Understanding Pakistan Project

Athar Osama June 18th, 2007

By: Athar Osama 

The rushed and haphazard manner in which the plans for the division of British India were devised and executed left so much to be desired, caused immeasurable suffering to the people on both sides of the border, left a crushing social and economic burden on the two countries—more so on Pakistan than on India, though—and a legacy of mutual rivalry and armed conflict that they continue to struggle with even to this day.

For the citizens of the nascent state, however, there were important and pressing matters to attend to. Pakistan had arrived and, with it brought a “promised homeland” for at least a major section of the Muslims of India. It also came with great opportunities and tremendous challenges.  

Yet, with their Quaid-e-Azam at the healm, Pakistanis believed that they could beat all odds and, having secured the country, would now secure their future as well. Unfortunately, that feeling did not last for too long. M. A. Jinnah–the frail leader almost on his deathbed–presided over a tumultous year for the country and, while being a source of great strength for his followers, he left a legacy as the first Governor General that could be described as mixed or “incomplete”, at best. Several questions may be raised of this first year of the country’s existence:

• What were the factors in Jinnah’s mind that led him to adamantly deny Mountbatten’s desire to become the first Governor General of Pakistan (jointly with India)? What kind of cost-benefit analysis was made for taking that decision?
• Did Jinnah’s insistence on becoming the first Governor General of Pakistan against Mountbatten’s desire cost Pakistan to the point of becoming crippled? Would Pakistan have fared better–in terms of share in assets, Kashmir etc.–had Mountbatten been allowed to become the Governor General instead?
• Did Jinnah’s assumption of the office of the Governor General as well as President of Constituent Assembly and the President of Muslim League leave a tradition of personalization of power that afflicts Pakistan to this day?
• What was the precise role of second-tier politicians in the post-independence Pakistan? What did Jinnah think of them and how did he (or did he?) groom them to becomes future leaders of Pakistan?
•  What were Jinnah’s views about democracy in Pakistan? And how did he view events such as dissolution of assemblies in Sindh and NWFP, and imposition of direct rule in Baluchistan in the light of that?
• Being the ”constitutionalist par excellence” that he was, what was Jinnah’s role toward the formation of the first Constitution of the country?

It is hard to look at Jinnah’s first and last year in office as anything other than the struggles of a dying man clinging on to life because he thinks, and rightly so, that the nation needs him most, only to lose this battle between life and death–that he has fought so hard for so many years– within a matter of months. These and many other questions highlight the critical issues confronting the country at that time. They may have also left deep legacies that continue to affect the nation today.

  

The Challenges and the Opportunities

The most immediate challenge facing the nation was to cope with the refugee situation. The new country was burdened with having to rehabilitate millions of refugees coming from Punjab and various parts of India. According to an estimate, nearly 6.5 million people came into Pakistan with over 5.2 million from East Punjab, another 360,000 from Delhi and the remainder from other pats of India (Khan, 2001). With the new state already strained for resources, looking after and rehabilitating these people was a major challenge.

On the positive side, Pakistan inherited 22 million acres (or 32% of the total) of irrigated land from British India. Nearly 75% of the net sown area in Pakistan had irrigation facilities as against 22.5% in India. Owing to better irrigation, and probably soil conditions as well, Pakistan enjoyed much better yields per hectare than India’s. (Vakil, 1950)

Pakistan received 70% of the British India’s jute capacity as well. However, having lost the entire jute mill infrastructure to Calcutta, it could not process its raw jute and had to depend on India for buying and further processing its jute crop, at least in the short-run. Similarly, while Pakistan produced 40% of British India’s cotton, it only had 14 of the 394 textile mills that existed in India before partition.(Vakil, 1950)

On the negative side, however, Pakistan was robbed of a major portion of its rightful share (under the partition plan) of the military assets—and weaponry—that was stationed at garrisons and depots that were spread across India. Another major deficiency that Pakistan faced was the vastly unequal distribution of power generation capacity, both existing and potential. India had vast resources of coal that was available for cheap power generation while Pakistan seriously lacked in its coal reserves.

Similarly, Pakistan had limited water resources for both irrigation and power generation (India’s estimated hydel power generation capacity was 30-40 million kilowatt while Pakistan’s was merely half a million kilowatt) (Vakil, 1950). With the Kashmir becoming a disputed territory, even these water resources were in serious jeopardy as India could, at will, deprive Pakistan of its share of water by capturing most of this resource upstream.

With resources and destinies so interlinked with each other (i.e. Pakistan’s dependence on India’s goodwill for its water, and India’s dependence on Pakistan’s raw material for its factories), much was dependent upon the goodwill between the two countries. Leaders on both sides made public statements that suggested that they expected nothing short of that. Some had, in the past, even suggested the possibility of a joint-defense pact between the two countries. However, in reality the relationship that emerged, as the ashes of the partition settled, was everything but cordial. This took leaders on both sides by surprise and Pakistan, being the weaker and smaller of the two states, suffered immensely as a result.

Row with Mountbatten

Many believe that in the raw deal that Pakistan got from the Boundary Commission, in the matter of the accession of Princely States, as well as the distribution of economic resources and military assets, Mountbatten was primarily motivated to get even with Quaid-e-Azam on the latter’s rebuttal to him with regards to his desire to become the Joint-Governor General of both India and Pakistan. Earlier, during the transfer of power negotiations, it had become quite clear that Mountbatten wanted to close his illustrious career in colonial administration by being appointed the Governor General of both India and Pakistan.

Some contended that this could have been in the interest of both the countries—especially, the weaker Pakistan—since much of the division of assets was still pending at the time of partition and majority of the assets—industrial, economic, and military—were in India’s physical possession. They argued that a Joint-Governor General with the constitutional responsibility to look after the interests of both dominions would have tried to be fairer to both. This, however, was not to be as Quaid-e-Azam refused to accept Mountbatten as Governor General of Pakistan and instead nominated himself to the post.

Philip Zeigler, in “Mountbatten: An Official Biography”, recalls the following conversation between Jinnah and the Viceroy:

“When Mountbatten pointed out that the Muslim leader’s [Jinnah’s] powers as a Prime Minister would be far greater than as a Governor General, Jinnah retorted: ‘In my position it is I who will give the advice and others will act on it’, Mountbatten argued that only with a common Governor General did Pakistan stand any chance of securing its fair share of assets. Jinnah was unmoved. ‘I [Mountbatten] asked him “Do you realize what this will cost you?” He replied sadly, “It may cost me several crores of rupees in assets,” to which I replied somewhat acidly, “It may well cost you the whole of your assets and the future of Pakistan”.  (Zeigler, 1985, p. 398)

There are mixed opinions about this matter. Some western observers term this as one of Quaid’s gravest mistakes, given the circumstances. Others have depicted him as a power-hungry soul who wanted nothing short of the highest title for himself.  Still others, including some Pakistani commentators, have justified his decision—although not its repercussions—as one based on sound argument.

The reason Quaid-e-Azam chose to become the Governor General, they argue, is not because no other title would have done justice to his persona but because there was a legitimate need for a Muslim figure to be the head of state of Pakistan to provide strength to the claim of sovereignty, especially because most administrative machinery, including Governors of several provinces and the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces were likely to be British for some time to come. Without a Muslim Governor General, there really would have been no real transfer of power from the British to the Muslims thus raising serious doubts about the claim of independence.

Within Pakistan itself, the debate on this issue has been mute. For Pakistanis, the Quaid’s stature is so great and his personality so flawless that it is inconceivable that he may have acted with any kind of mal-intent and/or made an error of judgment. Regardless of the motivations behind this action, it is perhaps one of the greatest puzzles of the partition saga to imagine how the partition would have unfolded if Mountbatten had been allowed to become the first Governor General of Pakistan and, as a result, Pakistan may have gotten a fairer deal during the partition. For example, would Pakistan have been better endowed in terms of resources to take care of its needs in the following years? Would the Kashmir, Hyderabad, and Junagardh issues been better resolved as a consequence of Mountbatten’s intervention? Would the intensity or the duration of the resulting carnage been reduced as a result?

While Mountbatten’s personality has been one of great controversy in Pakistan—primarily because of his central role in denying Pakistan its legitimate share of land and assets—and much is made of his soft corner for India and his “friendship” with Nehru and other notables of the Delhi’s social elite—it remains an intellectual curiosity if the latter was the cause or the effect of his bias towards Pakistan. While Quaid’s apprehensions about Mountbatten’s bias are quite understandable, especially given the manner in which the latter literally thrust the 3rd June Plan on him, and it was obvious to those around him that the two never got along on a personal level, perhaps it would have been worthwhile to take a temporary “bitter pill” in exchange for a fairer disposition vis-à-vis a host of issues on which Mountbatten could have been able to weigh-in in Pakistan’s favor. Of course, we may never know the definite answers to these but it is quite legitimate to ask the question.

Kashmir Explodes into a Crisis

With the crushing burden of the refugee crisis already bearing on the nascent nation’s shoulders, October brought further bad news as the situation in Kashmir exploded. The developing situation in Kashmir had its roots in the provisions of the 3rd June Plan as well. Under the terms of the plan, the five hundred or so Princely States in India—ruled so far by independent rulers under the protection of the King of England— were allowed to choose which of the two countries they wanted to affiliate themselves with. It was expected that geographical and population characteristics will dictate their ultimate choice. Majority of these Princely states ultimately made their choice on the basis of such pragmatic factors. However, rulers of Kashmir, Hyderabad, and Junagardh held out until the very end.

Hyderabad was ruled by a Muslim ruler—the Nizam—but the state had a majority Hindu population, as was Junagardh. Kashmir, on the other hand, had a Hindu Maharaja who ruled a majority Muslim population. While the Nizam of Hyderabad had decided not to join any of the two dominions, he was clearly sympathetic toward Pakistan. It was also an expectation that Maharaja of Kashmir will honor the wishes of his people and accede to Pakistan. This did not happen.

As the Maharaja failed to decide which country to opt for, his Muslim subjects rose up in a revolt against him. At the end of August, the Muslims in Poonch—part of Western Kashmir bordering Pakistan—revolted and formed their own Azad [Free] Kashmir Government. The Maharaja then ordered his troops to expel thousands of Muslims from the district of Jammu. In response, five thousand guerrilla tribesmen from NWFP crossed into Kashmir to help their fellow Muslims. Two days later, the Maharaja declared his mind: he acceded to India and asked for the support of Indian troops [Bolitho, 1954]. The ill-principled manner in which this happened caught the Pakistani political leadership by a surprise. The events put tremendous pressure on Pakistan to respond militarily to the resulting crisis.

In view of the urgency and gravity of the situation, Quaid-e-Azam moved from Karachi to Lahore on 26th of October to better monitor the crisis.  With Indian army quickly moving into Kashmir, Jinnah ordered his own half-baked and ill-resourced army to march toward Kashmir. However, Field Marshall Auchinleck, the overall commander of the combined armies and the in-charge of the division of military assets between the two countries, reasoned against such a move. He argued, first, that sending Pakistani troops into Kashmir will be ill-advised, constitutionally, as the Maharaja who, under the terms of the Partition Plan, was given the full right to accede to the country of his choice, had acceded legally and, second, that the Pakistan and Indian armies that comprised several senior British officers could not be asked to fight each other. Threatened with the dire prospect of pulling out all British officers—including the Commanders-in-Chief of both Indian and Pakistan army—the plan of invading Kashmir to take on the Indian army was abandoned. As time passed and the Indian army consolidated its control on power in Kashmir, and Pakistan was left with no choice but to resort to the United Nations’ mediation to resolve the issue.
 

Managing a Tight Political Ship

Several other significant political developments that took place during this time merit a mention. First, at the time of the partition, NWFP was ruled by a Congress-supported coalition government of Dr. Khan Sahib. While the people of NWFP, through a referendum, had indicated their desire to join Pakistan, this coalition was, in principle, against the state of Pakistan. According to some reports, Dr. Khan Sahib refused to take an oath of loyalty to Pakistan and refused to attend the hoisting ceremony of the national flag (Sayeed, 1960, p. 265) hence making it necessary to remove him from office. The Governor of NWFP, on the instructions of the Qauid, dissolved the Khan Sahib Ministry on August 22, 1947. Khan Sahib was later arrested and Emergency was imposed under section 92A of the Government of India Act of 1947.  

Other provinces of the country did not present a pretty picture either. In Sindh, for instance, the Chief Minister Ayub Khoro developed serious differences with Quaid’s nominated Governor Sheikh Ghulam Hussian Hidayatullah over the sharing of power (and appointment of key ministers in the cabinet) and was subsequently dismissed on charged of corruption and mal-administration on April 26, 1948. While this was the official reason for the dismissal, the underlying problems may have been deeper.

At the time of partition, serious differences had emerged between Sindhi Nationalist politicians—primarily Chief Minister Ayub Khoro—and the Muslim League leaders. The primary reason for this was the status of Karachi. Quaid-e-Azam and Muslim had decided to make Karachi the federal capital which meant that it could not remain under the jurisdiction of the Provincial Government. Taking Karachi away was an anathema to the Sindhi politicians as the city—small as it was, at the time—nonetheless was considered important, both economically and demographically. With the Chief Minister refusing to accede to Muslim League’s demand for handing over the control of Karachi, the province was in a state of deadlock.

In Punjab as well, a row had developed by this time between the Chief Minister, the Khan of Mamdot, and Mian Mumtaz Daultana, on one side, and Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan, on other side. This row ultimately grew into a full-fledged political crisis with much wider repercussions for the country. Finally, in Balauchistan, Quaid imposed direct rule by making it Governor General’s direct responsibility. In doing so, Quaid cited the lack of development of Balauchistan’s political institutions and asserted that direct rule may actually “benefit Balauchistan as compared to other provinces” [Sayeed, 1960]

The key reason for these early political setbacks—the sacking of the two ministries—was clearly the lack of development of Muslim League’s political machinery in most of the provinces that comprised West Pakistan. Quaid had spent several years building the Muslim League’s political infrastructure in these provinces, but Pakistan had perhaps arrived a few years too early. While the masses in these provinces had clearly rallied around the Pakistan Movement, the politicians themselves had not with the result that at the time of partition, the provincial governments were, at most, a patchwork of weak coalitions and temporary alignment of vested political interests. It took quite an effort—sometimes through constitutional and other times extra-constitutional means—to continue to align the interests of the these parochial provincial politicians with the central government in Karachi.

“I Can’t Waste My Time”

With the pressures of building a country from scratch and managing multiple crises, Quaid-e-Azam fell ill while he was still in Lahore. His frail health, however, could not dissuade him from working his usual long hours. When confronted on that issue, he would often simply say that he had to work as hard as he did.  Hector Bolitho—Jinnah’s first Biographer—relates several incidences of this final year of Quaid-e-Azam’s life that shed light on his commitment and determination as he toiled against all odds to ensure the country’s survival in its early and most precarious days.

Despite ill-health and extreme tiredness, he worked long hours at his desk at the Government house in Karachi. Quaid would receive fortnightly letters from each of the Governors of the four provinces—three of them British—that will brief him on the political situation in various parts of the country. He would often pass orders on how to tackle various problems as well. On the legislative side as well, Quaid’s role as the President of the Constituent Assembly demanded attention. Bolitho cites his Military Secretary as saying:

“When Bills would arrive for him to sign, he would go through them sentence by sentence. ‘Clumsy and badly worded,’ he would complain. I had to prepare myself beforehand for a cross-examination on the Bill, as if I had been the Minister who drafted it. He would say, ‘Split it up into more clauses!’ ‘This should go back and be re-written!’ When I pleaded, ‘You will be holding up a useful piece of legislation,’ he would relent. But his vigilance did not weaken. ‘They can’t hustle me,’ he would say. ‘I won’t do it.’”

In March, 1948, the Quaid traveled to East Pakistan in an attempt to better integrate the people of that province together into the Pakistani fabric. By that time, the language and class struggles had already begun in that part of the country with the working classes increasingly beginning to question the utility of the Pakistan struggle as they compared the reality on the ground with the utopian vision of the promised homeland that was to provide justice and equity to all. While the speeches, receptions, and meetings Jinnah had in East Pakistan were of a celebratory nature, by the large, he also faced at least one—probably a few more—instances of angry questions from second tier leaders and disturbances as well [Umar, 2004]. Undeterred, he continued to preach his mantra of unity, faith, and discipline to millions of his followers.

In April, the Quaid visited NWFP for another week of very hectic meetings, receptions, and travel. By the time he returned to Karachi, he was too weak to even work at his desk. He spent most of May in bed as he continued to work, albeit at a much diminished intensity. In June, he moved to a Banglow in Ziarat with a view to recuperate. Here too, however, his work continued to follow him as files that needed his attention poured in from Karachi at regular intervals. On July 1st, 1948, Jinnah, despite the insistence of his personal staff, made a trip to Karachi to inaugurate the State Bank of Pakistan. To him, this meant a lot as it symbolized the “sovereignty [of the new country] in the financial sphere”.

The Final Month

By the end of July, Quaid’s condition had deteriorated to an extent that he had to give up all work and was put under strict monitoring of a doctor a nurse. In August he was shifted to Quetta to allow him to be nearer to medical facilities. By mid-August, with constant medication, round-the-clock care, and complete rest, Quaid had recovered somewhat. Bolitho writes the following about his last weeks:

“IT must have been written many times, that a man reveals all his life in the way he dies. This was true of Mohammed Ali Jinnah. Although his slim body — which came to weigh only seventy pounds — moved so vitally, and his eyes kept their fire, those who were near him saw that his will, not his physical strength, was deciding when he should die. Miss Jinnah has recalled, ‘For several years before his death there was a constant tug-of-war between his physicians and the Quaid-i-Azam. They warned him to take long intervals of rest and short hours of hard work, but he did exactly the opposite, knowing full well the risk he was running. Often his doctors complained to me that he ignored their advice.’  Whenever Miss Jinnah said to her brother, “You must see a doctor,” he would answer, “No. I’ve got too much to do. I can’t waste my time.” [Bolitho, 1954, p. 219]

By late August, however, things took a negative turn. Bolitho notes:

“On August 29, he said to Dr Bakhsh [his personal physician], “You know, when you first came to Ziarat, I wanted to live. Now, however, it does not matter whether I live or die.” Dr Bakhsh wrote in his diary afterwards, ‘I noticed tears in his eyes….I could not account for his dejection….The explanation he offered was that he had completed his job, but I found this enigmatic and evasive. Was his job incomplete five weeks before? Had he done something in the meantime which had given him a sense of fulfillment? I could not help feeling that something had happened to undermine his will to live.’”  [Bolitho, 1954, p.223]

On Sept 5, 1948, the Quaid contracted pneumonia and came down with very high fever. On Sept. 10, his personal physician told Miss Jinnah that the Quaid may not survive for more than a few days. Facing the inevitable, arrangements were quickly made to get him back to the nation’s capital. At 4:15pm the next day, his aircraft landed at Maripur airforce base in Karachi. He was carried onto a stretcher to an ambulance which began the journey back to the Government house.

Much is made of the incident of the breaking down of the ambulance on the way from Maripur and the painful hour that the dying Quaid spent in the sweltering September heat on the road. It was most likely a chance happening brought about due to the extreme secrecy with which the Quaid was being transported back in his final hours. For the fear of spreading the news of his true condition too soon, he had expressly forbidden even Liaquat Ali Khan—his most trusted lieutenant—to receive him at the airport. If there was a conspiracy in this episode, it has never been unearthed. In all likelihood, however, this incident only advanced, perhaps by a few hours, what was inevitable anyway.

Quaid-e-Azam died a few minutes past 10 pm on Sept. 11, 1948 and left a sea of mourners behind him. His last words are reported to have been about Kashmir. To many observers, the Quaid signified—in totality—what Pakistan stood for. For others, he was the living embodiment of Pakistan. For millions of his followers—many of whom illiterate and destitute—he was Pakistan (Campbell et al., 1963). Through his life, that was spent in the championing for the Muslim homeland and the principled yet determined struggle for its creation and then survival, he showed his followers what a Pakistani should be like. In his death, too, the First Citizen did not fail to set an example for his fellow compatriots as he gave the ultimate sacrifice of his life.

The First Governor General in Retrospect

It is difficult to view the last year of Quaid’s life in any other way but through the prism of the crushing responsibilities that were put on his frail and dying being. What kind of alertness of mind and soul can one expect from a person literally lying on his deathbed, as Quaid no doubt was for most of 1948. There are still several questions that may be asked of the political developments of this momentous year and the choices made (or not made) by the Quaid in response to these. These questions will never be definitively answered for the protagonists of that time are all gone, and Quaid, in his characteristic aloof style (made more extreme, perhaps, due to his afflictions) did not share much insight with those around him.

For example, questions like: What was the role of the second and third tier political leadership during Quaid’s short tenure as Governor General of Pakistan? To what extent did Quaid-e-Azam trust the politicians—other than Liaquat Ali Khan, who definitely enjoyed his trust—in both the center and the provinces? How did the Quaid divide his time between his executive and legislative functions? What was the progress made by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in the writing of the Constitution of Pakistan during this first year’s of its existence? Did the Quaid—a constitutionalist par excellence—provide any guidance in this process, and if yes, then what was it? What were the Quaid’s views about the creation of democratic institutions in Pakistan and how did he view some of his own actions (e.g. the dissolution of provincial assemblies and the imposition of direct rule in Balauchistan) in that context?

And finally how did Quaid-e-Azam view the controversy about the separation of powers arising due to his own holding of the Muslim League leadership, the Governor Generalship, and the Presidentship of the Constituent Assembly?  [Sayeed, 1960, p. 246]. It was obvious that Quaid-e-Azam enjoyed tremendous power in the political set up of 1947-48. Not only was he the Governor General of the country but perhaps the most powerful Governor General of all-times, even more powerful than British Viceroys. He, as the President of the Constituent Assembly, also enjoyed significant control over the legislative functions. In addition, through a special amendment in the Independence of India Act of 1947 that was signed by the Viceroy, on his insistence, he enjoyed the unique and absolute power to change the constitution by a mere stroke of a pen. Nobody could challenge his authority or judgment on any action, whatsoever [Sayeed, 1960, p.271]. And nobody did.

To the extent that we can, it may be useful to understand these first formative years of Pakistan’s political and constitutional history and how the Quaid viewed them as they ultimately set important precedents for a nation that revered its leader with great awe and inspiration and was willing to take his word (and example) as an unwritten constitution.

Photo Captions & Credits:

1. Picture 1 - Life Sketch of Quaid-e-Azam published in 1948. This was sent by Syed Wajih Umar in Massachusetts (whose friend’s friend discovered it at a local hawker’s)

2. Picture 2 - An image of the inner article in the Life Magazine on Pakistan’s early difficulties published in 1948. (credit, same as above).

3. Picture 3 - A much frail and tired Jinnah in 1948.

4. Picture 4 - Jinnah’s Funeral in Karachi (Sept. 1948)

• Legislature & Legislation , Inter-Provincial Relations , Fatima Jinnah , Mohammed Ali Jinnah , 1947-1948 , Constitution , Politics , History in a Nutshell