Pakistani news report. (Courtesy: YouTube.com)

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• Foreign Policy , Relations with India , Ayub Khan , Military , 1965 , History in a Nutshell
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Athar Osama September 6th, 2007

By: Athar Osama

The origins of the 1965 War between Pakistan and India, its conduct over the course of several weeks, and its consequences are quite complex for one to be able to do justice with it. Add on top of that the fact that countries engage in one-upmanship to try to make exaggerated accusations of who started the war and claims of victory after it ends, primarily in order to manage “public opinion” at home, and it really gets very difficult and tricky. One additional unfortunate factor in lack of quality reporting on the 1965 War was the attempt by Pakistani leadership—both military and civilian—to attempt to destroy the evidence of the circumstances that actually led to this war. General K. M. Arif, in his biography “Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-97” for instance writes that in the immediate aftermath of the 1965 War:

“Pakistan suffered a loss of a different kind…Soon after the War the GHQ ordered all the formations and units of the Pakistan Army to destroy their respective war diaries and submit completed reports to this effect by a given date. This was done…Their [the war diaries’] destruction, a self-inflicted injury and an irreparable national loss, was intellectual suicide.”

                                    — General Khalid Mehmood Arif, Vice Chief of Army Staff, Pakistan Army

While unofficial accounts of the 1965 War by several Pakistani figures that participated in that war, including Ayub’s biographer Altaf Gauhar, Major General Shaukat Riza, Lt. General Gul Hassan, and General Mohammad Musa have since come to the fore, the “official” version of Pakistan’s military plans and objectives from that and how the performance of our commanders and troops differed from these have not surfaced.

Additionally, no effort has been made to systematically evaluate Pakistan’s strategic and operational plans and attempt to learn some lessons from the preparation and conduct of the war. Much of this remains an official secret protected by the Official Secrets Act that does not allow anyone to compromise such information due to a perceived “national interest”. Even General K. M. Arif’s book, for instance, carries only a copy of a map depicting an Indian military plan but none from Pakistan which could have been easily accessible to a person of his stature and position.  This then sets the backdrop of this analysis of the preparation and conduct of the 1965 War between India and Pakistan.

Rationale and Preparation for the War

Several events such as the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the frustrations over lack of progress in the Kashmir dispute, and Pakistan’s own victory in the limited Runn of Kutch Affair, contributed to the events that led towards the 1965 War between India and Pakistan.

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• Foreign Policy , Kashmir , Relations with India , Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto , Ayub Khan , 1965 , Military , History in a Nutshell
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Understanding Pakistan Project Team September 6th, 2007

By: Athar Osama

Ever since its creation, Pakistan’s national security challenges, primarily a threat from India, had occupied the minds of its defense and foreign policy planners. Just months after the country’s creation, a war broke out with India over the disputed territory of Kashmir. A day after its founder—Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah—passed away, India invaded the independent state of Hyderabad and annexed it with brutal force. Nothing it seemed was safe from Indian designs and the Indian leaders had made it amply clear that they would like the renegade Pakistan to return back to Mother India. (Figure: President Ayub Khan with Mrs. Kennedy during their visit to Pakistan. Foreign Minister Bhutto is seen in the background).

Pakistan’s Search for Security through Western Alliances

In this age of extreme paranoia—based on a fear that was justifiable or not—Pakistan’s leaders began looking for defense alliances, primarily with Western countries, to seek some level of comfort and security for its defense needs. The military had always been a pro-Western factor in Pakistan’s politics. The forces have been heavily dependent on foreign military trade and aid for their hardware and training needs respectively. In the initial years of the country’s independence, Britain provided some additional military hardware to stuff Pakistan’s virtually empty military arsenals. Britain, however, was not willing to meet all the defense procurement needs of the new country for it was also on friendly terms with India as well. During the late 1950s, therefore, there was a sharp switch towards a pro-America stance in Pakistan’s foreign in national security policy. Pakistan Army’s defense needs led this movement while the Airforce and Navy largely remained dependent on Britain and France for their weaponry.

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• Kashmir , Relations with India , Relations with US , United Nations , Foreign Policy , Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto , 1962-1965 , Military , Ayub Khan , History in a Nutshell
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