The Genesis of the Idea (Pre-1947)
Athar Osama June 4th, 2007
By Athar Osama
While much of Understanding Pakistan Project deals with events that have shaped Pakistan since its creation, it is important to develop a keen, and somewhat critical, understanding of the events that shaped the Pakistan Movement itself. The creation of Pakistan raised some very important questions:
- Was Pakistan really inevitable?
- Would the Muslims of the sub-continent have found a way to live and co-evolve peacefully and honorably with the Hindus if the latter had shown some willingness and open-mindedness to accept the legitimate rights of the minority?
- Was there something inherently undemocratic about the Pakistan demand?
- Were Muslims of sub-continent “one nation based on religion” or an agglomeration of multiple ethnic groups whose first loyalties were to their ethnicities?
- If so, what were the factors that brought about a temporary convergence of their interests?
- What was it that the proponents of Pakistan demand actually wanted to create and how was the country that came into being different from that?
- Did the idea of Pakistan leave room for multiple “legitimate” interpretations of sovereignty and autonomy, as had been claimed by smaller provinces ever since?
These and many other issues have been important triggers for momentous events in Pakistan’s later history. Understanding the context in which the Pakistan Demand was created and how it actually shaped is important to understanding and, hopefully, resolving these issues. The inaugural piece of the Understanding Pakistan Project helps to set the stage for the future discussion by providing a background for addressing some of these questions.
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It is almost customary to begin Pakistan’s history from the point in time when the need for a separate homeland for Muslims of India was felt. Consequently, many historians trace the roots of the Pakistan Movement to different points in Indian history, namely, the Pakistan Resolution (1940), the formation of Muslim League (1906), Sir Syed’s “Two Nation” Theory (1860), the War of Independence (1857), and even the year the first Muslim conqueror Mohammad Bin Qasim set foot in Sindh (712) [Sharif al-Mujahid, 1990].
Clearly, the idea of Pakistan that gained currency in the 1930s has deep roots in the socio-economic, political, cultural, and religious circumstances of Muslims of India. These roots are definitely worth exploring primarily because they provide the context for what came later.
However, for the purpose of this series, we will restrict ourselves to the developments that took place after the Meeting of the All-India Muslim League’s Council in Lucknow in 1937 where the idea was formally presented for the first time. After the Lucknow meeting the idea really began taking shape and soon became the voice of the people and an undeniable living reality within a relatively short span of a decade.
Questions like: How was Pakistan created and why did it come about? What were the motivations behind the proponents of the Pakistan demand? What were the positions of various ethno-provincial entities? What was the role of religious leaders in the Pakistan Movement? are critical to understanding what we have we become today and where we need to go.
Yet these are precisely the questions that don’t get asked when it comes to our own understanding of our country’s (now) 60-year old existence. For many of us, the compulsory “Pakistan Studies” course in school that hardly inspires or challenges any of us to examine our history with a critical eye ends up being our only encounter with our country’s history with a result that we’re not only criminally apathetic to our country’s present and future but also shamelessly ignorant of its past.
If the promise of Pakistan is to be redeemed, we must all become informed citizens willing to look at our own country and its history with an objective and open mind and carry out our duty towards it. We begin our journey through Pakistan’s history by understanding the factors and arguments that played the most significant part in the decade prior to its creation…
The Point of No-Return in Hindu-Muslim Relations
Mohammad Aslam Malik—a noted historian of the Pakistan Resolution—in “The Making of the Pakistan Resolution” notes that the first instance when the Pakistan idea was discussed in public was at the 1937 Meeting of the All-India Muslim League Council in Lucknow. This meeting took place in the backdrop of Congress’ spectacular success in the 1937 elections held under the Government of India Act of 1935. The Act envisioned elections for provincial and central legislatures and a step-wise transfer of power and authority that would ultimately allow self-rule through the formation of an All-India federation under the British Crown.
In the ensuing provincial elections, Congress won comfortable majorities and formed ministries in 6 of the 11 provinces while Muslim League suffered a humiliating defeat and with it lost—at least temporarily—its credibility as the sole representative of all Muslims of India. Of the total 484 Muslim seats contested in provincial assemblies, League only managed to win 108 as against 376 by other Muslim groups.
This defeat of the Muslim League was a turning point in the history of the Pakistan Movement. First, with Congress forming ministries and its unwillingness to share power with the League in any of the provinces, it served as a wake up call for the League leadership. The League—an organization that, until then, largely comprised Muslim elite of India— was left discredited and found it with no other option but to completely rebuild itself. Consequently, Jinnah would spend the better part of the next decade building grass roots support and a political machinery that was to later help convince the British to accept the Muslim demand for a separate homeland.
Second, the Congress’ reign in the provinces where it had won and formed Ministries was marked with such religious indifference and cultural and linguistic insensitivity that Muslims celebrated the “Day of Deliverance” when the Congress Ministries later resigned. This experience, more than any other, marked the parting of ways for Muslims of the sub-continent and forced them to ultimately demand a separate homeland for themselves.
The 1937 elections and its aftermath, therefore, created two mutually reinforcing currents by forcing the League to broaden and deepen its base of support and the Muslims of India to look for an alternative vehicle to represent their interests in any future political set-up. These two currents found a commonality of purpose in the Pakistan Demand.
An Alternate Scheme of Federation
It was in this backdrop that, in Oct 1937, the All-India Muslim League Council met to discuss “an alternate scheme to the federation” envisioned in the Government of India Act of 1935. The proposition was forwarded by Sir Sikanader Hayat, the prime minister of Punjab, and seconded by Fazlul Haq and Sir Saadullah, the prime ministers of Bengal and Assam respectively. It was suggested that joining the “federation meant the ruination of the Muslims of India as they would be under the perpetual subjugation of the Hindu Raj in the Center” .
After considerable discussion, a tentative resolution was adopted to appose the federation scheme under consideration at that time and to draw up an alternate scheme for the same. What is interesting, and often overlooked in the more simplistic texts on Pakistan’s history, is that there was not one but several different ideas—some quite vague—in circulation during those early years on what Pakistan exactly meant and what it should have constituted. It is also very interesting to trace the history of how, through a gradual process of winnowing down, the idea of Pakistan finally crystallized.
Different Conceptions of Pakistan
In the 1937 meeting, for instance, Sir Sikandar Hayat presented his own scheme of federation for consideration. His idea was to divide India into seven zones and organize the federation into a three-tiered structure comprising units (or provinces,) zones, and the center. This scheme envisaged a weak center with jurisdiction over defense, external affairs, customs, communications, and currency. All residuary powers were to go to the zones and the units. Two of Sikandar’s seven zones were to become Muslim majority zones. Sikander’s scheme resembled in many respects with ideas circulating (or that were to circulate) among the British politicians, most notably, Sir Stafford Cripps, who visit India in 1939 and then later in 1942 and 1946.
Note that Sikandar’s scheme was clearly not seeking partition and independence but only meant to redraw the structure and boundaries of the federation itself. This was broadly consistent with the interests of North-Western Muslim majority provinces, especially Punjab, that had not seen the discrimination after the 1937 elections and whose interests firmly lay in the continuation of British rule with a weak center and maximum provincial autonomy.
Some of the other more popular and innovative schemes include: Allama Iqbal’s scheme presented in his Allahabad Address that called for the creation of one Muslim Indian state in the North-West (currently Pakistan); Chaudhary Rehmat Ali’s scheme enunciated in his famous brochure “Pakistan: Now or Never” that had 3 separate Muslim nations (Pakistan in the North-West, Bang-i-Islam in Bangal and Assam, and Usmanistan in South India) carved out in India [Sayeed 1960, p.114]; and Sir Abdullah Haroon’s scheme that called for division of India into two separate federations each deriving its strengths from a major community it served.
Another interesting scheme came from Dr. Syed Abdul Latif (of Hyderabad Deccan) who divided India into four Muslim cultural zones and eleven Hindu cultural zones. Apart from areas that later became East and West Pakistan, this scheme also envisaged a Delhi-Lucknow bloc and a Deccan bloc to become part of the Muslim homeland. Dr. Abdul Latif’s scheme was innovative in that it went beyond the demand for Muslim majority provinces and suggested carving out pieces of Muslim majority lands out of minority provinces as well. In doing so, it had the support of the Urdu-speaking Indian Muslims. However, it probably under-estimated the difficulties of mass migration needed to realize this scheme [Sayeed, 1960, p.117].
In many ways, Dr. Abdul Latif’s scheme also signified one of the key contradictions and challenges of the Pakistan Movement in that for a considerable time the Muslim League leadership—which was predominantly Urdu- and Bengali-speaking—and bulk of its followers struggled with the notion of independence and how to best present their demands for a separate homeland without seriously jeopardizing the Muslim minority question.
- Is there a way to somehow bring the Muslims in the Muslim minority provinces in India within the geographical folds of Pakistan (as in Abdul Latif’s scheme)?
- Should Muslims even seek a separate homeland (as in Sikandar Hayat’s scheme)?
- How might the relationship between the entities be best structured to protect the interests of Muslims in minority provinces?
- Must the interests of a vast majority of Muslims in minority provinces be sacrificed to gain a homeland for those in majority provinces (as in Allama Iqbal’s scheme)?
These and similar questions along with the need to tread cautiously so as to not antagonize the British too soon; to gain time to build grass roots support for the All-India Muslim League (AIML), especially in the Muslim majority provinces where it did not exist at all; and to still attempt to seek some kind of reconciliation, adjustment, and constitutional guarantees from the Hindu-dominated Congress were some of the factors that were in the minds of Muslim League leaders, most notably, Jinnah during the time leading up to the Pakistan resolution. Jinnah, while assimilating these alternate schemes, had remained publicly neutral to all. In fact, Mohammad Aslam notes that Jinnah had not made up his mind until two months before the historic Lahore Resolution of 1940. [Malik, 2001, p.7]
Toward a Scheme of “Full Independence”
A year after the Lucknow meeting, Sindh Muslim League moved a step further in proclaiming that All-India Muslim League must “devise a scheme of constitution under which Muslims may attain full independence” [Malik, 2001, p.24]. In December 1938, AIML authorized its President to “adopt such course as may be necessary with a view to explore the possibility of a suitable alternative with which to safeguard the interests of Muslims and other minorities”.
This resolution was yet another milestone in the Pakistan Movement in two significant ways. It gave an unequivocal mandate to Muslim League leadership to plan for the events that were to come later, and, by vesting complete authority in Jinnah’s personality, it isolated those members of the League’s executive committee who still believed in a future under British Imperialism.
Jinnah quickly moved to capture the moment through concerted action on two fronts.
First, He authorized a delegation of AIML—comprising Abdur Rehman Siddiqi and Chaudhary Khaliquzzaman that was visiting the Middle East and Europe to participate in a conference on the future of Palestine—to bring the plight of the Muslims of India to the international scene and seek the support of other European governments. The delegation was also to have discussions with British government in London.
In addition, Jinnah made a shrewd attempt to gain political support from other Muslim countries and leaders. The idea was to create circumstances where he could use his influence with the British to broker a deal on Palestine that would have given him additional leverage with the Muslim world and, in the process, he hoped would have built international support for his own cause. This effort was brought to a naught as the British government, knowing Jinnah’s diplomatic and constitutional talents, was unwilling to allow him to capture the center stage in an international drama.
Second, Jinnah appointed a Constitutional Sub-Committee of the League to ponder over the alternate federation question. The objective here was to define, in a clearer, more cogent, and concrete terms, the precise parameters of a future constitutional arrangement that would safeguard Muslim interests. However, this committee, whose members included Sir Sikandar Hayat, did not make much headway. Some members, such as Sir Sikandar Hayat who had recently joined the Muslim League by merging with it the Unionist Party in Punjab , quite predictably were more sympathetic to the British Government than to Muslim League’s objective at this stage. [Malik, 2001, p.76]
In the late 1930s, attempts to bring about some kind of Hindu-Muslim rapprochement continued through Jinnah-Gandhi and then Jinnah-Bose talks. Also, the possibility of the British instituting their own federation structure on the basis of the Government of India Act of 1935 that would have pre-empted and scuttled the Muslim League’s efforts loomed large in these final moments of the 1930s. This, however, did not deter Jinnah as he accelerated the progress on defining Muslim League’s alternative to the federation structure by asking AIML’s Foreign Affairs and Central Working Committees to deliberate on the issue.
The Pakistan Resolution
The Muslim League annual session scheduled for December of 1939 was moved to March 1940 in view of the start of the second world war but also internal difficulties within the League itself. With the date fast approaching, the task of organizing Punjab Muslim League—given to Sir Sikandar as per the terms of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact under which Unionist Party in Punjab was merged into the AIML—was in shambles as Sikandar had no interest in doing so. Without a significant Muslim League presence in the Lahore meeting, it would have been difficult for the League to justify presenting as momentous a resolution as the Pakistan Resolution itself.
Yet that kind of presence was nowhere in sight and, at one time, in view of the impending fiasco the Muslim League Central leadership also considered the possibility of revoking the membership of the League’s Punjab organization that was being headed by Sir Sikander Hayat Khan himself. Cooler heads prevailed, however, and with the intervention of the League’s central leadership—many of whom traveled to Lahore well in advance to build momentum and support for the annual meeting—an embarrassing crisis was avoided.
In February 1940, the Foreign Committee of the Muslim League approved a draft for the Pakistan scheme which was later presented to the League’s Working Committee. This draft was debated in the AIML annual meeting that started March 21, 1940 and, after much debate, was approved unanimously in committee on March 23, 1940. In the open session attended by around 25,000 members on March 24, 1940, the historic Lahore Resolution was moved by Fazlul Haq (Bengal) and supported by Khaliquzzaman (UP), Zafar Ali Khan (Punjab), Aurangzeb (NWFP), and Haroon (Sindh).
It was passed “amidst unprecedented enthusiasm”, notes one observer. However, it is worth noting here that the passage of the resolution was not quite as unanimous as it is often projected. Sir Sikandar Hayat’s and hence Punjab’s support for the Lahore Resolution was not present right until the last moment. It was only a quid-pro-quo gesture by Quaid-e-Azam who looked the other way on Sikandar’s handling of the Khaksar Issue in Punjab that forced Sikandar to accede to the Lahore Resolution.
The resolution was amended in 1941 and, in its amended form, called for:
“…the establishment of complete independent states formed by demarcating geographically contiguous units into regions which shall be so constituted with such territorial adjustment as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Musalamans are numerically in majority as in the North-Western and North-Eastern zones of India, shall be grouped together and constitute independent states as Muslim Free National Homelands in which the constituent states shall be autonomous and sovereign…” [Malik, 2001]
The resolution further stressed that “in other parts of India where Mussalmans are in minority, adequate, effective, and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative, and other rights and interests in consultation with them.”
This resolution that ultimately came to be known as the Pakistan Resolution (although Muslim League initially objected to naming it as such for the fear that it may confused with Chaudhary Rehmat Ali’s scheme, and Hindu media and Congress forced the nomenclature to derail its support) was a turning point in the history of the Pakistan Movement. It focused Muslim public opinion and energized Muslim League’s efforts to organize itself like nothing else did.
Much of what happened between the passage of the Pakistan Resolution and the emergence of Pakistan is well-documented history. The Cripps Mission (1942), the Simla Conference (1945), and the Cabinet Mission (1946) tested Muslim resolve but failed to deter them from their chosen future. Mohammand Ali Jinnah, who had since emerged as the Quaid-e-Azam of the Muslims of the sub-continent, kept both British and Hindus at bay as he championed the cause of a homeland for Muslims.
Contrary to Congress’ insistence on it being representative of the interests of all Indians, the most principled—and perhaps logical—opposition to the Pakistan Resolution came from none other than Gandhi himself. Gandhi vehemently challenged Jinnah’s ‘two-nation’ theory, arguing that India was not a nation but a civilization. He pointed out that, even if the subcontinent were to be divided on the basis of religious nationalism, the new state of Pakistan would have to include a large number of Hindus, just as millions of Muslims would be left in India. The solution, he argued, lay not in division but in finding a way of accommodating the minorities. Yet this was precisely what Jinnah and many others had attempted to do and only having failed at it changed course over time.
Gandhi’s personality remains an enigma to many Muslims. His actions during the Khilafat Movement and the Gandhi-Jinnah talks completely belie the reconciliatory posture (including his stewardship of the rights of minority Muslims at the time of India’s independence) that he adopted toward the end of his life. Even if one gives credit to Gandhi for his late about-face on the whole Hindu-Muslim relation issue, he did not in any way proved himself capable of bringing about a real and meaningful change in Congress’ policies and politics toward Muslims.
Indeed, he paid the ultimate price for being “different” from his fellow countrymen when he was murdered in January 1948 by an extremist Hindu who was upset with his reconciliatory gestures towards the Muslims.
No wonder then that Maulana Abul Kalam Azad—India’s first Education minister after independence and one of India’s foremost Muslim leaders, secularist, and champion of Hindu Muslim Unity—in this autobiography “India Wins Freedom” indicts his closest colleagues in the Congress, Nehru and Patel, for their ‘mistakes’ and ‘failings’ which led to the terrible denouement of partition…and pronounced that the verdict of history would be ‘that India was divided not by the Muslim League but by Congress’. (Kudaiysia and Tang, 2000)
Fast Track Towards Pakistan
The 1945-46 elections in which Muslim League swept the Muslim reserved seats across India and established its credentials as the sole representative of Muslims of India proved to be the last straw for the hesitant British and the defiant Hindus. The writing was on the wall and the reality could not have been denied any longer. On June 3, 1946, India’s last Viceroy Mountbatten announced plans to divide India into two separate countries precisely as envisioned in the Pakistan Resolution.
Both India and Pakistan were to emerge as two dominions led by Governors General and having their own Constituent Assemblies. They would remain as dominions under the British Crown until the Constituent Assemblies passed their respective constitutions and proclaimed independence from the Crown.
Under the plan of India’s Independence, Pakistan came into being on August 14, 1947 as the only country in the world established to safeguard the interests of a religious community. It was also the first of the tens of nation-states that were to gain their independence in the post-colonial era. In his message to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, The King of England acknowledged the constitutionality of the Pakistan Movement when he said that “…in [thus] achieving your independence by agreement, you have set an example to all freedom-loving people throughout the world…”.
In many ways, the creation of Pakistan was the culmination of an epoch in Muslim history of India. It was also the beginning of a new era fraught with challenges and difficulties. The Pakistan that came into being was burdened with great human, social, political, and economic stresses. It was a country destined to fail, almost by design. India’s Prime Minister, Pandit Jawahar-Lal Nehru, would have it no other way and did not mince words in stating what was, to him, the very obvious. Indeed, it had only been Jinnah’s steadfast determination—almost bordering on rigid defiance, at times—and the popular demand of the Muslim masses that wrested Pakistan out of the British India.
The formidable challenge posed by the geographical absurdity of having two wings of a country separated by over a thousand miles of “enemy territory” is perhaps unparalleled in history. With the exception of a handful, the new country’s political leaders either lacked sincerity or were incapable of carrying the mantle of leadership forward. In an ironic twist of fate, majority of the people who needed Pakistan the most and really fought for independence found themselves on the wrong side of the border and while millions voted for Pakistan by the feet, tens of millions could not.
Why does this matter?
Why does it matter to look at Pakistan’s history with the ideological prism of the two nation theory, one may ask. Indeed, there are two basic criticisms to this approach towards historical analysis.
First, one group of the critics argue that the two nation theory has either never been a valid political theory in the first place or may have lost its meaning after the succession of East Pakistan in 1971. Indeed, they claim that the two nation theory was only contrived to serve the interests of the Muslim political-intellectual elite of India who constituted the main force behind the Muslim League and the brains behind the creation of Pakistan .
Second, another significant group contends that revisiting the ideology of Pakistan—of which, the two nation theory is a big part—is quite useless because Pakistan is now an established reality and going back in the past to revisit why and how it was created rather than working to realize its promise today is an exercise in futility.
Neither of these views, I believe, is either entirely correct or healthy for a meaningful political discourse in the country. By negating the existence of the two nation theory—whether as a legitimate political ideology or not—we deprive ourselves of discussing the ideological currents and political pragmatism that defined the political climate of the day and led to the creation of Pakistan. Similarly, by questioning the very utility of understanding how Pakistan was created, we deprive ourselves with the context within which to place the country’s later difficulties in leadership, governance, constitution-building, and ethnic relations.
The creation of Pakistan raised some very important questions:
- Was Pakistan really inevitable?
- Would the Muslims of the sub-continent have found a way to live and co-evolve peacefully and honorably with the Hindus if the latter had shown some willingness and open-mindedness to accept the legitimate rights of the minority?
- Was there something inherently undemocratic about the Pakistan demand?
- Were Muslims of sub-continent “one nation based on religion” or an agglomeration of multiple ethnic groups whose first loyalties were to their ethnicities?
- If so, what were the factors that brought about a temporary convergence of their interests?
- What was it that the proponents of Pakistan demand actually wanted to create and how was the country that came into being different from that?
- Did the idea of Pakistan leave room for multiple “legitimate” interpretations of sovereignty and autonomy, as had been claimed by smaller provinces ever since?
These and many other issues will become important triggers for coming events in the life of this new country. The next 19 episodes will cover this roller coaster of a history…
[This anchor post will be followed, through the week, with commentaries by other writers on the panel that may choose to write on any subject relevant to this period in Pakistani history. Please vist again to read these and tell us what you think? - Editor]
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I am quiet ignorant in field of political science and economics. However I would like to share my views on the first two questions asked. My observation is that these questions can be answered by looking at the current situation of minorities in India. Has Pakistan not been created, Muslims would have been in more-or-less the same state as they are in India presently. I infer this due to the following reasons or assumptions.
1. Even after partition large number of Muslims were still in India.
2. There is a history of hindu-muslim conflict in India before partition. We should observe an increase in these conflicts in number and in magnitude a few years before and after independence. But a decade or so after independence we should observe same conditions as pre-parition.
3. Current political conflict with Pakistan can be translated to the conflict between muslim majority and hindu majority provinces before partition.
4. Perhaps Kashmir conflict is an exception as pre-partition we cannot observe any issue related to Kashmir.
I would be nice to compile the statistics of Muslims in India regarding their population growth, their average salaries, status etc. Taking into constext different regions of India I think it will be possible to get an answer on the questions. Also if possible to get the data we can see how the trend of conflicts have gone during the years.
I am open to criticism.
Thankyou
Mobien
Just one comment regarding the seperation of east pakistan repudiating the two nations theory. I would suggest quite the contrary. Given an opportunity 24 years after the creation of Pakistan, the people of east bengal chose once more, and emphatically so without even a debate, to live as an independant country rather then the rejoin India. They thus chose not to “correct an error comitted without serious thought in the flush of emotions during the decade of 40’s”.
Mobien, the answer one hears from Indian Muslims to that point is the same as the “conspiracy theory” that the creation of Pakistan was an effort to divide the power of Muslims in the whole subcontinent. What Indian Muslims, especially in places like UP, say, is that they lost their intellectual cream to Pakistan. Imagine an independent India in which the people standing up for the community were not Mohammad Salahuddin, Imam Abdullah and Salahuddin Owaisi, but people like Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Abdur Rab Nishtar, Zafarullah Khan, Hussain Shaheed Suharwardy, and then the next generation had Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Mahbubul Haq, … and so on.
I am not saying I completely agree with that line of thinking, mind you; but I hear it from relatives in India all the time. My own father, who came over without any immediate family and had to struggle quite a bit, still maintains that he’d much rather be a struggling First Class citizen in Pakistan than a Second Class citizen in India. As I implied in my own commentary on Athar’s piece, the creation of Pakistan left the Muslims in today’s India with a bit of, for want of a better phrase, a guilty conscience and it is only now, in the third generation, the first not directly or indirectly connected to the partition, that I see (and this is my humble opinion based on anecdotal evidence) a generation coming up that is demanding their place at the table as unapologetic citizens like anyone else. However, one could say that had Pakistan not been created, this would be the case from the beginning…
As you can see, this kind of theoretical can go round in circles and that’s what makes it so frustrating.
Sabahat/Mobien:
Interesting point. I would tend to disagree a little bit with Sabahat’s contention that the Muslims of Pakistan could have contributed substantially to the betterment of Muslims of All India, had Pakistan not been made. Jinnah was virtually on his deathbed when Pakistan was created. It is highly unlikely that he would have done much. Others, really, they couldn’t do anything for Pakistan. I seriously doubt they could have done anything for Muslims of entire India against a much more disciplined and intelligent Congress Leadership. I think the major advantage that Muslims would have had if India had not divided would have been, not in leadership but, in numbers. Plus the mayhem that happened at partition wouldn’t have taken place and hence we would have held, perhaps, slightly less extreme views towards each other.
Anyways, to answer your question, Mobein, a year or so ago, there was a report produced on the state of Indian Muslims. It is commonly refered to as Sachar Report as it was produced by commission headed by Justice Sachar. I was able to find a link to a summary of that report:
http://www.milligazette.com/dailyupdate/2006/200612141_Sachar_Report_Status_Indian_Muslims.htm
The full report (6.5MB), while is linked below this summary, is not available. I tried finding it a few months ago but couldn’t. I was hoping that somebody else might be able to find and provide a link in one of these comments.
Salam Athar/All
Sachar report can be downloaded from http://www.sabrang.com/sachar/sacharreport.pdf
Regards
Jehanzeb
Again, to reiterate. I was not saying I hold that opinion, just reporting what I have heard from Indian Muslims and some Pakistanis.
To second the point of Asad Umar, separation of East Pakistan, by no means, invalidates the Two-nation theory. People can be grouped into nations according to different criterion - religion being one but not the only one. The Two-nation theory advocates that the differentiating factor between the Muslims and Hindus of the sub-continent is the religion, for all other social, political and cultural differences among them arise due to the religion. However, the Two-nation theory does not state that it is the only criterion that can be used to group the people of sub-continent. Thus, to say that by opting out of the state of Pakistan, Bengalis have negated the Two-nation theory, is not the right conclusion to draw in my opinion. Being a muslim does not mean there cannot be any other differences - ethnicity being one, in case of Bengalis; and if they chose to split up on these grounds, there is nothing wrong in it legally as well as ideologically, no matter how regretful it is for us Pakistanis. Its eventually the people’s decision.
Farooq, Sabahat et al.
I think the debate over whether the two nation theory was correct or wrong is probably going to remain forever inclusive. I also, to some extent, think that this is a wrong debate to have. Whether Hindus and Muslims are two nations, or two communities, or merely followers of two religions. That has little to do with whether they can or must live together. The proponents of the two nation theory point out to the treatment of Indian Muslims India after the partition and conclude that the theory was correct and that Muslims and Hindus cannot live together with peace and harmony. The critics of theory point to the several hundred years prior to the partition and conclude that Muslims and Hindus have lived together for so long and that their religion or nationality doesn’t matter.
In reality, though, I believe that that two nation theory is merely a name given to a set of very pragmatic set of political considerations of a particular time. By the way, It wasn’t only Jinnah who used the idea of different nationalities in India, even leaders of Congress was talking about two nations at that time, only that two nations to them were Indians and British.
I believe that the very pragmatic political considerations that ultimately drove Muslims of India to demand a separate homeland are amply evident our history. The Hindu-dominated Congress got several opportunities to accomodate the demands of Muslims–the last of which were the 1937 elections themselves. Instead of showing magnanimity towards other communities (most notably Muslims), they were more getting the independence from British that they desired.
Infact, one of the sole points of contention between Muslim League (and most notably, Jinnah) and Congress in the final years of the Indepedence movement was the latter’s absolute denial to acknowledge Muslim League as the representative of Muslims of India. To Qauid-e-Azam as well, and quite logically so, there was no possibility of negotiations with Congress without the it agreeing to Muslim League being a spokesman for Muslims.
In an ironic way, Congress, in its insistence of being the champion of a secular India, was so driven by the viewpoint of the majority (Hindu) that it failed to even see the other side’s viewpoint. In doing so the Congress acted like a typical super-power that is out of touch with the realities on the ground and unwilling to do a course correction.
I think these very pragmatic political considerations, and not the absolute impossibility of Muslims and Hindus living together at some ideological level, may have been the real determinants of the Pakistan movement.
I think that the question of validity of two-nation’s theory begs a bigger question. Should religion be our primary collective identity? Should it be our primary loyalty? Identity is a basic human need, but what should be the basis?
On one hand, we have religion, the “deen”, the “God’s will for the humanity” and the “all encompassing way of life”; all our evils are blamed to not following the shariah, and the intrinsic belief is that all will be fine if we follow the book. The set of laws is proclaimed perfect, coming from a divine, all knowing source, that knows all the needs of humans for the eternity. In this case, we identify ourselves with the religion.
On the other end of the spectrum is the argument of belief in human intellect, that humans as a society can figure out what is right and what is wrong for them; while at any given time the system may not be optimal, we might be able to find holes in it, over longer period of time the system moves forward. Nothing is divine, nothing is holy, nothing is sacred; its all what we, as a human society, decide and enforce as acceptable and not acceptable, and the definitions change over time, as we amend our perceived mistakes. There is room for decent, there is freedom for expression of new and contradicting ideas, that serves as the necessary ingredient for change and improvement; if we can convince a certain large subset, we can have the laws changed. In this case we identify ourselves with the humanity; pretty anonymous and humbling, yet empowering identity in my opinion.
The two-nations theory clearly chose the first identity; not in 1937, but much earlier, in Syed Ahmed Khan days, and in the days of inception of “Muslim” league. Creation of Pakistan was probably the shortest and fastest way to help a certain community at that time, but in my opinion, believing in the human intellect, and working to create an environment of tolerance, respect and coexistence would have been a much better long term solution.
Ironically, creation of Pakistan did not solve our identity problem. We, Pakistanis, find ourselves standing at the same cross-roads. Identify with the religion, or opt for a more human driven secular law. I don’t know what choice will we make this time. The shortcut, or the long term solution. Those of who stand for separation of religion and governance, find it hard to defend the stance given the choice that two-nations theory made; two nations theory was after all a theory of an Islamic nation and a non-Islamic one, not a theory of Pakistan and India. As a result, in the process of defending secularism, some of us find ourselves digging further and criticizing the two-nations theory and the prominent leaders of Pakistan movement, inviting further scorn from both the religious and patriotic right.
I some times feel that if you are among those supporting a secular Pakistan, you have no honest ally; it is hard to argue for a secular Pakistan and not criticize the creation of Pakistan by implication without some amount of self contradiction.
I love my country and I wish that Pakistanis become the bearers of belief in humanity and human intellect.
Pakistan Zindabad, Paidabad.
Mukarram, I agree with you when you say “if you are among those supporting a secular Pakistan, you have no honest ally; it is hard to argue for a secular Pakistan and not criticize the creation of Pakistan by implication without some amount of self contradiction”. The same is also evident from the Quaid’s adress to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in 1947 when he said “Muslims ceased to be Muslims, Hindus ceased to be Hindus….” and so on. Being a practical person as he was, he knew that so called “two nation theory” is something indefensible and impracticle that is probably why he took a complete U Turn and starting talking in the same language and terms as Congress was, but only after he had sucessfully achieved his goal of creating a homeland.
Another interesting point is the comparison between Pakistan and Isreal, the only states created in the name of religion. Ironically, both are dead enemies to each other. For pakistan and pakistanis its a point to ponder that how could they negate the creation of Israel when they justify the creation of their own country in the name of A RELIGION. Some might argue that Israel homes jews from outside the area whereas Pakistan was created for Indian Muslims. Well then our claim versus their is different only in terms amount and length of time. huh
*Were Muslims of sub-continent “one nation based on religion” or an agglomeration of multiple ethnic groups whose first loyalties were to their ethnicities?
I would like to answer this specific point. I think the whole region paid a heavy price for the ignorance of the Indian Muslims (for me the Indian Muslims were those muslims of the British India who hailed from the central and northern and north-eastern states of the British India, like upians and biharis and bengalis—The muslims of the north-western provinces, Pathans and Balochis specifically, never considered themselves as Indians and even Sindh has always been an independent entity) and is still paying it because the parah-likhas of UP and Bihar could not live together peacefully with their hindu neighbours.
Two nation theory is bogus. If a muslim of UP or Bihar was different from his Hindu neighbour just because he was the follower of a different religion, then one cannot overlook this fact that culturally he was altogether different from a Baloch or a Pathan or even from a sindhi, I mean only his religion was different from his hindu neighbour but culturaly they were same people, and blood is thicker than water, right?. Instead of living peacefully with his Hindu neighbour he decided to create Pakistan, migrated their and now find it difficult to live with his Sindhi and Pathan and Panjabi neighbours. These so-called ‘indian-mulsims’ have been playing their card of minority politics very successfuly for over a century and fooling other people. And if muslims and hindus are realy different then what about those mulsims who are still living in India?
Jinnah Papers: Documenting Partition
AFTER the question of Partition of India was settled in 1947, Mountbatten, the then Viceroy, noted in his personal record that the Indian leaders would regret the decision they had taken in haste. In his speech to the Constituent Assembly in Pakistan on August 11, 1947, Jinnah said, “Any idea of a united India could never have worked. In my judgement it would have led to a terrific disaster. May be that view is correct, may be it is not; only future will tell — that remains to be seen”.
To Nehru, it was the Partition but to Jinnah, it was a division. For the Muslim League it was a compromise but to the Congress, it was a settlement. Krishna Menon called it a “shock solution”. The Partition resulted in about half-a-million casualties, and the migration of about 12 million people. The kindest thing that can be said about those who took such momentous decisions for the destiny of millions then that they knew not what they were doing. Statesmen who was make no allowance for the unforeseeable, mortgage the future of their country.
A spate of historical literature has appeared on Partition of India. A grandiose publication, Transfer of Power in 12 volumes covering five years, (1942-47), each volume containing about a thousand pages, unfolds how British policy was hammered out week by week, day by day, hour by hour. This work edited by Nicholas Mansergh, formerly Smunts Professor of the History of British Commonwealth, University of Cambridge, is wonderfully a solid performance. Of course, the perspective is British!
Indian political leaders appear in these volumes as social climbers, trembling poltroons, small petty lawyers and banias fighting over trifles, while the British high-ranking officials imbued with a lofty sense of duty and rectitude were advancing India’s cause of self-government. Mansergh completed these 12 volumes in 13 years.
As a counterprise, to give an Indian point of view, Indian Council of Historical Research planned in 1976 to produce and publish documents entitled Towards Freedom, covering the period, 1937-47. During these 22 years only two volumes have appeared; the first in 1985, and it is due to the initiative of the present Chairman of the Council, Professor Settar that the second volume in three parts appeared early this year.
The Jamia Hamdard, Delhi, planned to bring out three volumes on the Partition, covering the period, 1937-47. The first volume, 1937-39, published early this year edited by S.A.I. Tirmazi contains 537 documents using some portion of the Quaid-i-Azam papers but in this plethora of diverse documentation Mr Jinnah lies hidden. I have said Mr Jinnah. When the Aligarh Muslim University wanted to confer on him the degree of Doctor of Laws in 1944, he declines it saying that he was known as Mr Jinnah and would die as Mr Jinnah, nothing more, and nothing less.
Although history may often seem to be a scientific study of the past, its interpretation, however much we may refine our techniques of historical analysis, remains stubbornly national than we often realise. To counterprise our national prejudices, we have to re-examine our pre-suppositions and see the other side of the case. What was really Mr Jinnah’s case? Therefore the study of 80,000 pages of the Quaid-i-Azam papers which has 23 volumes of newspapers, and personal clippings is central to the historian’s interests.
Jinnah was a man of few words. He wrote no book. He kept no diary. He produced no memoir. He did not go to prison. A prison is often the nursery of memoirs. He was not known as a prodigy of learning. At times his silences baffled others. Nothing could fathom him. He confided in no one except, in Raja of Muhmudabad, Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan and of course, Sir B.N. Rud until their relations soured, when the latter became the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. Jinnah wrote when necessary. Law books he read for his profession, particularly those relating to property and company law. He did not tidy up his correspondence like Nehru with an eye on posterity. His favourite book from which he often quoted in his public speeches — for this man who was often dubbed as obstinate and most uncompromising — was John Morley’s book entitled Compromise published first in 1874, an exposition of liberal principles, which emphasises that compromise is to politics, what devotion is to friendship.
The National Archives of Pakistan has brought out the first series of Jinnah paper comprising two volumes in three parts. Originally Dr I.H. Qureshi, sometime Professor of History, at St Stephens, and later Vice-Chancellor, Karachi University, initiated the idea of compiling and publishing Jinnah papers. He took up the matter with President Ayub Khan who approved the proposal, but it was General Zia-ul-Haq who provided the infrastructure. Dr Z.A. Zaidi, a senior researcher in the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, was appointed the Editor to undertake this work. He has brought out these volumes in 30 years.
Strangely enough, these volumes are published in reverse order, i.e. from 1947 which is like putting a cart before a horse, denying the reader a consecutive picture of the evolution of Pakistan through successive stages. Volume I (in two parts), Prelude to Pakistan, covers the period, February 20 — June 20, 1947. The text comes to 1800 pages. The second part consists of 14 appendices containing extracts from Mansergh’s Transfer of Power volumes and newspapers such as Dawn and Pakistan Times, etc.
There is nothing startlingly new in these documents and they add little to our understanding of Jinnah, and his politics and strategy. Only on three or four themes there is new documentary material drawn chiefly from India Office Records and Churchill papers at Cambridge. It is a pity that Zaidi, though mainly based in London, has completely ignored the valuable Intelligence Department reports ‘Loss of Control’ which Patrick French has recently used in his work Liberty or Death.
These volumes are limited to the period from February 20 to June 30, 1947. Jinnah’s interminable negotiations with the British, his bitter wrangling with the Congress, his total involvement in the civil disobedience movement in Punjab and North-West Frontier left little time to him for correspondence. Of the 1071 letters published in these volumes, his letters number 125. His letters deal with matters of trifling nature such as thanking his donors, congratulating his party workers, sending goodwill wishes to political organisations, giving instruction to his bankers and dealing with his property and shares. The title “Jinnah papers” is a misnomer. Jinnah is mostly a recipient of letters than a letter-writer. He appears supremely an elusive presence throughout on the margin rather than at the centre of affairs.
Some historians insist that Jinnah did not want Pakistan nor did he will it. Nor was he responsible for it; it was, however, the only possible outcome, a product of the curious circumstances for which the chief responsibility lay with the Congress. The first protagonist of the view was Ayesha Jalal, the author of The Sole Spokesman. Jalal tells us what Jinnah did not want, but doesn’t tell us what really he wanted. Jalal presents Jinnah as a sad, lonely dying man, utterly helpless, overpowered by events, looking like a sick eagle at the sky. These documents completely dispel this notion.
Jinnah was completely in command of the situation. He was determined to fight for Pakistan. He told Mountbatten on April 3, 1947, that he would have a few acres of the said desert provided it was his own. With great feeling he wrote in May 1947 on a piece of paper meant for himself which Zaidi has reproduced. Jinnah wrote “Pakistan means not only a matter of power and security, of loaves and fishes; there are things of the spirit involved in it. It means sovereignty of people and it will be all that it stands for. Will not people say with those Arabs who said, ‘What does it matter, how weak and poor our homelands are, if only we are masters in them’ (Vol. I, Document No. 516).
Mountbatten has been strongly criticised by historians in Pakistan and England for what they call a sinister design on his part in altering the India-Pakistan boundary at the last stage. Zaidi’s volume throws light on this controversial question, Zaidi has drawn evidence from India Office Records which he has partly used ignoring what exists in the Transfer of Power volumes.
Sir Cyril Radcliffe was appointed the Chairman of the Boundary Commission to delimit the India-Pakistan boundary. He was Lord Chancellor Jowett’s nominee. Jinnah had suggested his name first. Nehru had wanted Maurice Gwyer to be the Chairman. Radcliffe had never visited India before. He knew no Indian language, nor did he possess Raginald Coupland’s grasp of the Indian constitutional problem. A brilliant Oxford product, and a reputed lawyer, he was known for his long stretches of silences. In India he didn’t meet any political leader. He did not attend any hearing of the claimants to the disputed areas. Motilal Setalwad told him then the entire procedure adopted by him in respect of the Boundary Commission proceedings was strange and farcical. Radcliffe completed his work in 36 days, left India having destroyed his papers. Later when asked whether he would return to India, said “God forbid, not even if they ask me. I expect they would shoot me out of hand, both sides”.
The question is whether Mountbatten persuaded Radcliffe to alter the boundary award. Was Radcliffe made a scapegoat in Mountbatten’s hands ? This issue was raised in the British Parliament, and later in the United Nations in 1948. Curiously enough, V.P. Menon is silent about it in his books.
The documents in Jinnah papers show that the Radcliffe Award almost corresponded with the detailed demarcation of the boundary made by Wavell on February 7, 1946, which he communicated to the Secretary of State, Pethick-Lawrence. The proposed boundary outline that Wavell despatched was actually drawn by V.P. Menon and B. N. Rau, thereby including the Muslim majority areas of the district of Gurdaspur, and Amritsar. The matter does not rest there. There is in Zaidi’s volume K.M. Pannikar’s note The Next Step which readily provided a starting point for the Menon-Rau delimitation of the boundary. Pannikar, a veritable opportunist of the first order, who nurtured ambitions of being appointed the Viceroy’s constitutional advisor, wrote a note that the country be partitioned and he laid down the guiding principles for the division of Punjab and Bengal.
Pannikar did not append his signatures to the note, two copies of which were sent in the names of his friend Guy Wint and Freda Martin (Mn Guy Wint) to Wavell and Cripps. They form a part of the correspondence exchanged on January 11, 1946, between Sir William Croft, Deputy Under-Secretary at the Indian office and Sir David Monteath, the permanent Under-Secretary. It was thus Menon-Rau note based on Pannikar’s communication which provided almost a readymade material for Radcliffe to prepare his award. The point is that in examining the factors underlying British policy in the period under study it is not so much to Whitchall that we must look but to varied local pressures in India as well as to the harsh force of circumstances and the initiatives of certain individuals holding pivotal position who exercise influence on the formation of policy.
These volumes confirm that it was Winston Churchill who finally persuaded Jinnah to accept the Partition plan. Churchill remained consistent in his hatred towards India and the Congress. These volumes show that Jinnah was closely in touch with Churchill. Jinnah had met Churchill on May 22, 1947, a little more than a week before the Partition plan was to be announced. Zaidi has used Churchill papers, and some part of Mountbatten’s papers in the Transfer of Power volumes.
Historians have wondered who this Elizabeth Gilliat was whom Jinnah was writing to occasionally. For long it was thought that it was a fictitious name that Churchill adopted. These volumes clear the mist. Elizabeth Gilliat was Churchill’s Secretary. Jinnah was adopting dilatory tactics in accepting the Partition plan as he was opposed to the partitions of Punjab and Bengal. Zaidi does not, however, include other documents relevant to Churchill’s message which Mountbatten conveyed to Mountbatten. This message is available in the Transfer of Power volumes. The message was to threaten Jinnah that all British troops would be taken away from India, if Jinnah didn’t accept the Partition plan. Churchill had added, ‘By God, Jinnah is the only man who’s can’t do without British help’.
It has almost remained a mystery why the Prime Minister of Punjab, Khizer Hayat Tiwana who was bitterly opposed to the Muslim League. Suddenly resigned on March 2, 1947, to the chagrin of the Congress and Akali leaders whom he didn’t care to consult. It must be emphasised that the Unionist Ministry wouldn’t have lasted due to the popular Civil Disobedience Movement in Punjab. The documents in Volume I show that it was Jinnah’s emissary Sir Mohammed Zafarulla who persuaded Khizer not to betray his community in the hour of trial. It appears that the letter of resignation was drafted by Sir Zafarulla.
There is ample evidence in these volumes (particularly in 2nd part of Vol. I) drawn chiefly from the newspapers Dawn and Pakistan Times that Jinnah masterminded the Civil Disobedience Movement in Punjab and the North Western Frontier. His object was to topple the Khizer and Khan Sahib ministries and to disturb the communal ratio in Assam so that he could grab for Pakistan the largest possible area. In this the designs of the two members of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, Abdul Rab Nishter and Ghaznafer Ali Khan are laid bare. The Civil Disobedience Movement had a popular support in which large number of students of Aligarh Muslim University, burqa-clad women, Pirs and Sajjada-Nashin participated. The newspaper material is extremely valuable which is not available in this country, though, sadly enough, extracts from Urdu newspapers and journals are omitted.
This work suffers from a lack of proper editing and annotation. For example, the reader is at a loss to know who. K. Rallia Ram is, a fervent correspondent, who informs Jinnah regularly about the political developments in Punjab. The editor has not cared to identify even Riaz Piracha who became later the Foreign Secretary, Pakistan. In 1946 he was the President of the Punjab Muslim Students Federation. Riaz Piracha is prepared to give up his studies in order to fight for the cause of Pakistan. There are quite a number of individuals flitting across the pages but no attempt is made to identify them.
Jinnah had the habit of making some doodles at times, but he wrote short notes for his own use — these may be called “dispersed meditation”, to use Francis Bacon’s expression. One of these notes reads as follows:
Money lost — nothing lost
Courage lost — much lost
Honour lost — most lost
Soul lost — all lost (Vol. II, p. 257).
To sum up, uncomfortably bulky as these volumes are, a scrappy collection of documents, some of its valuable material can be easily found in the specialised publications. The whole work lacks sense of direction, a clear-cut design. The documents are listed neither chronologically nor thematically. The index is inadequate, and the references are too perfunctory to be of any value. It lacks Mansergh’s almost suffocatingly thorough cross-references. The documentation is ruthlessly selective and aggressively tendentious but it is a pioneering documentary work published in Pakistan on the Partition. One is grateful for Zaidi’s immense labours but they were not usefully directed.
Mobien, you might find my earlier post useful. See below for the text:
The Two-Nation Theory was the basis for the Partition of India in 1947. It stated that Muslims and Hindus were two separate nations by every definition, and therefore Muslims should have an autonomous homeland in the Muslim majority areas of British India for the safeguard of their political, cultural and social rights, within or without a United India.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-Nation_Theory
Pakistan’s Muslim population today: 140,278,140 ie, 97.0% of total population
India’s Muslim population today: 144,198,760 ie, 14.0% of total population
Source: http://www.factbook.net/muslim_pop.php
Considering the facts above, we have more muslims in post-parition-India than Pakistan. Does that sound like objective and ideology of Pakistan was a woolly? What gives Pakistan the right to let the larger Muslim population of the reigon to suffer under Hindus? OR rightfully why do we still continue to exist as Pakistan? Isn’t the basis now all folly?
Interestingly, IF there was no Pakistan then today Muslims would be approx 28% population of India. A major minority in secular India whose Prime Minister is Sikh and President is Muslim.
My two cents.
As Mr. Faisal has provided the population distribution of today’s Pakistan and India it should be amply clear that the Pakistan experiment was a futile one for following reasons.
1) Pakistan’s premise was Pakistan for Muslim was intrinsically immoral on the grounds that whatever geographical areas were going to be Pakistan would have had substantial numbers Hindus, native to that region. Which by the premise of Pakistan are unwelcome citizens by the very definition. On what moral grounds would a person of the soil be considered unwelcome on her own soil?
2) If Pakistan was meant for Muslims, what was its obligation to the Muslims of the whole India? Was it obliged to facilitate the migration of each and every willing Muslim living in the pre-partition India? Was that a practical commitment? If not what was promise of Pakistan?
3) It should have occurred to the elite that there would be a substantial fraction of Muslim left within the borders of the new India. If the elite had been so convinced of the plight of Muslims in independent India, where was their consideration for the Muslims who would have been left behind? Additionally by the act of mere partition what additional burdens were the Muslim elite burdening the left behind Muslims?
4) The leadership had not considered these vital issues. This leaves us with an arguable conclusion that the Muslim leadership was only concerned about what was good for itself and not as purportedly the good of the Muslim community. While I am sure there was a good segment of the clerics, perhaps the majority that was dogmatic about the scripture, the so called non-theocratic leadership found it useful to take the cover provided by the clerical bigots. They all conspired to be the big fish in a small pond rather than be small fish in an Ocean that was India.
5) The conclusions of my previous bullet are well proven by the fact that Pakistan, sans about 10 - 15 years perhaps, has had a Khaki rule for the past 63 years. Creation of Pakistan has not been a complete boon to all the muslim communities within Pakistan either. After 63 years there isn’t single week that doesn’t pass without a Shia mosque being bombed or vandalized, etc, etc.
6) After 63 years people of other religions have voted with their feet. Which is very evident from the population distribution. That begs the question, how can a country make the sons and daughter’s of the soil feel unwelcome. What protections has sit provided to the minorities? Wasn’t it incumbent upon the leadership that had argued that its community would suffer under Hindu hegemony, to enshrine the very same guarantees that it was afraid it would not have been accorded, for its minorities? wasn’t that leadership morally decrepit and hypocritical in failing to do the same, that it wanted for itself?
7) In retrospect, looking at India, wouldn’t Shia or an Ahmedia, wonder if they would have been better off, if only their parents or grandparents had opted to stay back in India? While there are periodic religious riots, aren’t the Muslims in India feel that they do get a fair shake there. After all some of the most richest people in India are also Muslims, across all walks of life. For all its faults, secular India seems to have provided more equitable opportunities to Muslims, than Pakistan due to its shriveled economy.
9) I know one cannot put the toothpaste back in the tube, however it is incumbent of the educated and the elite of Pakistan to introspect about the folly of the two nation policy. This should be unvarnished for your country to make any progress and to hold the current leadership accountable.
You all are fake.
fakers.