Understanding Pakistan Project

iFaqeer June 4th, 2007

By: Sabahat Ashraf (iFaqeer)

The anchor piece this week can best be described, in its own words, as “a criticism of looking at Pakistan’s history from its ideological prism”. But I’d like to point out that even in setting it up in that way, it is very difficult for us to get out of that way of thinking completely.

The piece starts out by asserting that the idea of Pakistan was first formally presented to the Muslims of the Sub-Continent in 1937 and goes on to imply that it became a rallying cry in 1940. That in itself can be taken as revisionism–and taken as revisionism based on either what can loosely be taken as the pro-Two Nation Theory point of view or the anti-Two Nation Theory. One could say that the idea was not just a 1935-47 phenomenon. Or one could say that “Pakistan” wasn’t actually the real desired end-game of the likes of Mr. Jinnah, either, until it became the only option left to them. And the anchor piece does a good job of laying out the history that can be used as the basis for either critique. And in that, I think it meets the aim set for this project.

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The conclusion that the demand for Pakistan was to “make a radical demand and then negotiate for as much as you can get” gambit on the part of one of the best strategic legal minds the Subcontinent has ever produced is one that is held by several serious academics I have talked to, especially over the last few years. And it is backed by some serious analysis of statements by Mr. Jinnah, particularly, during the 1937-47 period and in the period between the June 3 Plan being accepted by all and the actual date of independence. But even that can be taken as buying into the Jinnah-centrism that seems to be so dominant on all sides of the discussion, and on both sides of the Durand Line–especially in relation to that last phase of the independence process.

To accept without questioning that The Two Nation Theory has deep roots in history is, at one level, in and of itself an acceptance of the official Pakistani version of the foundational myth. Which is not to say that the official Indian version, unquestioningly held by almost all Indians till very recently, or the other minority views floating around, are any better at providing us a complete or, for that matter, accurate picture.

But before we get into details, I feel I have to say a couple of things up front.

I work actively within at least one pan-South Asian diaspora group on issues of peace, human rights, etc., in South Asia. And the two things I want to put on the table come out of that experience.

Firstly, I would like to point out emphatically that it is not just Pakistanis that frame their whole engagement of what their country is and how it came about on their reaction to, and feelings about, The Two Nation Theory. In fact, one could say that, with a few exceptions like those offering Marxist critiques of our foundational myths, The Two Nation Theory has been used by both sides of the Durand Line and all sides of the social debate as a way out of having to discuss any of the other layers and dynamics at play.

I personally do not think that a discussion of history and the merits of The Two Nation Theory and how it came about are of no utility. Yet I have to admit that I have had occasion to say that

Pakistan is an established reality and that we need to discuss the issues of the people of South Asia based on that fact, instead of having all our energies and time be spent hashing and rehashing that discussion. So when we raise that, people like me are not saying that discussions of The Theory are moot; but that they should not be the end-all and be-all of social, political and historical analysis.

The second thing that has often struck me–a couple of times rather startlingly–is that people, both Pakistani and otherwise, often take for granted that you share their view of The Two Nation Theory. I have had moments where a friend and interlocutor realized that halfway through a discussion that that was the case and been thrown off completely at that point, not sure how to continue the discussion.

Lastly, in terms of setting things up, it is now about three generations since independence, and it seems, to this humble observer, that we are now getting to a point where a discussion can be had about the history of the independence and division of South Asia that includes a generation of people who are not directly, or indirectly through their own parents, related to the events. And this is creating a sea change. I think it is because of this change, for example, that we are starting to openly question the inevitability of the foundation Pakistan.

Having said all that, if, in the course of this discussion, we are able to cover, or uncover, issues and how they have presented themselves in history and what they mean for things today, we will have made a contribution towards moving the discussion forward. And of course, I say that first and foremost, given the mandate of this website and project, in terms of the Pakistani context. But personally, I think that is relevant in the wider South Asian, if not global context as well.

So, the ideological prism for looking at the history of Pakistan.

First of all, I don’t entirely agree that doing that is a matter of choosing where to start. It has been more a matter of picking and choosing what to look at in each period. And the tendency to do that is not limited to Pakistan, so we shouldn’t get into any complexes or exceptionalism in that regard. However, the fact remains that we have done a lot of that in the Pakistani context, and continue to do so. As I have said above, whether we admit it up front or not, all discussion of the process and history of South Asia in general and Pakistan in particular happens in the shadow of The Two Nation Theory, and pretending otherwise is either naive, unwise or driven by one or other agenda. It is necessary to work in that context in discussing the questions what we need to discuss.

I don’t, however, completely agree with Athar when he says that we–or even most of us Pakistanis–accept what we were taught in “Pakistan Studies” class, hook, line and sinker. We are definitely not trusting enough of authority to do that. But I do agree that the lack of a robust intellectual give-and-take in the sixth largest nation in the world has definitely left us with a deficit of knowledge about our own and our country’s history. And it definitely contributes to what Athar describes as apathy towards politics and social conditions, but I see which I see more as a sense of powerlessness in the face of historical forces we don’t completely comprehend. And it is the powerlessness that leads to inaction, since it is a short step from not understanding a problem to not knowing what to do about it.

Athar begins his analysis with what might be considered a post mortem of the 1937 elections.

In terms of the history itself, a couple of things that bear mention. Firstly, as the mention of “Muslim seats” implies, “Separate Electorates” were already in place at that point. This had been a demand of the Muslim leadership. So, when you think about it, the first acknowledgement that there was more than one community in the Subcontinent that required separate political representation had already been made. And, if you follow the official Pakistani line, the first step towards separate nations had already been laid. It is interesting, also, that we mention that 376 seats were won my “other Muslim groups”. But in the dominant discourse we hardly ever identify these groups.

The other thing that bears pointing out in the discussion of the period beginning with the elections of 1937 is the mention of Jinnah working from that point on to rebuild the League. It is part of the official “Pakistan Studies” curriculum, but I am often surprised how often it is not part of the picture that it was a drawn-out process and conversation between Mr. Jinnah on the one hand, and Iqbal and Jauhar on the other that convinced Mr. Jinnah to rejoin the process of negotiating with the British. He had in about 1930 or so, left Subcontinental politics and the Subcontinent itself in frustration. And it is interesting to note that the role in which he rejoined the fray was very different from the one he had played before that.

Moving on to “The Congress Minitries” from 1937 to 1939 themselves, their attitude to religious and other minorities definitely contributed towards the alienation of the Muslims from majoritarian government in India–an alienation that lasts at a very deep level to this day, both within today’s India and in Pakistan-India relations. But I think it is rather simplistic, and close to accepting the official Pakistani foundational myth to say almost without comment that the experience “forced them to ultimately demand a separate homeland for themselves”.

It also is worth noting that, for people who are steeped in the discipline of “Pakistan Studies”, and to those of us who been through the Pakistani educational system, the phrase “The Congress Ministries” is one of great resonance, much in the same way that “The Quit India Movement”, or “Lexington” are to the people of other nations. In fact, if I was writing only for an audience made up of people like myself, I wouldn’t have needed to add the qualifier “from 1937 to 1939″ above. It is part of received history, in the context of Pakistanis that that period of Indirect Rule (the official British term for the form of government adopted under the Government of India Act of 1935, which later was amended to form the basis of the governing documents of both India and Pakistan when they receivedindependence) basically left us no option but to demand Pakistan. “Divide and Quit” was Mr. Jinnah’s retort to the Quit India Movement started by the Congress, we are told.

However, as Athar points out, the discussion was not over at that point. It had just begun. And that even British Indirect Rule was not something that was ruled out completely–especially in the competing ideas being put forward by Muslim leaders. And, of course, given the complete identification of Mr. Jinnah with the very idea of Pakistan–till very, very recently–the point of Mr. Jinnah having been neutral to the many ideas floating around, and remaining so till two months before the Resolution passed in Lahore on March 23rd, 1940, will, to a very many people, be very startling.

As, when you think about it, should the clear assertion that it was only a year later, that the clear demand for separate, independent country was first made–and even then, it was only by a committee of one provincial wing of the party that did so: the Sindh Muslim League (in approval of a resolution introduced by G M Syed!). By the end of 1938, the League was still providing very generally-worded authorizations for its President.

And at this point in the story, Athar provides some insights that were new even to me. The mention of attending a conference on Palestine provides an interesting historical marker, setting the international context of events and providing a glimpse into the international vision of pre-independencce Muslim leadership that we very rarely get. The mention of Jinnah-Bose talks is as tantalizing. I hope Athar will provide some more footnote-type material on them, so we can follow up.

Which brings us to the Resolution of March 23, 1940. Pakistanis, and some others, often refer to it as the Pakistan Resolution–as does Athar at one point. But as any less-than-ideologically-reverent reading of the operative excerpt (which Athar also reproduces) and which us products of the Pakistani educational system have all learnt by heart at one point or another, will show, that resolution still left quite a bit of leeway on the final shape of “Pakistan”. For one thing, the excerpt ends with a reference to “independent states … in which the constituent states shall be autonomous and sovereign…”. One snappy comment on that nugget is that Bangladesh doesn’t negate that manifestation of The Two Nation Theory; it only fulfills it.

And yes, the events between March 1940 and August 1947 are well-documented history, but to accept that history as just one in which Mr.Jinnah, now acclaimed as the “Quaid-e-Azam” by, excuse the expresson, “A Grateful Nation”, “kept both British and Hindus at bay as he championed the cause of a homeland for Muslims”, seems as too straight and simple a description for a reader of history shaped by Pakistani society to accept without question. Seriously, ask yourself, If this was any other topic, would any of us accept such an uncomplicated view of a period of seven of the most critical years in our nation’s history? In fact, scratch a few Pakistanis, as they say, and see if they do accept that.

I am very gratified that Athar touches, to use his word, on the enigma that is Gandhi. The only place where I have seen any discussion of Gandhi by a Pakistani is Adil Najam’s post on Pakistaniat.com. The journey of my own attitude to the Mahatma has gone around in at least one full circle. It bears pointing out that the view of one wonderful, rainbow Indian Nation was not something Gandhiji held without qualification. On the other hand, not enough Pakistanis appreciate the post-partition attitude and actions of Gandhi. And, in my view, even fewer Indians do.

In the discussion of the actual transfer of power, saying that the June 3 Plan set things up “precisely as envisioned in the Pakistan Resolution” seems like a simplification, too, as I have said above.

The quotation from the British King at independence, is a gem that this extensive student of Pakistani history has to admit, he had not seen before. And this despite the fact that the point it makes is one that could very easily add to the richness of and pride we South Asians, on both sides of the border, have in our history. I guess the reason one doesn’t often hear it is that we’re too busy quoting our favourite statements from our respective national parents–the midnight quote from Nehru and the “You can go to your temples, mosques and churches” quote from the Quaid.

Athar’s closing notes are also interesting in what he says and how he says it. Personally, I feel that the line about how a country that had two wings separated by over a thousand miles was ridiculous is contradicted by the fact that the configuration worked for a quarter of a century and was only undone by the kind of national “irreconciliable differences” that have threatened the national unity of much more ethnically and geographically unitary states–the US is, but one example. Secondly, what are we to do with the point, on the one hand, of saying that Pakistan was a country set up to fail and then pile on top of it the point that most of the leaders of this new country lacked sincerity and then look back to where the set-up worked in one piece for a quarter century, and continues to exist 60 years later?

The Pandora’s box of questions Athar raises at the end of his piece, of course, are the real cats that we need to bring out of the closet and discuss how to bell. A lot of them have to do with contradictions that become glaringly obvious in any reading of the history that keeps its eyes open and unblinkered by ideology–religious or national. What I have tried to do above–at the risk of sounding like an inveterate contrarian–is to try and point out some of these contradictions as they occur to me in reading Athar’s chronology. And that’s what I hope to contribute in the next 19 episodes of this discussion.

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