Understanding Pakistan Project

Athar Osama July 2nd, 2007

By: Athar Osama 

We left the story of Pakistan last week at a critical juncture in its history. The new country is in its fifth year since independence. It has lost two of its most capable leaders—first, Quaid-e-Azam (the greatest leader) who passed away merely a year after independence and, second, Quaid-e-Millat (the leader of the nation) who was assassinated just four years into the journey.

The country has already seen an unsuccessful military coup (the Rawalpindi Conspiracy) and while it has survived the mammoth effects of the partition, stability and prosperity is still a long way ahead. During the short few years, a number of challenges have rocked the country, thus further adding to this instability. The dispute over water of the rivers, boundaries in Kashmir, allegations of corruption in allocation of evacuee property, and a fast deteriorating drought that began as early as the last quarter of 1947 in the eastern wing are a few of these.

First Signs of Trouble in East Pakistan

In fact, in some parts of the country—especially the province of East Bengal—the Muslim population which was under the illusion—perhaps naively so—of having achieved a mythical Islamic state where welfare of the poor and social justice would reign supreme, is already getting a bit restless due to the perceived gap between that lofty ideal and the reality on the ground. Badruddin Umar, in The Emergence of Bangladesh: Class Struggles in East Pakistan (1947-58), writes:

“[After the partition] the whole political perspective was [thus] transformed, and the communal contradiction which caused the partition of the country was replaced by contradictions between the two regions and the ethnically and linguistically different people who belonged to the Muslim community…The Muslim peasants, workers and middle class people were taught to visualize Pakistan as a dreamland, where milk and honey would flow, everyone would get education and suitable job, healthcare would be a routine matter, and there would a flowering of the culture espoused during the Pakistan movement. What really happened was that the Muslims of East Bengal, who constituted the vast majority of population, were quite confused and bewildered at the barrenness of the dreamland called Pakistan, where they had to go hungry and die of famine, where no surplus land was distributed among the poor peasants and sharecroppers, where very little new opportunities were opened up for the working masses and the educated sections of the people and life in all aspects remained as torturous as before. ”  (Umar, 2004, p.15-16)

In East Bengal, which was the most politically literate and aware province of Pakistan—perhaps entire British India—and was also the birth place of All India Muslim League itself, this anti-exploitation sentiment now turned into an anti-Muslim League and soon anti-Pakistan sentiment.

The Pakistan Muslim League—having inherited the mantle of leadership from All-India Muslim League—had become the all-powerful political party in Pakistan. While its hold onto power was almost absolute in West Pakistan where for a politician to be a non-Muslim Leaguer was almost considered as being “unpatriotic”, it still had very few (mostly small) rivals in East Pakistan where parties like the Communist Party and Kissan Sava provided an aura of an opposition.

With Muslim League’s powerful position in both center and the provinces, it was natural that people thought it responsible for all the wrongs—perceived or real—that had befallen upon them. The Pakistan Muslim League thus became an easy—and probably legitimate—target for the catharsis of their political, nationalistic, and economic frustrations.

The first signs of what was to come later came in 1949 during the tenure of Liaquat Ali Khan himself. In 1949, the East Bengal Government announced a by-election at a Muslim constituency of Memansingh district in South Tangail. Against all odds—and support of the state machinery—an independent candidate, Shamsul-Haque, defeated the Muslim League candidate in this bye-election. On that occasion, the Daily Azad—an opposition newspaper—noted:

“This is an extraordinary and unprecedented affair in the history of Muslim League election history…but the question arises, why did it happen? After the establishment of Pakistan certain activities of the Muslim League reduced its popularity and effectiveness. The old appeal of the League for achieving the Pakistan is no longer there, though the appeal to preserve Pakistan is still meaningful. The incomparable leadership of Quaid-e-Azam is no more…Everywhere the influence of the government is moulding the activities of the League…Consequently not only the burden of their own errors and deviations, but also the sins of governmental activities must be borne by the League…It is now clear that and in many areas, abominable practices have broken the dam of people’s tolerance. The Tangail bye-election is a declaration of that truth…Everyone will have to think seriously about the significance of this incident…Whether the banner of revolt raised against the League will one day engulf the whole of Pakistan, and League and Pakistan will be separated and destroyed will have to be considered. Let us hope this opens the eyes of all Leaguers—this is our prayer today.” (Umar, 2004, p. 96). 

The elections not only signified the rising sentiment against the League and the East-Bengali government but also the internal disarray within the League itself. The Muslim League leadership both at the center (Chaudhary Khaliquzzaman) and province (Maulana Mohammad Akram Khan), however, remained in a state of denial (Umar, 2004, pp. 100-1). Prior to and after the bye-elections, the Muslim League also saw defection from a number of leaders from its ranks. These ex-Leaguers decided to hold a conference on June 23rd and 24th of 1949 to discuss their own future political strategy.

This meeting of ex-Leaguers and other opposition politicians decided to re-organize the Muslim League as a mass organization. It was decided that every man and woman would be considered members of this organization and that they would have to pay no membership fee to become members. They decided to name this organization the Awami Muslim League. Among the leaders of this organization were Maulana Bhashani (President), Shamsul-Haque (Sect.), and Khondkar Mushtaq Ahmed and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as (joint secretaries).

Indeed, it was precisely this Awami Muslim League that ultimately played a pivotal role in the break up of Pakistan. While we will follow the history of this organization as we go forward, it is worth emphasizing two points here.

First, while there is no denying the fact that some early politicians affiliated with the Muslim League in these early days of the country had done things that brought disrepute to the organization, or the fact that with the creation of Pakistan provincial politics had turned into a messy business, or even the notion that there was definitely a certain tendency on behalf of the Muslim League toward centralization of power, it may also be argued—although not as evident to many at the time—that Muslim League’s troubles were not unprecedented or unique.

All victorious political or revolutionary movements face situations similar to this in that once the movement itself is successful, they are left with no opposition and almost unchecked power in their own hands. The founders of the United States, for instance, had not anticipated having a two (multi-) party system of government and faced similar criticisms in the beginning. Even in the life of George Washington—who commanded unparalleled admiration and gratitude from his fellow Americans—there was definite, sometimes even severe, criticism of his own government’s policies.

In United States’ example as well, this “imbalance” of power ultimately resulted in the breaking out of a rival faction (the Federalists and anti-Federalists) from the ruling party with Jefferson and Madison—two of the founding fathers—forming the opposition. Indeed, most such political movements—of which Muslim League was merely one—have not survived the heavy responsibility of governing honorably and judiciously without an effective opposition.

Second, it worth noting that even though the formation of the new party was a clear sign of the gulf between central leadership of Pakistan and the more popular leadership of Bengal—a gulf that would one day widen to the point of no return—it was still, at least at that time, couched as a tangential movement (a splinter group) rather than one at cross-purposes with the original party (i.e. a full-fledged opposition party). This was most obvious in the choice of the name for the new political entity. In creating the Awami League, therefore, the leaders of the Awami Muslim League decided to cash in on their Muslim League credentials rather than rejecting them outright.

It is also worth a mention here that, contrary to what is sometimes suggested, Awami Muslim League also continued to promote an (atleast semi-) religious rather than entirely nationalistic or a secular ideology. Badruddin Umar (2004, p. 110), for instance, notes that the “Basic Demands” document presented at the founding meeting of the Awami Muslim League was influenced by Abul Hashim’s work, The Creed of Islam, which had been quite well-known not only in East Bengal but all of India—although it was considered somewhat on the radical side by Muslim League itself. 

The Basic Principles of the Constitution Revisited

As East Bengal, and other provinces of West Pakistan, presented a sorry picture of political and economic turmoil, perhaps the greatest challenge the country faced was in the realm of constitution-making. In many ways, the absence of the constitution—i.e. a clear compact between the various branches of government, between the center and provinces, and between the government and the government—only compounded the already severe problems of governance of the time.

Under the terms of the Independence of India Act of 1947, the Constituent Assembly was appointed to the task of drafting the first constitution of Pakistan and then hand-over power to a new assembly elected by the people through a general elections. When the Basic Principles Committee of the Constitution, formed on March 12, 1949, presented its interim report on 28th September 1950, it created tremendous uproar in the smaller provinces, especially East Bengal.

The BPC report called for the creation of a bicameral legislature comprising a lower house and an upper house. The representation in lower house was to be on the basis of population while all five provinces were to have an equal representation in the upper house. The two houses of the parliament, however, were to have equal powers thus effectively neutralizing the population advantage of East Bengal. Furthermore, the President was to enjoy tremendous power and was to be elected by an indirect vote of the joint session of the two houses where West Pakistan, once again, was to have an absolute majority.  

All major East Bengali newspapers—including the pro-government ones—criticized the recommendations of the BPC. Demonstrations were held all across the provinces and a pamphlet was published with the title: “Will Janab Liakat Ali Khan answer the following questions?”. Among other things, it questioned the wisdom in BPC’s ignoring of the language issue, the provincial autonomy not only as a pragmatic consideration for a country divided by two thousand miles of enemy territory but also as promised in the Lahore Resolution, and the decision to make the provincial ministry subservient to the central cabinet rather than the provincial legislature. (Umar, 2004, p. 166).

Despite the initial emotions, it was resolved to provide substantive counter-recommendations to the BPC. A Grand National Convention on Constitution began in November 1950 at the Dhaka Bar Library Hall and was attended by 400 delegates. The Convention made certain positive recommendations. Among them included naming Pakistan as the United States of Pakistan, that the parliament be comprised of only one chamber whose sessions be held alternatively in the central capital and the capital of East Pakistan, that the state languages of the country would be Urdu and Bengali, and that the defense forces would be constituted into two units with each region being composed of men from that region. (Umar, 2004, p. 168-9).

In addition the Basic Principles Committee, the Constitutional Committee on Fundamental Rights of Citizens had also submitted its findings to the Constituent Assembly. The list of fundamental rights presented by the Committee had included equality of all citizens in front of law; equal protection of law to all citizens; no discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth; freedom of speech, conscience, expression, association, profession, occupation, trade, or business; every qualified citizen to be eligible for induction in service of state irrespective of any of the above factors; no restriction for any community on religious services or instruction; and no community to be forced to pay taxes the proceeds of which were to be allocated to the propagation of a particular religion. In addition, the Committee had also provided for special rights for minorities. (Khan, 2001, p. 69-70)

The Grand National Convention, having rejected the recommendations of the Fundamental Rights Committee, also passed a separate resolution outlining a bill of fundamental rights of the people as a counter-proposal to the recommendations of the Committee of Fundamental Rights that had submitted its report as well. Its suggestions moved from the rather abstract language of the Committee’s recommendations to the more specific. It divided fundamental rights into three categories, namely, equality before law, right to trial, right of vote, and habeas corpus; right to life, education (free and compulsory up to a certain age), work and livelihood, health, shelter, wage, and trade unionization; and fundamental freedoms, equal status and opportunity, socialization of production, and personal honor etc. (Umar, 2004, p. 169-70).

It is worth noting the differences between the recommendations of the Committee and the Convention. The latter pushed the envelope on the demanded fundamental rights in two significant ways. First, it used more specific language than what was used by the Committee and in doing so better defined the fundamental rights being sought (especially note the omissions in the Committee recommendations such as habeas Corpus, right to trial, right of vote etc.). Second, it also sought some very specific rights vis-à-vis welfare of the population, especially the worker and trade union classes to the extent of making this charter of fundamental demands look both socialist and welfare in its character.

With such severe criticism of the Interim Report of Basic Principles Committee, however, Liaquat Ali Khan referred it back to the Constituent Assembly for a re-evaluation. The latter also solicited proposals from the public by January 1951 to be examined by a special sub-committee formulated for the purpose. While these deliberations were taking place, Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated in October of 1951.

Rise and Fall of Khawaja Nazimuddin’s Ministry

Liaquat Ali Khan was succeeded by Khawaja Nazimuddin, the then East-Bengali Governor General of Pakistan—as the next Prime Minister. Malik Ghulam Mohammad—an ailing Punjabi bureaucrat who had served as the Finance Minister of Pakistan since its early days—took over as the new Governor General of the country.

While most Muslim Leaguers believed Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar to be the rightful heir of Liaquat Ali Khan—a choice that Liaquat himself had indicated during the last days of his life—Nishtar’s nomination was vehemently apposed by certain powerful groups and the final power arrangement probably had less to do with the influence and standing of the individuals and more to do with attempting to balance a Bengali Prime Minister with a Punjabi Governor General.

The choice of the malleable Khawaja Nazimuddin, however, seems to have been supported by the Punjabi group for precisely the wrong reasons i.e. he being perceived as a weak enough Prime Minister to not challenge the Punjabi interests (Sayeed, 1960, p. 414). Thus began an era of politics in Pakistan marked with internecine rivalry between the two geographical units, West Pakistan (specifically Punjab) and East Pakistan.

It was also a period during which the lack of depth of Muslim League’s political roots within Pakistan became acutely apparent. While politicians fought among themselves—often for narrow, parochial interests—the power gradually shifted to the bureaucrats who proved themselves more disciplined and administratively able. While this did not necessarily mean more representative government or even better governance for the people in the long term, it did, at least for a while, represented the only hope for some semblance of governance and order in Pakistan over the otherwise all-too-familiar scene of bickering and fighting politicians.

After incorporating the due feedback from all relevant sections of the society, Khawaja Nazimuddin presented the final report of the Basic Principles Committee on December 22, 1952. This report almost completely reversed the pro-Punjabi stance of the interim report leaning, this time, towards East Bengal. The report called for adopting the Objectives Resolution as the Preamble of the Constitution. The parliament was supposed to be bi-cameral in structure. The House of Units (Senate) comprising 120 members indirectly elected by the provincial legislatures with East-Pakistan electing 60 and the remaining being divided on the basis of proportional representation between the four provinces of West Pakistan. The House of the People was to comprise 400 members with 200 each from East and West Pakistan. House of the People was to enjoy real authority with money bills originating in that chamber.

Like the interim report, the final draft also evoked a strong response. This time around, however, the reaction in Punjab was extremely unfavorable. Many Punjabis saw it as an attempt to establish Bengali domination over the whole country (Sayeed, 1960, p. 416). The critics of the report found it illogical that in a federal structure Bengal would have as much importance as all West-Pakistani provinces put together (Khan, 2001, p. 74). In doing so, the critics seemed to have overlooked the fact that Bengal had a population greater than the population of all four provinces of the West Pakistan put together and so, on the basis of that, it would have a simple majority in a purely democratic set-up.

In view of the opposition of Punjab, the recommendations of the Basic Principles Committee were set aside thus creating a constitutional deadlock in the country. In addition, to further complicate the already complex picture of inter-provincial relations in the country, this also created a gulf between the Bengali Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin at the center and Punjab’s Chief Minister Mian Mumtaz Daultana. This gulf came to a head in a somewhat unrelated incident. 

In early-March of 1953, anti-Ahmediyya riots broke out in Lahore. Ahmedis are a close knit community who believe that Mirza Ghulam Ahmed of Quadian (1835-1908) was a prophet or nabi. This belief is deemed against the Islamic belief the finality of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) and is thus considered blasphemous. The Ahmedi community in Lahore at that time had members that occupied prominent positions in the government as well as the professions. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister—Sir Zafarullah Khan—was the most prominent member of the Ahmedi community and was naturally the main target of Majlis-e-Ahrar, a political party that had initiated the anti-Ahmediyya agitation in Punjab. Hamid Khan, in the Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, notes that the agitation had serious material and political motivations. (Khan, 2001, p. 74).

While Khan (2001) does not elaborate on that point further, it is likely that anti-Ahmediyya agitation was started by Majlis-e-Ahrar—who were then the allies of Muslim League in Punjab—to destabilize and punish Nazimuddin Ministry for presenting an openly pro-Bengal BPC report. Sayeed (1960), however, does not seem to entertain that possibility and suggests that Daultana merely “under-estimated” the threat to law and order from this agitation and the blow back it produced for which he had to pay a dear price. This, however, may not be entirely inconsistent with the above theory as Daultana could have tipped of the Ahmediyya Movement then fallen victim to the unrest himself as well.

Not surprisingly, therefore, this agitation, coupled with the ongoing food shortages in Punjab, caused tremendous difficulties for Nazimuddin. Major General (retd.) Iskander Mirza—a military-man turned bureaucrat and the defense secretary at that time—advised Nazimuddin to impose martial law in Lahore. Nazimuddin first hesitated and then agreed. Martial law was thus imposed in Lahore amidst a declaration by Ayub Khan—the Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army—that army would not allow the country to fall in anarchy. This amounted to interfering in the affairs of the civilian government and resulted in straining the relationship between the Prime Minister and the Commander-in-Chief. Nazimuddin’s relationship with the army further deteriorated when, faced with severe financial difficulties, he slashed the defense budget by a third.

Nazimuddin felt that the Punjab government, along with the army and the Governor General’s office were conspiring against him. He even considered appealing to the British Government for recalling the Governor General of Pakistan. He still enjoyed the confidence of the Constituent Assembly and could prove his support in that chamber (Khan, 2001, p.75). Malik Ghulam Mohammad—the Governor General—however, acted first. On April 17, 1953, he summoned the Prime Minister along with his cabinet and ordered him to resign. When Nazimuddin refused to comply, he was summarily dismissed. He attempted to contact the Buckingham Palace to protest his dismissal but found that the overseas communications links of the country have been disrupted. Even the British High Commissioner did not relay Nazimuddin’s telegram to the Queen. What was more intriguing, notes Sayeed (1960, p. 418), is that Muslim League Parliamentary Party—led by Bengali-Frontier group—failed to protest against Nazimuddin’s dismissal. He goes on to say that:

“The Bengali-led Parliamentary group felt that they neither had enough public opinion behind them nor did the country care enough for parliamentary institutions to support them in such a fight against the Governor General…the Parliament did not stand as a corporate group to maintain its dignity and sovereignty. It did not represent a homogenous country” (Sayeed, 1960, p. 418)

With that, Khawaja Nazimuddin became the first victim of a bureaucratic-military coup in Pakistan (Khan, 2001, p. 75) and parliamentary democracy received its first major jolt at the hands of anti-democratic forces in the country made powerful only by peoples’ general indifference towards them.

Nazimuddin’s departure also did not bid well for the campaign to create a constitution in Pakistan. It made, all too apparent, the constitutional deadlock existed between the two largest provinces of the country and, to a lesser extent, between the center and the provinces. It would take nothing short of a stroke of genius to arrive at a constitutional compromise that would be acceptable to all. With Nazimuddin gone, who would take on the mantle of Pakistan’s leadership and bring about the consensus? and more importantly, how would he achieve that?

 We will continue our story of Pakistan in episode 2/2 of this article on July 5, 2007.

• Liaquat Ali Khan , East Pakistan , Politics , Constitution , 1951-1954 , Khwaja Nazimuddin , History in a Nutshell