Pakistan - India War of 1965: The War in Kashmir – 1/3 (1965)
Athar Osama September 6th, 2007
By: Athar Osama
The origins of the 1965 War between Pakistan and India, its conduct over the course of several weeks, and its consequences are quite complex for one to be able to do justice with it. Add on top of that the fact that countries engage in one-upmanship to try to make exaggerated accusations of who started the war and claims of victory after it ends, primarily in order to manage “public opinion” at home, and it really gets very difficult and tricky. One additional unfortunate factor in lack of quality reporting on the 1965 War was the attempt by Pakistani leadership—both military and civilian—to attempt to destroy the evidence of the circumstances that actually led to this war. General K. M. Arif, in his biography “Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-97” for instance writes that in the immediate aftermath of the 1965 War:
“Pakistan suffered a loss of a different kind…Soon after the War the GHQ ordered all the formations and units of the Pakistan Army to destroy their respective war diaries and submit completed reports to this effect by a given date. This was done…Their [the war diaries’] destruction, a self-inflicted injury and an irreparable national loss, was intellectual suicide.”
— General Khalid Mehmood Arif, Vice Chief of Army Staff, Pakistan Army
While unofficial accounts of the 1965 War by several Pakistani figures that participated in that war, including Ayub’s biographer Altaf Gauhar, Major General Shaukat Riza, Lt. General Gul Hassan, and General Mohammad Musa have since come to the fore, the “official” version of Pakistan’s military plans and objectives from that and how the performance of our commanders and troops differed from these have not surfaced.
Additionally, no effort has been made to systematically evaluate Pakistan’s strategic and operational plans and attempt to learn some lessons from the preparation and conduct of the war. Much of this remains an official secret protected by the Official Secrets Act that does not allow anyone to compromise such information due to a perceived “national interest”. Even General K. M. Arif’s book, for instance, carries only a copy of a map depicting an Indian military plan but none from Pakistan which could have been easily accessible to a person of his stature and position. This then sets the backdrop of this analysis of the preparation and conduct of the 1965 War between India and Pakistan.
Rationale and Preparation for the War
Several events such as the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the frustrations over lack of progress in the Kashmir dispute, and Pakistan’s own victory in the limited Runn of Kutch Affair, contributed to the events that led towards the 1965 War between India and Pakistan.
Pakistan’s ex-Foreign Secretary and two-time Foreign Minister Abdus Sattar, in his “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Concise History” describes the motivations behind the 1965 War:
“The Pakistan-India ‘Kashmir’ war in 1965 was the culmination of a process of the rise and fall of expectations of a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute, popular agitation and state repression in the Indian-held state, jingoism triggered by the border clash in the Runn of Kutch, a limited operation born of frustration and desperation conceived by the Pakistan government to draw international attention, and unintended escalation…In perspective of history, leaders on both sides seemed to have lost control over actions…that pushed them into an unwanted war neither side had planned.” (Sattar, 2007, p. 88)
General K. M. Arif, in discussing the motivation and preparation leading up to the 1965 War pays special emphasis to the deteriorating, real or perceived, balance of power in South Asia in the early 1960s. He notes the general perception which may have been shared by his colleagues in the Pakistan Army that “sooner or later, India would be in a position to force a decision about Kashmir based on her own terms. Pakistan would, therefore, have to do something herself to pull Kashmir dispute out the deep freeze before the power ratio got decisively titled against her in the future” (Arif, 2001, p.45). This clearly added an important time dimension—an urgency—to the Kashmir dispute that may have resulted in a desperate action on the part of Pakistan’s political and military leadership.
But who were the protagonists—the key players and decision-makers—involved in pushing Pakistan to adopt a military approach towards settling of the Kashmir dispute? What was the ultimate plan of action? What were the military and political objectives to be achieved and how did this planning group thought these could be achieved? What was the end-game, for India, for Pakistan, and for Kashmir? What were the fallback and exit options, for India, and for Pakistan? In order to glean some insight—albeit an incomplete one—one has to look into the planning process that was adopted and the preparation that went into the Operations Gibraltar and Grand Slam.
Hamid Khan, in his “The Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan”, describes the role of Bhutto-Aziz nexus and the military leadership’s level of un-preparedness for the 1965 War as follows:
“When India attacked Pakistan, the man most surprised was Ayub. His surprise was shared by the Commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army. They had been assured by Bhutto, Foreign Minister, and Aziz Ahmed, Foreign Secretary, that India would not cross international borders to attack Pakistan. They had even suppressed a message from Pakistan High Commissioner in New Delhi sent through the Turkish Embassy to the Foreign Office in Islamabad that India was planning an attack on Pakistan’s territory on 6 September. Ayub was woken up at 4 o clock in the morning on 6 September and give then news of Indian advance towards Lahore. He telephoned General Musa, Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army, who said that he had also heard the news but was waiting for confirmation. All this badly exposed the military genius of Ayub and his army chief.” (Khan, 2001, p. 179)
In view of the urgency that the Kashmir situation had acquired in the minds of Pakistan’s military and civilian leadership, General Ayub Khan had created a Kashmir Public Committee with Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed as its Chairman to keep the Kashmir situation under review (Arif, 2001, p. 47). While the precise terms of reference of this committee, beyond the above terminology, are not clear, Aziz told the committee members that the President had tasked the committee to begin the creation of two plans—one to encourage sabotage activities across the ceasefire line and the other to provide all-out support for guerillas to be inducted into Kashmir. This was carried out by HQ 12 Division at Murree under the overall direction of the GHQ. The direct involvement of Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed and Foreign Minister Bhutto in the workings of war planning at the same time when the entire foreign office was unaware of this exercise (Sattar, 2007; Arif, 2001) was quite out of the ordinary, to say the least. Bhutto’s role is reported to have been instrumental in shaping the plans that finally came out of this exercise. Sherbaz Khan Mazari, in his biography “A Journey to Disillusionment” writes:
“The [Kashmir] Cell was greatly influenced by the views of Aziz Ahmed and his Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto had also taken to lobby the Army directly by visiting senior officers at their residences and seeking to impress upon them with the indispensability of launching raids across the Cease-Fire Line. These visits led General Musa to complain to Ayub Khan that Bhutto was brainwashing his officers.” (Mazari, 1999, p. 128)
In mid-February 1965, writes General K. M. Arif, the plan for Operation Gibraltar was presented to Ayub Khan to which Ayub Khan remarked: “Who authorized the foreign office and ISI to draw up such a plan? All I asked them to do was to keep the situation in Kashmir under review.” Ayub’s initial unwillingness, notwithstanding, work on the planning for Operational Gibraltar continued behind the scenes. General K. M. Arif writes:
“Slowly Bhutto convinced Ayub of the logic of his strategy. He maintained contacts with Major General Akhtar Malik who was well respected in the army on professional matters. Ayub went to Murree on May 13th to attend a sand model presentation made by Akthar Malik on Operation Gibraltar. General Musa and the military brass from GHQ attended the presentation. The Naval and Air Chiefs were not invited. Ayub approved the plan. This was a victory of individuals over institutions…playing his cards with finesse, Bhutto had brought Ayub around to his reasoning ith a written assurance given to him that India was “at present in no position to risk a general war of unlimited duration for the annihilation of Pakistan” (Arif, 2001, p. 48).
General K.M. Arif also quotes General Musa as stating that:
“Those who controlled the Ministry of Foreign Affairs…did not appear to believe that India would use deep raids, in a disputed territory, as a reason for escalating a wider war, for the sake of Kashmir…I went on opposing the whole idea, both verbally and in writing, till I was ordered to implement it, despite my opposition” (Arif, 2001, p. 48)
It is difficult ascertain the voracity of Musa’s statement for he would not have had he opportunity to “verbally” express this in public prior to the war and his written opposition to the operation would remain protected, perhaps forever, to allow corroboration. In any case, notes K. M. Arif, “[Musa’s] explanation is flawed. Surely Musa knew the last honorable option open to him if his professional advice on the vital issue of peace and war was rejected.” (ibid, p. 49)
It is amply clear, though, that all prudent civil-military mechanisms of defense strategy and policy planning were bypassed in the pre-planning of Operation Grand Slam. The Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC)—the apex defense policy making body of the country—did not even meet prior to or during the war. The Defense Services Chiefs Committee (DSCC) which comprises the three services chiefs and is required to approve all military plans was never even informed about the existence of the plan. The air and naval chiefs deeply resented the fact that they were not taken into confidence (Arif, 2001 p. 54).
Thus began Operation Gibraltar in an attempt to unfreeze the Kashmir issue and bring it to the notice of the world.
Operation Gibraltar
From a military standpoint, the concept behind Operation Gibraltar was simple. Small groups were planned to be inducted into the Indian Occupied Kashmir on a broad front to destroy or damage military targets—bridges, ammunition and supply dumps, formation headquarters, lines of communication, and military convoys—to create panic, arouse hatred, against the occupation power and to encourage the oppressed people to rise in revolt. There was a general feeling being promoted by the proponents of the operation that the Muslim population in Indian Occupied Kashmir was eager and willing to revolt if provided with such a support. The proponents of the operation were so sure of themselves—but also for secrecy reasons—that they even did not care to forewarn the sympathetic Kashmiri freedom fighter groups of what was to come their way.
The operation began on August 7, 1965 with six groups—Babur, Ghaznavi, Khalid, Qasim, Salahuddin, and Tariq—beginning the infiltration of enemy territory in Kashmir (Arif, 2001, p. 49). By mid August as many as 7000 guerrillas led by Pakistan Army officers had crossed the Cease Fire Line (CFL) into India (Mazari, 2001, p. 129). These infiltration teams failed to gain the widespread local support that they had expected to achieve and almost fizzled out without achieving any of the objectives put forth for the operation. K. M. Arif blames the failure of the Operation to “conceptual flaws and inadequate planning” (Arif, 2001, p. 49) noting that “an underground [freedom] movement is not an affair to be employed arbitrarily for producing instant results” (ibid, p. 50).
Sherbaz Khan Mazari notes that the:
“Indians were caught by surprise but the people of Occupied Kashmir refused to rise in a war of liberation and engage the attention of Indian forces. Some of the Kashmiris even informed on the guerillas leading to their early capture…” (Mazari, 2001, p. 129).
On August 15, 1965, Indian forces crossed the ceasefire line and launched an attack on Pakistan administered Kashmir. Pakistani reports cite this attack as unprovoked. Indian reports cite the attack as a response to the massive armed infiltrations by Pakistan. Initially, the Indian Army met with considerable success in the northern sector (Kashmir). After launching a prolonged artillery barrage against Pakistan, India was able to capture three important mountain positions. However, by the end of the month both sides were on even footing as Pakistan had made progress in areas such as Tithwal, Uri and Punch and India had gains in Pakistan Administered Kashmir, having captured Pir Sahaba and Budil (August 26th), Bharat Gali and Sarpir (August 27th), and the Haji Pir Pass (August 29th) eight kilometers inside Pakistani territory. (Wikipedia, 2007)
Operation Grand Slam
Following the failure of Operation Gibraltar, that had resulted in territorial gains and rapid Indian advances in Kashmir, Pakistan launched a bold counter attack on September 1, 1965 at 0500 hours to reclaim vital posts in Kashmir lost to India. This attack, codenamed “Operation Grand Slam” was intended to relieve the pressure of enemy action in upper Kashmir (Arif, 2001, p. 55) by capturing the vital town of Akhnoor in Jammu and thus sever communications and cut off supply routes to Indian troops (Wikipedia, 2007). Success in this operation would have isolated the Indian forces in Indian-held Kashmir from their base, besides providing Pakistan further openings towards Jammu and Rajouri (Arif, 2001, p. 56).
The operation was carried out primarily by the 12 Infantry Division of the Pakistan Army commanded by General Akhtar Hussain Malik—an exuberant, articulate, and ambitious commander—who was given limited military resources and no reserves to achieve his task. Attacking with an overwhelming ratio of troop, superior use of terrain and tactics, and technically superior tanks, Pakistan was on the verge of springing a surprise against Indian forces, who were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses (Wikipedia, 2007). The attack was carried out along Bhimber-Chhamb-Akhnoor axis. Taking the enemy by surprise, Pakistan captured Chhamb on Sept 2, 1965. Next to fall was River Tawi.
With only Jurian left between Pakistan and Akhnoor, there was a change of command with HQ12 Division being called back to Murree and HQ 7 Division taking its place in the offense. Also, instead of going straight for Akhnoor, as was originally the plan, the new commander first sought to capture Jurian. Jurian fell to Pakistan on Sept 4, 1965 with the enemy withdrawing its 41 Mountain Brigade to Akhnoor. However, by this time, Pakistan had lost critical 36 hours in this process that gave all that the enemy needed to regroup. Operation Grand Slam had lost its steam.
The fateful decision of changing the command of an ongoing successful operation whose very success depends upon the speed with which it is executed has been debated within Pakistan’s military circles for ages. The obvious reason for handing over the command of from Maj. General Akhtar Hussain Malik to Maj General Yahya Khan at this last moment may be to allow Yahya-one of Ayub’s favorite generals—to distinguish himself with the glory of a battle victory—one that had thus far defied almost any general in Pakistan’s history. Some have also argued that had Akhtar Malik been allowed to capture Akhnoor, he, being the only general to have won a battle of this magnitude, would have become the undisputed successor to Ayub Khan thus depriving Yahya of the position that he so desperately sought.
General Mohammad Musa, the Commander in Chief at the time, however, has defended his decision to make the change of command as “pre-arranged” rather than an afterthought (Arif, 2001, p. 58). Pakistan Army’s Official historian, Major General Shaukat Riza, agrees with that assessment. However, there are several loopholes in the logic to do so and General K. M. Arif, in his book Khaki Shadows, discusses some of these in some detail. General Akhtar Malik’s own description of what happened documented in an unverified letter (copied below) to his brother also tends to support a sinister motive. Regardless of why it was done, however, it represented one of the greatest missed opportunities in Pakistan’s short military history.
This also became one of the turning points in the war, as India decided to relieve pressure on its troops in Kashmir by attacking Pakistan further south. Thus started the Battle of Lahore and the broader 1965 War between India and Pakistan.
(Figure: General Mohammad Musa Khan, one of the protagonists of the 1965 War who was found lacking in professional competence and judgement.)
We will look at that in the second of this 3-part episode on the 1965 War on Thursday.
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